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ABSTRACT !!
ACTORS, LEGAL FORMATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN ISLAMIC 
BANKING AND ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN TURKEY !!
ÖZGÜR RAHŞAN ÇETREZ !
Ph.D. Dissertation, January 2016 !
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Özgecan Koçak !!
Keywords: organizational forms, authenticity, Islamic banking, organic agriculture, Turkey !!
This dissertation investigates how new organizational forms with explicit moral claims take 
shape as various actors make, revise, and evaluate symbolic claims and concrete practices. 
To this end, I inductively examine Islamic banking and organic agriculture in Turkey 
throughout their history spanning three decades to understand how Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture are conceptualized, codified into law, translated into commercial 
products, and communicated to various audiences. 
I find that in both industries the question of ‘alignment’ to an ‘ideal’, the ideal being 
informed by the alternative codes of, Islamic law in the case of Islamic banking, and the 
rules of Nature in the case of organic agriculture was persistent throughout the history of 
these industries. Debates over authenticity of practices, definitions and purposes in relation 
to the ‘ideal’ included deliberate discussions of the sources and the nature of that ‘ideal’ 
facilitating ever detailed accounts of the ‘ideal’ and influencing the practices and the law 
and regulations along the way. 
In explicating the connection between construction of meanings and practices and their 
relation to authenticity, this dissertation provides insights into how authenticity concerns as 
conforming to a sacralized ideal play out in the trajectory of new organizational forms with 
moral claims. !
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ÖZET !!
TÜRKİYE’DE KATILIM BANKACILIĞI VE ORGANİK TARIMDA AKTÖRLER, 
KANUNİ OLUŞUM VE OTANTİSİTE !!
ÖZGÜR RAHŞAN ÇETREZ !
Doktora Tezi, Ocak 2016 !
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özgecan Koçak !!
Anahtar Kelimeler: örgütsel biçimler, otantisite, Katılım Bankacılığı, organik tarım, 
Türkiye !!
Etik değerlere dayalı yeni örgütsel biçimlerin nasıl şekillendiğine odaklanan bu çalışmada, 
Türkiye’de katılım bankacılığının ve organik tarımın başlangıçlarından itibaren otuz yıllık 
süreçleri tümevarım kalitatif çalışma yöntemi ile incelenmiş ve katılım bankacılığının ve 
organik tarımın nasıl kavramsallaştığı, kanunlarla nasıl tanımlandığı ve çeşitli aktörlerce 
nasıl anlaşıldığı ve anlatıldığı araştırılmıştır. 
Çalışma sonucunda, katılım bankacılığında İslam Hukukuna dayalı bir ideal banka ve 
ekonomi anlayışının ve organik tarımda Doğanın işleyiş kanunlarını temel alan bir ideal 
tarım ve üretim anlayışının bu iki endüstrinin şekillenmesindeki çok boyutlu rolleri 
bulunmuştur. Her iki endüstride de uygulamaların, tanımların ve benimsenen etik değerlerin 
ideal modellere uygunluğu, bir başka ifadeyle otantikliği hem şekilleri hem maksatları 
yönünden tartışılagelmiş ve ideal modellerin kendileri ve dayandığı temeller de bu 
tartışmalara konu edilmiştir. Çeşitli aktörlerin dahil olduğu bu tartışmalar hem katılım 
bankacılığında hem organik tarımda uygulamaları ve kanuni süreç ve tanımları etkilemekle 
kalmayıp, ideal modellerin de zamanla daha ayrıntılanmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. 
Uygulamalar, tanımlar ve bunları ideal modellere uyumlu kılma çabaları arasındaki 
ilişkileri ortaya koyan bu çalışma, otantisite kaygısının etik değerlere dayalı yeni örgütsel 
biçimlerin şekillenmesindeki rolününün anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. !
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1. !!
1. INTRODUCTION !!!!
This dissertation investigates how a new organizational form takes shape as various 
actors make, revise, and evaluate symbolic claims and concrete practices. Symbolic claims 
involve those relating to moral basis, solidarity, sustainability, social welfare, and identity. 
Concrete practices include the legal framework of regulation, and the formal definition of 
products and services. I inductively examine organic agriculture and Islamic banking in 
Turkey throughout their history spanning three decades to understand how the concepts of 
organic agriculture and Islamic banking are conceptualized, codified into law, translated 
into commercial products, and presented to various audiences. 
The goal of my research project is to understand dynamics of new organizational 
forms that invoke explicit moral foundations. Organic agriculture and Islamic banking 
propose a change in the process of agriculture and banking respectively for the sake of 
common good. Organic agriculture is concerned with establishing agricultural practices that 
is good for human, animal and environmental health. Islamic banking is involved in 
creating interest-free financial transactions that conform to Islamic rule of prohibition of 
interest that is also claimed to be a better practice for social and economic viability. Both 
are informed by the alternative codes of, Islamic law in the case of Islamic banking, and the 
rules and models in nature in the case of organic agriculture. Moreover, Islamic banking 
involves political and ideological challenges regarding its moral ground, Islamic law, as it 
is situated on a historical fault line characterized by ever-present tension between secular 
ideology and Islam in Turkey. Thus, Islamic banking and organic agriculture are similar in 
terms of an explicit reference to laws, rules and models in Islamic law and nature 
respectively, yet different in terms of the degree of political and ideological contestation 
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around those laws, rules and models. This provides an opportunity to examine the influence 
of such contestations in the trajectory of industries. 
How do general and abstract sets of governing rules inform specific and concrete 
practices? In particular, how do discussions of religion and nature figure in the techniques 
of banking and agriculture respectively? The conversations regarding Islamic law as 
informing the practices of Islamic banking always extend to discussions of Islamic law 
itself and spill over to discussions on society and human being. Similarly, the discussions of 
society and human being are in tandem with the discussions of practices in organic 
agriculture and references to how nature works. How do actors imagine and create 
alternative models for banking or agriculture? How do they associate their practices in the 
present with ideals that are said to have prevailed in the past? 
To understand the nature of these associations, I attend to key actors and the main 
conversations among them in Islamic banking and organic agriculture. I find one way of 
association is to refuse the dichotomies between modern economy and Islam, or technology 
and nature and claim that Islamic models and models informed by nature are compatible 
with modern life. In this conceptualization, the emphasis is on the claims that the modern 
concerns such as social and economic development are compatible with Islamic models and 
environmentalism. Modern conventional techniques are claimed to be falling short for 
satisfying these concerns. In these accounts, Islamic banking and organic agriculture are 
answers to these shortcomings. Practices of financing and agriculture are modified by 
taking out interest and harmful agricultural inputs and re-defined as moral as well as 
effective forms in terms of social and environmental and eventually economic impacts. In 
these accounts, practices based on Islamic law, and the rules of nature ensure better social 
and economic outcomes by putting certain limits on the activities believed to be causing 
harm and injustice such as interest based financing and chemical agricultural inputs. 
This is not the only account of Islamic banking or organic agriculture however. In the 
second kind of accounts, actors drawing from the same source, Islamic law or the rules of 
nature imagine a new social order along with new models of banking and agriculture. They 
criticize the first account fiercely as replicating the very same forms and relations to which 
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Islamic banking or organic agriculture is believed to be in opposition. For these actors, 
Islamic banking or organic agriculture is not merely new conceptualizations of moral and 
effective financing or agricultural methods. Instead, they are versions of conventional 
products and practices re-packaged as ‘Islamic’ or ‘natural’, without truly transforming 
assumptions and relations embedded within those products and practices. 
Actors taking this point of view instead hope that Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture serve as midwives for an entirely different social organization and human 
model. The fundamental feature of this different order in both Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture is the notion of interconnectedness; humans are in relation to fellow humans and 
all the existing things within and beyond physical world. This relatedness fosters caring, 
justice and solidarity forming the basis of community which is thought to be eroded within 
capitalist society against which these imageries are positioned. In these accounts, Islamic 
banking or organic agriculture is against a system that separates human from community 
and nature, economic relations and production from social relations and all of them from 
the governing rules of the Divine and Nature respectively. 
In these accounts, an Islamic model of banking should go beyond conceptualizing an 
alternative to a Western institution; it should also be about conceptualizing an alternative to 
the capitalist order within which the conventional banking was formed. Risk sharing, or 
participation to losses and profits is not only the fundamental organizing principle of 
Islamic banking but the organizing principle of society. In such a society, humans are not 
self-interested rational individuals as conceived in capitalist order, but are in relation to 
others caring about the well being of fellow humans as conceived in ‘Islamic’ order. As 
such, Islamic banking challenges the assumptions regarding human nature and society and 
not only the way the banking is performed. 
Similarly an agricultural model based on local knowledge, local seed and biodiversity 
is a model for organizing society where humans are embedded in relation with all animate 
and inanimate things. Only understanding of this relationship can foster a social organizing 
that is connected and in harmony with nature. This conceptualization of human and society 
is contrasted with consumer-human who do not know what or why he consumes and is 
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unaware of the larger affects of his actions on society and nature. As such, organic 
agriculture challenges the very assumption about the human - nature relationship and places 
human squarely with all other beings at the same level and not above them. 
My research has revealed that two distinct understandings of Islamic banking and 
also of organic agriculture against an incumbent system manifest itself in the main debates 
within and around each industry. Incumbent system in both accounts refers to conventional 
banking or agriculture as well as capitalism, urbanization, industrialization, secularism or 
modernization, depending on the arguments being made. In the first kind of accounts, 
Islamic banking or organic agriculture is complementary, filling a gap within the system, or 
serving the needs of previously excluded people on the grounds of their beliefs or 
preferences. In the second kind of accounts, Islamic banking or organic agriculture is 
alternative and in opposition to the larger system itself, it is about establishing a social 
order based on solidarity and justice. In both accounts, the discussions of practices, formal 
definitions, the system, the ideal, and the sources of that ideal are enmeshed and carried out 
with the assessments and criterions of ideal in relation to, explicitly but not exclusively, 
rules of the Divine or Nature. 
The subject and findings of this dissertation connect with four streams of research 
examining new organizational forms and changes in organizational forms and practices: 
research on institutional logics, research on the role of social movements in creating new 
organizational fields, research on emergence and use of market categories and research on 
organizational authenticity. In the remainder of this chapter I first summarize these 
theoretical perspectives in relation to how change in organizational forms has been 
conceptualized. Next, I elaborate this dissertation’s specific contributions in relation to 
particular issues in the studies of new organizational forms. I conclude with an outline to 
the following chapters. 
!!!!!
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1.1. Studies of New Organizational Forms !!!
Scholars using the frameworks of institutional theory, social movements and research 
on market categories in the study of new forms and practices invoke logics, culture, frames, 
and/or identity as symbolic resources utilized to create meanings and boundaries. Common 
to this research stream is that establishing category features and its boundaries is a 
collective process involving producers and their audiences such as consumers, 
intermediaries, state and rivals with varying preferences over the meaning and the 
boundaries of the category (Negro, Koçak and Hsu, 2010; Vergne and Wry, 2014). 
Institutional logic perspective posits that institutions have a central logic, “a set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organizing principles 
that provides individuals with vocabularies of motives and with a sense of self” (Friedland 
and Alford, 2012: 248, 251). “Logics, in other words, provide guidelines on how to 
interpret and function in social situations” (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and 
Lounsbury, 2011: 318). Organizations, organizational fields and professions operate in 
multiple institutional spheres meaning that they are typically under plural and usually 
conflicting institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 2012). An organization that is under 
the influence of incompatible expectations of multiple institutional logics face institutional 
complexity (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). Recently 
scholars started to delineate the institutional complexity suggesting that organizational field 
level characteristics (e.g. maturity, stability, the number of uncoordinated organizations or 
social actors influencing the field, centralization) and organizational attributes (e.g. position 
in a field, size, identity, hiring practices) as well as the individual level factors (e.g. 
individuals’ intra- and extra- organizational relations and interdependency among 
individuals) shape the form and intensity of institutional complexity that organizations 
experience (Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Besharov and Smith, 2014). 
The question of how organizations respond to institutional complexity, i.e. 
incompatible multiple institutional logics is the main research interest within institutional 
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logics perspective and generally linked to understanding heterogeneity and change within 
and among organizations and organizational fields. More specifically the studies of 
institutional logics and institutional complexity are linked to the process of institutional 
change (e.g. Dunn and Jones, 2010; Haveman and Rao, 1997; Thornton, 2002), strategic 
responses of organizations (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Pache and Santos, 
2010) and the studies of hybridity in practices, identities and organizations (e.g. Battilana 
and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; Jay, 2013). 
The first line of exploration, linking institutional logics and institutional change, 
examines how dominant institutional logics within a domain shift, are replaced or sustained 
usually as a function of exogenous forces and the interests and activities of certain actors. 
In studies that emphasize power relations among actors, contestation over symbolic or 
material sources among different actors adhering to different logics initiates emergence of 
or changes in practices, forms and organizational fields (e.g. Leblebici, Salancik, Copay 
and King, 1991; Seo and Creed, 2002). From this perspective, misalignment between the 
institutional arrangements and interests and needs of actors who are the subject of those 
arrangements provides impetus for institutional change. In studies emphasizing cultural 
processes, institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988) realize and make use of the 
conflicts among multiple institutions that become salient in a domain to further their 
interests or understandings of the practice or forms. Contradictions or contestations among 
institutional logics within a profession or organizational field usually become salient 
through exogenous and endogenous influences such as historical context, the changes in 
adjacent professions or organizational fields that have an overlap with the focal domain and 
the new entrants to field. 
The second line of exploration, suggesting competing institutional logics provide a 
latitude for strategic organizational response to institutional complexity, examines what 
those strategic responses are and how they are determined (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Kraatz and 
Block, 2008; Pache and Santos, 2010). Kraatz and Block (2008) describe that organizations 
may try to eliminate the pluralism (by denying validity of external expectations, attempting 
to co-opt the entities that have contradictory demands, challenging the legitimacy of those 
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entities); compartmentalize them (by creating separate units that attend to different 
institutional logics) or control the pluralism (by playing out different constituencies against 
one another or facilitating a cooperative solution). Relying on Oliver’s (1991) typology, 
Pache and Santos (2010) propose that organizations may acquiesce, compromise, avoid, 
defy or manipulate the institutional demands. Their specific contribution is linking these 
strategic responses to the nature of institutional conflicts (conflicts over means or goals) 
and the degree to which the conflicts are represented within the organization. They propose 
that organizations “resort to more resistant strategies when facing conflicting institutional 
demands related to goals than when facing conflict related to means” (Pache and Santos, 
2010: 469). This is because, they argue, means (processes and actions) are potentially more 
flexible and negotiable compared to goals that reflect the core system of values. 
The third line of exploration of institutional complexity focuses upon how multiple 
logics are reflected in the organization’s structures, activities and processes and linked to 
the hybrid organizing (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Battilana and 
Lee, 2014). Besharov and Smith (2014) delineate institutional complexity by proposing two 
dimensions, logic compatibility and logic centrality, to explain the heterogeneity in how 
multiple logics manifest in organizations. They conceptualize logic compatibility as “the 
extent to which the instantiations of logics imply consistent and reinforcing organizational 
actions” and logic centrality as “the degree to which multiple logics are each treated as 
equally valid and relevant to organizational functioning” (Besharov and Smith, 2014: 367, 
369). Their framework links variance along these two dimensions within organizations to 
field, organizational and individual level factors such as number of professional institutions 
at the field level, hiring and socializing practices at the organizational level and the 
characteristics of relationships at the individual level rather than the actual contents of the 
logics themselves. What Besharov and Smith’s work implies in terms of hybrid 
organizations is that hybrids differ in their proneness to contestation due to multiple 
institutional logics they instantiate depending on the dimensions of logic compatibility and 
logic centrality. According to their framework, low compatibility/high centrality yields 
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contested hybrids while high compatibility/high centrality yields minimal conflict with the 
potential for logic blending within organizations (Besharov and Smith, 2014). 
Explicit or implicit in these studies and in general in institutional framework, the new 
form or practice must acquire legitimacy to survive, that is, it must be perceived as 
desirable, proper or appropriate by those who have the sources the new venture needs 
(Suchman, 1995). Institutional entrepreneurs or change agents use framing, rhetorical 
strategies (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) and stories (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001) as 
means of crafting new identities, facilitating change and/or acquiring legitimacy (Battilana, 
Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009). 
Social movement theories applied to the emergence of new forms highlight collective 
action of producers and/or activists that brings about change in markets or industries. 
Similar to institutional entrepreneurs in institutional logic perspective, albeit with explicit 
oppositional agendas, these collective actors utilize cultural resources usually referred to as 
frames or codes that provide ‘schemata of interpretation’ and link beliefs and identities to 
actions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008 ; Soule, 2012). Cultural frames in this perspective 
are usually political, in opposition to dominant frames and product of collective 
sensemaking. Frames define problems, provide solutions and motivate and garner support 
by appealing to shared grievances and desires (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014).  
Empirical research using social movements perspective in the study of form 
emergence and change usually invoke identity concept as the basis of contestation and 
political struggle. Cultural frames help constructing or reshaping collective identities and 
promote changes in practices and forms usually in relation to dominant institutional forms 
and practices. In studies using both social movements and institutional perspective, cultural 
frames are usually conceived as carriers of higher schemata or institutional logics to inform 
action. Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey (2008), for example, provide an account of how 
activists by using cultural codes of sustainability, authenticity, and naturalness constructed 
and mobilized an alternative logic in the creation of market for grass-fed meat and dairy 
products in the United States. Rao, Monin, and Durand, (2003) depict how identity 
movements in the professions valuing individual autonomy led elite chefs to abandon 
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dominant logic associated with classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine in France. Lounsbury, 
Ventresca and Hirsch (2003) in their study of for-profit recycling industry in US explicate 
how recycling movement enabled the industry formation by reframing recyclables as 
commodities that produced a common ground for collaboration among constituents. 
Research on emergence and use of market categories within the organizational 
ecology tradition uses categories to understand organization - environment relations and 
conceive categories as part of the cultural and material environment that define audience 
perceptions of organizational identities and forms. Categories give meaning to actors and 
products, inform collective identities and constrain or enable market outcomes (Negro et 
al., 2010). Categories and classification systems influence and are influenced by 
perceptions of market audiences such as consumers, producers and critics although the 
power and agency of a given participant may vary (Negro et al., 2010). The empirical 
studies in this research stream focus on how categories as meaning systems emerge, 
become legitimate, change, and shape market behavior and market outcomes with a main 
focus on the latter. In studies invoking both categories and institutional logics, and 
categories and social movements, categories are perceived as middle ground between logics 
or frames and organizations and organizational actors that are proximate to actors and 
amenable to manipulation (Vergne and Wry, 2014). 
The role of authenticity in the emergence of new forms and practices recently gained 
attention especially from scholars who use identity perspective within ecological research 
and, to a lesser extent, social movement framework to examine form emergence and 
evolution. Organizational scholars usually study the concept of authenticity within cultural 
fields and generally focus on how perception of authenticity affects market outcomes such 
as prices, and consumption patterns (Carroll and Wheaton, 2009; Johnston and Baumann, 
2007). There is an agreement in this line of research on social and economic importance of 
authenticity: authenticity valorizes the object by imbuing it with a deeper meaning. 
Outside of cultural studies of authenticity, research in organizational ecology recently 
started to conceive authenticity as a characteristic of producer identity (e.g. Baron, 2004; 
Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2011) or an organizational 
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feature (e.g. Carroll and Wheaton, 2009; Kovács, Carroll and Lehman, 2013; McKendrick 
and Hannan, 2014). Scholars within the organizational ecology tradition posit authenticity 
concern as a driving force for creation of new organizational forms with oppositional 
identities to conventional counterparts. Empirical evidence in these studies suggests 
increasing prevalence of some form of dominance in markets usually in terms of ownership 
or process (e.g. foreign, multinational, industrial etc.) sparks concerns over authenticity 
among consumers and producers leading to emergence of a cluster of peripheral producers 
with authentic identities. Authenticity in these studies is a dimension of producer identity 
that could be deployed strategically in relation to other producers to signal distinction. 
Similarly, scholars using social movements perspective, usually conceive authenticity as 
part of cultural frames for mobilizing collective identities. 
What we learn from these studies on new organizational forms or practices is that 
producers and their audiences collectively define and create meanings of the new industry 
or the practice. Recent studies highlights the role of authenticity as a signal of 
differentiation among producers that may possibly lead to new organizational forms or 
collective identities. Researches differ in their focus on the role of audiences but generally 
tend to examine a few predetermined sets of actors such as state, rivals such as dominant 
incumbent producers and vanguards such as critics, activists, enthusiasts and analysts. My 
reading of the aforementioned literature regarding new organizational forms or practices 
reveals common presumptions about and treatment of these audiences. For example state is 
generally assumed to be source of endorsement or material rewards. Rivals are almost 
always dominant incumbent producers in a contentions relations with nascent producers. 
Producers who may be perceived as similar or associated with nascent producers are not in 
the picture. Vanguards such as critics, activists, enthusiasts and analysts are always treated 
as homogenous in their preferred meanings and practices. Authenticity arguments are 
almost always linked to the distinction arguments against ‘inauthentic other’. Below, I 
discuss these presumptions in the extant literature in relation to state, rivals and vanguards 
that limit a comprehensive understanding of new organizational form or practice 
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emergence. My findings that I summarize in the next section below contribute to these 
undeveloped ideas in the studies of organizational form and practice emergence. 
In terms of state’s role in new organizational form or practice emergence, state 
authorization is generally assumed to benefit new ventures. From neoinstitutionalists’ 
perspective the benefit stems from state’s role as rationalizing and selecting appropriate 
organizational forms and practices (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). State regulation and 
accompanying legal formalization validates the industry as a rational and appropriate 
venture. Researchers using social movements perspective or market categories within the 
organizational ecology tradition generally highlight the impact of state intervention on 
resource flows within or among organizational populations. For example, Wholey, 
Christianson, and Sanchez (1992) showed that state regulations requiring health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) to file a deposit increased the failure rate of small 
HMOs by a disproportional amount when compared with large HMOs. In their study of 
nascent independent power sector Sine, Haveman and Tolbert (2005) focused on how 
regulations in this sector lowered sectorwide economic entry barriers by altering financial 
incentives for all players. Common to these studies is a well developed account of 
dependence of organizations on the state but a less developed account of why the state acts 
as it does (Simons and Ingram, 2003). A few studies focusing on the state - organization 
relations outside of North America report more intricate relations such as symbiosis, 
competition and rivalry other than dependence that is influenced by ideology, state capacity 
and autonomy and the form of polity (e.g. Simons and Ingram, 2003; Özen and Akkemik, 
2012; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Özel, 2014). These studies point to the value of in-depth 
inductive examination of the role of state in the new organizational form and practice 
emergence and evolution. 
In terms of-rivals in the studies of new organizational form and practice emergence, 
rivals are almost always conceived as dominant incumbent producers. For example in 
institutional perspective, institutional entrepreneurs rise against incumbent institutions and 
producers by advocating alternative logics. In social movements perspective, producer-
activist use cultural frames in opposition to dominant frames and producers to shape 
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collective identities and promote changes. What is implicitly or explicitly is assumed in 
these perspectives is that parties challenging established practices will be contested by the 
defenders of those practices due to divergent positions and motivations. However a few 
recent research using social movements perspective argued and showed that challengers 
(nascent producers) and defenders (incumbent producers) could collaborate despite having 
divergent goals (e.g. O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Van Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma, and 
den Hond, 2013). These studies argued that the different parties could identify mutual goals 
that lay the ground for collaboration. For example, O’Mahony and Bechky, (2008) argued 
that open-source community projects and commercial firms in the proprietary software 
development tradition collaborated because the former wanted to expand the scope of open- 
source software and the latter were interested in tapping into an emerging market. 
Collaboration in their context was possible thanks to boundary organizations created by 
open-source community projects that attenuated the differences between themselves and 
commercial firms while preserving boundaries between them (O’Mahony and Bechky, 
2008). Van Wijk, et al. (2013) explains the collaboration between activists and field 
incumbents in Dutch tourism industry by the features of sustainable tourism movement that 
they refer to as movement permeability. They argued that activists’ disparate goals, 
discourses and practices in sustainable tourism movement lay the ground for the 
engagement and collaboration with the incumbents. These studies suggest that relations 
among nascent and incumbent producers may take different forms other then rivalry as a 
function of the motives, goals and the features of those goals as well as the interaction 
patterns among these actors. 
In the similar vein, aforementioned literature generally do not consider or examine 
the producers who are similar to nascent producers in some aspect such as ideology or 
practice as influential actors in the emergence and evolution of organizational forms or 
practices. One such attempt is Simons and Ingram’s (2004) study in the mature field of 
cooperatives. They argue and show that ideological similarity will evoke competition when 
the populations depend on the same resource base, and mutualism if they do not. They 
showed that two agricultural cooperatives with same ideology and resource base, moshav 
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and kibbutz, competed with each other while each had mutualistic relations with credit 
cooperatives that had kindred ideology and different resource base. However we do not 
know whether there are other contingencies that may contribute to non-competitive 
relations between ideologically similar producers even when they share similar resource 
bases. 
In terms of vanguards’ role in the studies of new organizational forms and practices, 
researchers contend that vanguards such as critics, activists, enthusiasts or analysts 
contribute to new form emergence by direct interaction with consumers, and by influencing 
authorities or powerful intermediaries (Koçak, Hannan and Hsu, 2013). Through these 
interactions, they help a common understanding to form among different sets of actors. 
They are usually understood to be alliances of the industry and treated as a homogenous 
group. For example, we do not know how and why critics, activists or analysts converge or 
diverge in their preferred meanings and practices. Nor do we know exactly which roles they 
play other than helping a common understanding of the industry to emerge. These 
presumptions limit a comprehensive understanding of actors and their roles in the formation 
of new practices or organizational forms. 
!! !
1.2. Contributions to the Literature !!!
The first contribution of this dissertation to the extant literature studying new 
organizational forms and industries lies in its explication of two distinct accounts of Islamic 
banking and of organic agriculture. Both accounts of Islamic banking and also of organic 
agriculture convey a distinct alternative imagery to the incumbent organizational forms. In 
each industry, two variants of ‘alternative’ with respect to the incumbent industries do not 
only co-exist as distinct conceptualizations but are in relation with each other through 
continuing debates over what is ‘ideal’, influencing the practices and the law and 
regulations along the way. Actors while interacting with each other may emphasize one 
variant of alternative over the other but they also use arguments from both imageries 
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expanding and elaborating the content of each account over time. This expansion and 
elaboration is especially salient in conversations around the ideal models as depicted in 
Islamic law or rules and models in nature. 
This is different from the general understanding of new forms or industries as more or 
less settled on a dominant meaning, logic or classification. A few studies suggest that plural 
institutional logics or multiple meanings can be maintained over time within a practice, 
form or profession. They explain this plurality in terms of audience structure or inherent 
duality of logics within professions guiding their expert knowledge and practices. For 
example Jones, Maoret, Massa and Svejenova (2012) argue that distinct conceptualizations 
and practices within modern architecture were possible due to serving different mix of 
clients associated with institutional logics of state, religion, commerce and family. Dunn 
and Jones (2010) suggest medical education always incorporated logics of care and science 
but their salience varied depending on the external and internal contestation over 
jurisdictional control and meanings. 
The cases of Islamic banking and organic agriculture suggest that two variants of 
alternative were not the products of competing logics or distinct clientele. Both industries 
serve to general public and two variants of alternative exist in the accounts of Islamic law 
scholars or self-acclaimed environmentalists. In institutional terms, the actors adhering to 
the same logic had different understandings of Islamic banking or organic agriculture and 
its relation to the incumbent system. Thus, theories of institutional logics as developed and 
used within organizational studies are not sufficient for explaining the phenomena that I 
observe in these two cases. 
This finding brings two main questions along with it. Why is there such a distinct 
anti-capitalist criticism? What explains the different accounts within seemingly 
homogenous set of actors? Given observations that markets are increasingly described with 
moral terms (Fourcade and Healy, 2007) and that previous studies examining new ventures 
with critique of modern systems do not report such strong anti-capitalist accounts parallel 
to the one described (e.g. Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Weber et al., 2008) these 
questions become more curious. 
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Based on my data, I cannot provide a full account for these questions. However, the 
persistent references to ‘how things must be according to Islamic law’ or ‘how things work 
in Nature’ in the data suggest that the explicit vision of an ‘ideal’ for the moral project is 
important in shaping the form and the discourse of the market. Empirical work in new 
organizational forms with specific moral claims such as anti-industrial stance usually report 
a bottom-up, social movement like process in the emergence of such forms. In these 
settings, new industry forms as a loose alliance of early activist-producers collectively 
building an anti-industrial rhetoric along the way while associating it with their collective 
identity and a craft-like process (e.g. Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Weber et al., 2008). 
Anti-industrial rhetoric and practices are usually built in relation to industrial system. There 
is no strong explicit guiding rules to inform practices in such markets. 
Islamic banking differs from such projects with its specific reference to Islamic law. 
Islamic law does not only inform the discourse of Islamic banking but also provides an 
ideal as a model. Similarly, in organic agriculture people talk about models/systems in 
nature as an ideal for organic agriculture to live by. In these cases market formation is not 
just collective construction of meaning, but collective construction of meaning according to 
a given ‘ideal’. I suspect, when the moral project is understood to be as conforming to an 
ideal existed or constructed already, market dynamics become more complex. This is 
because the model of ‘ideal’ brings its experts and defenders to the market formation along 
with it. This gives examination of the experts and the defenders of the ‘ideal’, the sources 
and nature of that ideal and historical and conceptual relation of the ideal to the 
phenomenon at hand a paramount importance. 
The second finding of my study relates to the concept of authenticity in new 
organizational form creation. What I find that is different from previous studies of new 
organizational forms is the centrality of the question ‘What is ideal?’ for the actors involved 
in these two industries. Extant literature contends that institutional entrepreneurs engage in 
sense-giving efforts to define new organizational forms (Negro et al., 2010; Vergne and 
Wry, 2014). They answer the question ‘What is …. ?’ for microbrewery (Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000), modern Indian art (Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010), satellite radio 
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(Navis and Glynn, 2010), multidisciplinary practice firms (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) 
by listing various features of the new organizational form, its products and practices, often 
in order to highlight its difference from incumbent forms. I find that the ‘What is the ideal 
…. ?’ question is even more central in Islamic banking and organic agriculture. The 
discussions in both industries are simultaneously about the meaning of Islamic banking or 
organic agriculture and the validity of those meanings and practices in relation to 
specifically but not exclusively Islamic law or the rules of nature. In other words, actors in 
both cases were not only involved in meaning construction (discussions around product 
features, labels, purposes etc.) but also were deliberately discussing the authenticity of 
meanings, labels and the practices as well as the criterions to be used in authenticity 
assessments. The main concern in these accounts was not differentiation from opposed 
models as current literature generally suggests but being aligned with sacralized forms and 
purposes. 
This was especially salient in Islamic banking. The notions of the ‘real’ figure 
prominently in Islamic banking. Phrases like ‘real trade’, ‘real profit’, ‘real economy’, ‘real 
value’ and the discussions about ‘real money’ based on a ‘real substance’ as alternative to 
paper currency all used in the accounts of Islamic banking as grounded on ‘real activity’ 
and therefore distinct from conventional banks that earn money out of money with no ‘real 
contribution’ to the society. Each reference to ‘real’ and many more were discussed 
extensively among Islamic law scholars and Islamic bankers in relation to Islamic law, 
formal codification, conventional system and the socio-political context.	

This has two main implications for current research linking organizationals forms 
with authenticity. First, it suggests that when industries are grounded on explicit moral 
foundations, the question of validity of those morals reflected in both symbolic and material 
domain may be an important part of collective construction of the form. In terms of larger 
literature studying new forms and industries, this brings the notion of authenticity, that is, 
the realness or genuineness of the meanings and practices, to the center of form emergence 
and evolution. Unlike generally conceived as status symbol or signal of distinction, 
authenticity as conforming to an ideal maybe intricately linked to the discussions of 
meanings and definitions. 
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Second, the parallel question of ‘what is ideal?’ as an intricate part of the question 
‘what is it?’ may require first establishment of criteria to be used in authenticity 
assessments. Authenticity accounts in Islamic banking provide a compelling example of 
deliberate discussions around the criteria to be used in authenticity assessments. Islamic 
law scholars differ in their understandings of Islamic law largely due to plurality of sources 
and reasoning techniques within Islamic law which reflects itself on which criterions have 
preference in assessing an action’s compatibility to Islamic law. This is different from the 
current research on authenticity that implicitly assumes a more or less established 
classification or set of criteria while examining authenticity claims. A specific 
understanding of ‘the other law’, Islamic law in Islamic banking and rules and models in 
Nature in organic agriculture is the source of criteria in authenticity assessments, however 
the differences in understanding of ‘the other law’ lead contestation over which criterions 
have preference in authenticity assessments. 
Although authenticity assessments and discussions of criterions included references 
to conventional counterparts in both industries, the discussions were not about claiming the 
conventional counterpart as inauthentic. Authenticity discussions in both Islamic banking 
and organic agriculture is an ‘internal issue’ revolving around the true meaning of ‘Islamic’ 
or ‘natural/organic’. This is again different form the current literature that examines the 
authentic (art, identity, product etc.) in relation to inauthentic which is consistent 
considering the main focus is distinction claims and separation from ‘other’. Unlike current 
literature and more consistent with original meaning of authenticity, I find the authenticity 
discussions in both Islamic banking and organic agriculture is mainly about ‘aligning’ to an 
ideal. 
These findings on authenticity bring a fresh look at to the concept of authenticity in 
the studies of new organizational forms and categorizations. Authenticity may have a larger 
role than a mere strategic tool used for separation as generally assumed in categorization 
studies. It may be at the center of form/categorization emergence as part of collective 
construction of meaning discussed in relation to not only the inauthentic ‘other’ but maybe 
more so in relation to an ‘ideal’. 
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In addition to explicating two co-occurring meanings of Islamic banking and also of 
organic agriculture and their relation to authenticity, this dissertation presents several 
contributions in relation to specific issues in the studies of new organizational forms. One 
of these and the third contribution is its explication of heterogeneity within a presumably 
same set of actors. I find that the actors generally lumped together as intermediaries such as 
critics, reviewers or analysts in the organization literature are more differentiated differing 
strikingly in their understanding and evaluation of industries. In both Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture there were people who played facilitating role but differed strikingly in 
their understanding of the focal industry. I identified two distinct roles among Islamic law 
scholars in Islamic banking and among self-described environmentalists in organic 
agriculture and referred to them as ‘moral certifiers' and ‘idealists’. 
Advisory Boards within Islamic banks (commonly known as Sharia Boards in other 
countries, not necessarily formally in the organizational structure) and non-governmental 
organizations such as Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological Living are most 
representative of moral certifiers. Islamic law scholars in Advisory Boards and people at 
Buğday do not have legally defined roles as control, regulation or certification bodies but 
nonetheless perform very similar roles to those carried out by formal bodies. They also 
endorse the industry as a moral enterprise and actively work on developing public 
consciousness on the harms of interest in banking and chemicals in agriculture, guiding 
public preferences towards these industries. 
Individuals, groups of people, or NGOs whom I refer to as idealists are in the same 
camp with moral certifiers regarding their desire for morally grounded alternatives to 
conventional banking and conventional agriculture. Islamic law scholars such as Abdülaziz 
Bayındır and Kibele Ecologic Life Cooperative are most representative of idealists. Like 
moral certifiers, they are actively involved in consciousness raising activities for a better 
alternative by producing and disseminating knowledge through their writings, public 
appearances, and events. Unlike moral certifiers, idealist do not represent Islamic banking 
or organic agriculture in its current form as conducted by certified producers as ‘the better 
alternative’. They differ from moral certifiers significantly in their conception of the 
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imagined alternative. A stance against the dominant system - the system being capitalism, 
modernity, urbanization, industrialization, globalization, science, secularism, tradition etc. 
depending on the argument - composes a significant part of idealists’ accounts that 
differentiates them from moral certifiers. Whereas idealists imagine Islamic banking or 
organic agriculture as an alternative outside of the mainstream finance or agriculture 
respectively, moral certifiers perceive these industries as alternatives existing alongside and 
within the mainstream finance and agriculture. 
In short, I find moral certifiers and idealists to be similar in terms of the ideologies 
and motivations they express. Yet, they take very different positions and have divergent 
priorities on some key contested issues and attempt to shape the emerging form in different 
ways. I consider two possible explanations for this variance based on the extant literature: 
research on institutional logics and research on relational networks and interaction within 
markets 
A dominant explanation for the heterogeneity among actors in institutional theory is 
the existence of contradictory logics within or among institutions. For instance, Suddaby 
and Greenwood (2005: 61) explain that the logic of professionalism holds an “inherent 
contradiction contained in the tension between "core values" and "commercial interests”” 
that eventually becomes overt and provides a space for contestation and differentiation 
among the members of the same profession. Although idealists occasionally challenge 
moral certifiers for being too lenient on producers for the sake of viability of the industry, 
my data points to the main debates among them revolving around what should constitute 
the core values for the industry. Moreover, neither idealists nor moral certifiers are involved 
in practicing Islamic banking and only a few of them are commercially involved in 
practicing organic agriculture, hence their economic interests are not tightly linked to the 
viability of these industries. Idealists and moral certifiers were generally Islamic law 
scholars with similar educational and professional backgrounds in Islamic banking and 
people who generally considered themselves as within the ecological movement in organic 
agriculture. I do not find any other cultural, ideological, or logical divide between moral 
certifiers and idealists either. Therefore, I conclude that the differences I observe among 
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idealists and moral certifiers are not due to contradictions between "core values" and 
"commercial interests”. 
Research on relational networks and interaction within markets contends that 
differences in patterns of interactions among actors is associated with construing similar or 
diverging understandings of the same phenomenon (e.g. DiMaggio, 1997; Koçak et al., 
2013; Gray and Silbey, 2014). Similar to this account, recent studies in institutional 
complexity suggest that actors’ intra- and extra-organizational relationships and their 
degree of interdependence influence how they interpret and use institutional logics (e.g. 
Greenwood et al., 2011; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Besharov and Smith, 2014). Moral 
certifiers have more frequent relations with certified producers due to the ‘informal 
regulative role’ they play. This may make their understanding of the focal industry more 
aligned to the understanding of the producers. But the degree and nature of relationship 
they have with producers is their own choice - it is not an assigned formal role that can 
serve as an exogenous explanation of these individuals’ views. Moreover, some idealists 
previously played moral certifier roles, making the ‘diffusion of meanings through 
interaction’ account less plausible. 
Although my data provides diverse evidence regarding the difference in relation to 
the ‘system’ among actors it does not provide evidence to fully account for the basis of this 
difference. Islamic banking case suggests different ‘styles’ in relation to interpretation of 
Islamic law among Islamic law scholars influence their understanding of Islamic banking. 
However, the question of the sources of adhering to different ‘styles’ in the first place 
remains. This finding points to the need for more research examining the heterogeneity 
within the same set of actors such as among producers or among critics that are presumed 
to be under the influence of same institutional logic or having similar relational and cultural 
networks. 
As the fourth contribution, my findings add to the growing body of research 
exploring conditions under which identity-based boundary weakens or strengthens. 
Scholars studying market categories with oppositional identities usually invoke social 
movement framework and report that producers activate sharp identities and automatically 
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devalue the incumbent category. In these studies, producers are commonly assumed and 
depicted as capable and motivated to differentiate themselves from the incumbent or 
oppositional producers. For example grass-fed producers used cultural codes to deem 
conventional products as inferior (Weber et al., 2008), and microbreweries used 
oppositional identity strategies to exclude mass-production brewing companies (Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000). Negro et al. (2011) showed traditionalist producers highlighted their 
collective identity to maintain categorical distinctions when the modernist producers 
claimed the same label in the case of Barolo/Barbaresco winemaking. 
Taking categorical distinctions and boundaries as their main focus, these researchers 
tend to miss or ignore the concerns other than differentiation in boundary drawing. 
Similarly, the discussions on the influence of larger contextual constraints on using identity 
claims to establish or maintain categorical distinctions is generally omitted. My findings 
point to industry specific and societal level conditions that limited the capacity and 
motivation of producers to invoke sharp distinctions based on identity from both 
conventional counterparts and similar ventures. 
Drawing mainly from Islamic banking, I find, unlike current research claims 
producers did not automatically engage in activating sharp identities and devalue 
conventional counterparts. Specifically, Islamic bankers avoided the name ‘Islamic 
banking’ and any explicit references to Islam, because of their understanding of Islam as 
sacred and not to be confounded by material world; the social concerns of implying 
exclusion on the basis of religion; the instrumental concerns over appealing to a wider 
audience; and secular ideology perceived as hostile to explicit Islamic references. 
In relation to similar ventures, I find, relation-based constraints, (both material and 
ideological affinity), limited the capacity and motivation of producers to invoke sharp 
distinctions between their industry and similar ventures even though those ventures were 
perceived as harming the industry. Specifically, multi layered social and economic relations 
with and ideological affinity to similar ventures in Islamic banking and the perceptions of 
similar ventures as being within the same camp in organic agriculture limit producers’ 
ability and motivation to separate their industry from similar ventures. 
"21
As the fifth contribution, I explicate how producers try to influence categorical 
expectations through engaging with other actors over validity and feasibility of those 
expectations and also  through highlighting the symbolic importance of their work. 
While extant research on market categories show evidence that organizations benefit 
from fitting into externally imposed categorical expectations and penalized for 
nonconformity (Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak, 2009; Zuckerman, 1999), a growing body of 
research started to examine how producers deviate from those expectations without 
negative repercussions. Scholars usually highlight the features of categories or external 
factors in the leniency of categorical expectations as explanation for organizational 
deviation. Deviation from categorical expectations is less problematic when classification is 
emerging or in flux (Ruef and Patterson, 2009) or when a specific contingency influences 
audience perceptions (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005). A recent study suggests deviation is 
possible even when category is fairly taken-for-granted. Hsu and Grodal (2015) shows 
tobacco firms could increase tar and nicotine deliveries (core features) of the light cigarette 
category through strategic concealment as the category taken-for-grantedness increased. 
Increasing category taken-for-grantedness was associated with lower scrutiny over 
categorical imperative which provided opportunity for producers to manipulate core 
categorical features. 
My findings contribute to the broader issue of how producers depart from category 
expectations by highlighting the role of conversations over authenticity between producers 
and the other actors. Specifically, Islamic bankers try to influence category expectations 
and sometimes could modify key features by challenging and negotiating the expectations 
of Islamic law scholars. To this end, Islamic bankers questioned the feasibility of 
expectations in current realities; made use of conflicting views among Islamic law scholars 
regarding key features, and emphasized the symbolic importance of Islamic banking that 
highly resonated with Islamic law scholars. Organic producers usually challenged the 
feasibility and relevance of expectations in current realities such as questioning the 
feasibility of using local seeds, or relevancy of criticisms around green-house production. 
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And lastly, as the sixth contribution, this study adds to authenticity research by 
broadening the understanding of authenticity dynamics by examining two different contexts 
outside the cultural fields. The concept of authenticity is usually linked with distinction 
claims and perceptions both in research on cultural fields and in organizational studies 
examining the emergence of new forms and practices. Organizational scholars usually 
conceive authenticity as a dimension of producer identity that could be deployed 
strategically in relation to other producers to signal distinction. 
Focusing on producer side conversations around the authenticity of products and 
services of Islamic banking and organic agriculture, I find that the concerns over 
authenticity was persistent throughout the history of these industries. The authenticity 
assessments in these industries are less about social status as suggested by cultural studies 
or oppositional identities and differentiation as suggested by ecology and social movements 
research but more about conforming to a sacralized ideal. 
Unlike current research that focuses on and shows evidence for the influence of 
authenticity perceptions on market outcomes, I highlight the influence of authenticity 
concerns over formal codification and regulation process. The accounts related to the 
formal codification in and around these industries almost always carried out in terms of 
their compatibility to an ‘ideal’ in both form and spirit. In Islamic banking, the actors I 
refer to as idealists and to a lesser extent moral certifiers favor detailed formal codifications 
of products and industry-wide standardization to ensure that products conform to Islamic 
law. This presents a compelling example of influence of authenticity concerns in legal 
formation of industries. 
!!!
1.3. Outline of Dissertation !!!
In the following pages, I first describe the methods, data, analysis process and cases 
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I introduce five distinct actors common to each industry. I refer 
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to these actors as: state, certified producers, non-certified producers, moral certifiers, and 
idealists. I explain the role of state in each industry in Section 3.1. State refers to 
government, and government bodies and officials and was the main authority in the legal 
creation of these industries. Political contestations and larger ideological forces were more 
influential in state regulation of Islamic banking than in organic agriculture. State - Islamic 
banking relations show how societal level conflict between secular ideology and Islam was 
reflected in the discussions of formal codification of Islamic banking. Islamic bankers 
interpreted state’s specific legal attempts as a threat to the very existence of the form until 
early 2000s when ideological contestation lost its heat. 
I explain certified producers referring to managers and owners of Islamic banks and 
the small and large producers and businesses that produce certified organic products in 
Section 3.2. The products of certified producers are formally codified by state and regulated 
and certified by state-authorized bodies as conforming to related laws and regulations. 
Certified producers in both industries are similar in depicting their industry in terms of its 
benefit to economy, society or environment, but they do not compose a uniform group. 
Islamic bankers are divided in their views on proper and distinct legal definition of Islamic 
banking. Understanding of law as a marker that separates Islamic banking from 
conventional banking irrespective of its benefits or drawbacks versus understanding of law 
as a tool for symbolic and material gains was the main axis of the division among Islamic 
bankers. The division among certified organic producers hinges on atomistic versus holistic 
approach to organic farming. 
Non-certified producers are producers who might be perceived as comparable to or 
associated with certified producers but operate outside the formal organic or banking law. I 
describe labels such as ‘natural’, ‘local’, or ‘traditional’ in organic agriculture and Islamic 
holdings in Islamic banking as non-certified producers in Section 3.3. 
In Section 3.4., I describe the people that I refer to as moral certifiers; Advisory 
Boards within Islamic banks (commonly known as Sharia Boards in other countries) and 
non-governmental organizations such as Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological 
Living. Islamic law scholars in Advisory Boards and people at Buğday do not have legally 
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defined roles as control, regulation or certification bodies but nonetheless perform very 
similar roles to those carried out by formal bodies. They also endorse the industry as a 
moral enterprise and actively work on developing consciousness in public around the 
specific issues of chemicals and interest and guide the public preferences towards these 
industries. 
In Section 3.5., I describe people I refer to as idealists. These people, groups of 
people, or NGOs are at the same camp with certified producers and moral certifiers 
regarding their desire for alternatives to conventional banking and conventional agriculture. 
However they differ from those actors significantly in their conception of the imagined 
alternative. I explain what idealists mean when they refer to ‘being accord with nature’ or 
‘being accord with Creation, fıtrat’ while elaborating their views of organic agriculture and 
Islamic banking respectively. I show, a stance against a dominant system (system referring 
to one or more of the following: capitalism, modernity, urbanization, industrialization, 
globalization, science, secularism, tradition) composes a significant part of idealists’ 
accounts that differentiates them from certified producers and moral certifiers. Idealists 
conceive Islamic banking and organic agriculture as an alternative outside of the 
mainstream finance or agriculture respectively. For moral certifiers and certified producers, 
these industries represent an alternative existing alongside and within the mainstream 
finance and agriculture. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on two persistent themes figuring in the conversations of 
these actors throughout the history of Islamic banking and organic agriculture. The first 
one, the formal definition and incorporation of the focal industry within the legal system is 
the topic of Chapter 4. The second one, the debates around whether Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture are really what they are purported to be is the topic of Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 4, I claim and show that i. different positions with respect to formal 
codification among different actors, ii. larger legal space, and iii. larger socio-economic 
context were influential in the persistence of the debates around formal definition of these 
industries. 
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In Section 4.1., I describe how variations in the positions of actors in relation to 
formal law influence how these actors understand legal codification of the focal industry. I 
identify four main priorities - separation from conventional counterparts; alignment with 
the ideal form; ensuring a viable operation; and separation from similar ventures- in respect 
to formal codification that figured in the accounts of idealists, moral certifiers and certified 
producers to a varying extent. 
In Islamic banking, in the accounts of the actors that I refer to as idealists and moral 
certifiers, legal codification of Islamic banking is about aligning formal definition with the 
contractual forms in Islamic law while simultaneously separating it from conventional 
banking. These actors are generally in favor of detailed legal codifications of Islamic 
contracts and establishing industry-wide standards. In the accounts of Islamic bankers, legal 
codification of Islamic banking is about ensuring safe and viable operation of Islamic 
banking. Islamic bankers are usually less enthusiastic regarding strict, detailed regulations 
and setting up industry-wide standards compared to idealists and moral certifiers. 
In organic agriculture, in the accounts of the actors that I refer to as idealists, legal 
regulation in agriculture in general revolves around the criticism of capitalism and used as 
an ideological tool to depict the ills of the system while simultaneously drawing from the 
rules and models in Nature. Unlike Islamic banking the concerns about separation from 
conventional agriculture do not figure in the idealists’ accounts in relation to legal 
codification. 
In both industries, the people I refer to as idealists and moral certifiers have 
ambivalent attitudes towards unregulated similar ventures. And in both industries certified 
producers did not or could not overtly separate their industry from non-certified producers 
even when they are perceived as rivals or threats to focal industry. Islamic banks’ multi-
layered relations with similar ventures in Islamic banking and the perceptions of similar 
ventures as being within the same camp in organic agriculture influenced producers’ ability 
and motivation to separate their industry from similar ventures. 
In Section 4.2., I describe the specific challenges that arose from the larger legal 
space in relation to formal codification of Islamic banking and organic agriculture. I claim 
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and show that beyond just creating the legal definition of an organizational form, there is a 
separate challenge: the challenge of making legal definition of organizational form 
compatible with other legal definitions so that the form becomes operational. I show this 
issue was especially salient in Islamic banking because it introduced new terms and 
definitions such as profit and loss accounts and expected profit that did not fit neatly with 
related regulations in tax and accounting. 
In Section 4.3., drawing mainly from Islamic banking case, I explain how external 
factors, such as ideological contestation and economic crises influence the perception and 
reception of changes in formal codification. I claim if the change in the legal codification is 
perceived as a necessity caused by external factors, it stirs less contestation among idealists, 
moral certifiers and producers regarding its appropriateness to Islamic law compared to 
legal changes that happened in the absence of external forces. 
I focus on the debates around the ‘realness’ of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture in Chapter 5. Both Islamic banking and organic agriculture are infused with or 
motivated by values, norms and beliefs informed by Islamic law and rules and models in 
Nature respectively. Both use different methods from the incumbent conventional banking 
and conventional agriculture. In Islamic banking economic transactions are not based on 
debt financing which is associated with interest based transactions. In organic agriculture 
an agricultural method that excludes harmful chemical inputs throughout the process is 
followed. Both have a claim to do good, and involve an imagination and enactment of 
social solidarity and sustainability. As such, the debates around whether Islamic banking 
and organic agriculture are really what they are purported to be is a persistent theme. 
I relate the debates regarding the ‘evaluation of realness’ of these industries to the 
concept of authenticity. The criterion for assessing the authenticity of both industries is 
grounded on the other law, Islamic law or rules and models in Nature as the sources of the 
moral foundations of these industries. Type authenticity in Islamic banking is about the 
conformity of the implementation of financial instruments to the Islamic contractual forms 
that the jurists throughout the centuries commonly regarded as valid according to Islamic 
law. Moral authenticity of a financial instrument is evaluated on various grounds, but 
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usually hinges on the contract’s maksat, i.e. purposes, aims, intentions, and morals of the 
form and fıtrat i.e its true nature, and doing what it is supposed to do according to Islamic 
law. 
In organic agriculture, type authenticity is generally associated with formal organic 
label. Moral authenticity discussions revolves around debates such as local seed versus 
hybrid seeds, mono-culture production versus biodiversity and small farmers versus 
agribusiness and hinge on a stance against hegemonic system, usually articulated as 
capitalism. 
While the assessments of products and services in Islamic banking is simultaneously 
about the form and the moral, it is usually about moral in organic agriculture. Moreover 
both type and moral authenticity in Islamic banking is highly debated mainly due to 
different views among Islamic law scholars on sources and styles of reasoning in Islamic 
law. Authenticity debates in Islamic banking are simultaneously and explicitly about 
establishing the authenticity criterions. 
In Chapter 6, I conclude with a discussion of my main arguments and a few proposals 
for future research questions.  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2. !!
2. METHODS !!!!
I use comparative case study method to inductively examine the trajectory of two 
industries, organic agriculture and Islamic banking in Turkey from their beginning in 1984 
to the present with a focus on debates over definitions and practices. The purpose of this 
research is to reach new theoretical insights from the examination of the debates in and 
around these two industries and their link to the evolution of organic agriculture and 
Islamic banking. 
In the first section of this chapter, I overview the method of comparative case study 
and explain why it is appropriate for my research. In the second section, I describe how I 
performed case selection and provide the descriptions for each case; organic agriculture 
and Islamic banking in Turkey. In the third section, I present the data sources and the 
methods of data collection. In the last section, I conclude this chapter with the explanation 
of data analysis process. 
!!!
2.1. Comparative Case Studies !!!
Case studies are in-depth investigations of a bounded social setting with a focus on the 
events that occur in and over time in that arena (Van Maanen, 1999). They provide 
historically situated tales of how events are linked to one another through time. The fine 
grained analysis of events and the social context in which they occur allows to reveal 
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temporal sequences, competing perspectives, objectives and contextual modifiers (Van 
Maanen, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990). The aim and function of such work is to extend readers’ 
understanding of a particular setting and the social processes that take place there. Schools, 
industries, organizations, occupations, communities, individuals can all serve as settings 
for case studies. The specificity, historical character, and the interpretive features are the 
distinctive characteristics of the case studies (Van Maanen, 1999). Because the main aim is 
not to generalize outside of a case study, case studies stand apart from experimental and 
survey work. The standards for those works such as statistical representativeness, statistical 
sampling and bias are not appropriate standards for case studies (Siggelkow, 2007 ; Small, 
2009; Van Maanen, 1999). 
One of the main uses of case studies is theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007). Eisenhardt (1989), proposes a roadmap for 
building theories from case studies by synthesizing Miles and Huberman’s (1984) 
procedures on qualitative data analysis, Yin’s (1984) work on design of case studies and 
Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) work on grounded theory building. As such, she advocates key 
grounded theory concepts such as constant comparison of data, overlapped data collection 
and data analysis, empirically grounded theories and theoretical sampling and theoretical 
saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The key feature of building theories from case studies is constant comparative 
method as in grounded theory approach. The aim is to link up specific events and 
observations to more general analytic categories and issues by continuously comparing and 
contrasting data to find underlying patterns. Data analysis and data collection in this 
process are not separate activities but they are carried out simultaneously throughout the 
research until a point is reached where new evidence provides no new information and 
confirms previously established conceptual categories. The researcher can make 
adjustments during the data collection and analysis process such as collecting more data 
from different sources or adding new questions to interviews to probe particular themes 
further or to rule out particular alternative explanations, all of which serve to the aim of 
producing a valid, testable, empirically grounded theory. 
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In this process, data that confirm emergent conceptualizations and relationships 
enhance confidence in the validity of the emerging model. Data that disconfirm emergent 
conceptualizations and relationships should also be interpreted to refine the emerging 
model. Reaching at a point at which incremental learning and refinement is minimal 
indicates that theoretical saturation has occurred (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). The criteria for determining saturation depends upon both empirical context and the 
researcher’s sensitivity to new interpretations of data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Cases and informants to collect further data are chosen for theoretical not statistical 
reasons while building theories from cases as in grounded theory approach (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Cases and informants are selected not because of their 
representativeness of some population but because of their potential to illuminate and 
extend the understanding of some social processes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). This is called theoretical sampling and constitutes one of the distinctive 
features of both Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) approach to theory 
building. The natural consequence of this feature is that the resulting propositions are not 
suitable for grand generalizations about certain populations but instead, can richly describe 
the existence of a particular process, mechanism, tendency, type, relationship, dynamic, or 
practice (Small, 2009; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Eisenhardt claims that her approach diverges from grounded theory by early 
identification of the research question and possible constructs, informed by the existing 
literature. However as Suddaby (2006) states, the assumption that grounded theory 
approach requires scholars to start their research without any knowledge of extant literature 
is a serious misreading of Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) work. The possibility of prior 
knowledge to force the researcher into preexisting conceptualizations is real and something 
to deal with during building theories based on a comparative method. However there is 
really no effective solution for this inherent limitation of the approach other than 
continuously being aware of the issue as interpretive work is always a function of the 
researcher’s background and research interests (Suddaby, 2006). 
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Although it is possible to induce theory from single cases, multiple cases typically 
provide stronger base for theory building. It is because multiple cases enable comparisons 
that help to make arguments that are valid across chosen cases. Multiple case studies also 
allow for broader exploration of the research question across varied empirical evidence. 
Thus resulting propositions are likely to be more deeply grounded in varied data. However 
it still would not be appropriate to generalize the results to some wider population as the 
cases are selected for theoretical reasons such as replication, extension of theory, contrary 
replication, and elimination of alternative explanations rather than statistical 
representativeness. 
Extrapolation from case studies is more of a validity issue than the representativeness 
of particular cases. (Small, 2009). Generalizability from cases is usually based on the 
assumption that the theory may be useful in making sense of similar events rather than on 
drawing conclusions about some wider population from the sample of that population 
(Maxwell, 1992). Thus extrapolation from a case study to like situations in general is based 
on logical inference rather than statistical inference (Small, 2009). 
I use a comparative case-study-based research design (Eisenhardt, 1989) and adopt a 
grounded, interpretive approach for examining debates over definitions, practices and 
claims related to organic agriculture and Islamic banking in Turkey. My purpose is to 
develop new theoretical insights about how competing views of various influential actors 
regarding the industry is related to industry’s trajectory through time. This aim requires 
necessarily capturing actors’ interpretations of events, practices and claims first, and then 
to ‘lift’ these interpretations to a higher abstract level in light of both contextual factors and 
prior theorizing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As such my chosen 
grounded, interpretive approach fits well to this research’s purpose. 
Another reason why comparative case-study-based research design is an appropriate 
choice is that case studies allow in-depth examination of events within their contextual and 
historical setting. Historical and contextual examination proves crucial to understand 
complex events such as industry emergence because the specific course of events to 
emerging industry are inextricably rooted in a particular time and place. These events 
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involve various actors usually with competing perspectives and positions regarding the 
nature of events. Historical and contextual examination is then also crucial to understand 
these actors’ perspectives and actions as the actors are both constrained and enabled by 
their larger socio-economical environment. Moreover, these actors derive from a larger 
socio-economical context to make relevant and effective arguments to further their views 
of the industry. Thus to understand actors’ arguments and justifications, it is crucial to 
understand in which context they are made. In that sense, data pertaining to statements, 
actions and events can never be understood in isolation. Treating the events and actors in 
isolation and producing singular arguments of phenomena would not capture the 
complexities of industry emergence. Given also that recent research contends a historical 
and contextual comprehension is important to understand the industry emergence (e.g. 
Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010; McLaughlin and Khawaja, 2000), a comparative case study 
provides an effective method for my research. 
!!!
2.1.1. Showing Validity of Findings in Comparative Case Studies  !!
Although generalizability is not a big concern (Van Maanen, 1999; Small, 2009), 
assuring reliability and validity is critical for building sound theories from case studies. 
These terms are normally based on positivist assumptions that underlie quantitative and 
experimental research designs. But the question of producing reliable and valid accounts of 
phenomena is real and constitutes the basis for frequent criticisms regarding the quality of 
case studies. 
One of the most frequently voiced concerns regarding qualitative research is the 
reliability, the issue of whether different researchers would similarly describe, interpret and 
explain the same phenomenon. Reliability, according to Maxwell (1992), is  a particular 
type of threat to validity. If different researchers produce different data and accounts of the 
same events, then it posses questions to validity of those accounts. Provided that the 
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researchers have similar perspectives and purposes and are interested in similar questions, 
they are more likely to reach similar accounts. 
Validity in qualitative research in general, relates to relation between the account, 
and the phenomena that the account is about. The assumption is not that there is only one 
correct objective account, on the contrary, it is always possible for there to be different, 
equally valid accounts due to differences in the perspective and purposes of the researchers 
(Maxwell, 1992). However it does not mean that all possible accounts of some 
phenomenon are equally credible. Maxwell (1992) proposes different types of validity that 
corresponds to different phases of qualitative research to make discrimination among those 
accounts that I use as a guide for enhancing the soundness of my arguments in this 
research. 
Descriptive validity refers the factual accuracy of an account, that is the researcher 
does not make up or distort, for example, the statements an informant makes. This is the 
basis for all other forms of validity. This kind of validity corresponds to primary 
understanding of an account and in principle, disagreements regarding the descriptive 
validity can be resolved easily given the appropriate data. The accounts of the chronology 
of events in Islamic banking and organic agriculture for example, or the statements of 
informants’ that I use in this research could all easily be validated by referring to archival 
data and the recordings of interviews respectively. 
Interpretive validity refers to accounts of what the described events, and actions 
mean to the actors involved. I try to get the informants’ understanding of Islamic banking 
or organic agriculture as well as their accounts of the events and debates in their industry. 
The goal of interpretation is to describe the actors’ meanings. The accounts of these 
meanings are necessarily grounded in the language of the informants and rely as much as 
possible on their own words and concepts (Maxwell, 1992). Thus interpretive accounts are 
still very close to data and the issue here, like in descriptive validity, is the accuracy of the 
account. “Accounts of participants’ meanings are never a matter of direct access, but are 
always constructed by the researcher(s) on the basis of the participants’ accounts and other 
evidence” (Maxwell 1992: 49). 
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The main threat to interpretative validity is to impose one’s own meaning rather than 
to understand the actors’ perspective. One of the ways I attend to interpretive validity is 
seeking clarifications during interviews. Before I conduct an interview with a particular 
informant, I read/watch his/her public statements, interviews, writings, videos, articles - 
any material that I can find authored by him/her. This is a good practice for many reasons 
but in terms of interpretive validity it provides me an opportunity to tap into those topics 
where I have a difficulty to understand the informant’s point of view. During the interview, 
I would directly refer to his/her previous statements and kindly ask for clarification on his/
her account. I would also state my understanding of a particular event and ask if it 
corroborates with the way he/she sees it where appropriate. 
Theoretical validity moves the account further from the actors’ actions, language, 
meanings, and interpretations to a more abstract account that proposes to explain what the 
phenomenon is about. It involves the development and application of theoretical constructs 
from/to descriptive and interpretive understanding of the account. Whereas issues of 
descriptive and interpretive validity are concerned with the accuracy of the accounts, 
theoretical validity is concerned with the appropriateness of the account as a theory of the 
studied phenomenon. 
The main threat to theoretical validity is ignoring discrepant data or not considering 
alternative explanations of the phenomena (Maxwell, 1996). I attend to this issue by trying 
to reach out to diverse archival data and informants to collect a comprehensive variety of 
views. I particularly attend to discrepancy among views and try to figure out the sources of 
such differing views. I would consciously think what kind of data or explanation could 
disprove the evolving theory. I would test the evolving theory and potential explanations 
by collecting more evidence that could challenge conclusions either by talking to a specific 
person who might have a different view or by asking specific questions. 
In inductive research that focuses on understanding a particular phenomenon, prior 
elimination of validity threats through the features of research design is less possible. 
Instead, specific threats to the validity of particular features of the account are generally 
addressed by seeking evidence that would allow them to be ruled out. In the light of 
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Maxwell’s (1992) typology, the validity of my research is based on (1) how accurately and 
completely is the description of the events and debates in Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture conveyed? (descriptive validity): e.g. who were the main actors, what were the 
main events/debates/justifications? (2) how accurate is the interpretation of what these 
events and debates mean to the different kinds of actors involved in these industries? 
(interpretive validity): e.g. how is the state regulation perceived by Islamic bankers, how 
are those producers who follow standards similar to organic agriculture but do not get 
organic certification are perceived by the proponents of certified organic? and (3) how 
appropriate is the explanation for the accounts of events and interpretations provided?
(theoretical validity): e.g. do I have the richness of data sources and detail to capture 
various views, is the data analysis transparent, have I used inferential logic, have I 
considered and discussed alternative explanations, connections to existing literature? 
!!!
2.2. Case Selection !!!
The criteria I used for case selection were motivated by my research interest, the data 
collection requirements for generating grounded theory, and the attempt to rule out 
particular threats to validity. 
In order to pursue my research question, I wanted to pick two emergent industries 
that involved creation of new meanings that spur diverse discussions. Organic agriculture 
and Islamic banking propose a change in the process of agriculture and banking 
respectively for the sake of common good. Organic agriculture is concerned with defining 
new agricultural practices that are good for human, animal and environmental health. 
Islamic banking is involved in creating interest-free financial transactions that conform to 
Islamic rule of prohibition of interest which is also claimed to be a better practice for social 
and economic viability. Therefore both industries have the challenge of incorporating 
moral claims and practices into economical objectives. Both the moral nature of these 
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industries and the inevitable tension between moral and economic objectives create fertile 
ground for heated debates around what these industries are actually about and how they 
differ from their conventional counterparts. Moreover both industries are nation-wide 
industries attracting attention from various actors, both state and non-state, which also 
contributes to the diversity and intensity of debates around these industries. 
In order to examine the influence of social and political forces, I wanted to select two 
industries that emerged at around the same time. Organic agriculture and Islamic banking 
in Turkey have clear beginnings in 1984. I studied the historical context of development 
for each case and wrote a case history (Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2.) that charts the role of 
important events common to both industries such as economic liberalization program of 
1980s in Turkey and the military intervention, and influence of international actors such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). 
Moreover both industries provide advantages for data collection. They have recent 
and clear beginnings which makes it possible to define the boundaries of these cases. Both 
industries are imports and initiated with a clear economic focus by the state in the case of 
Islamic banking and by European exporters in the case of organic agriculture in 1984. This 
clarity regarding the origins of these industries makes it easier to collect data on the 
beginnings of each industry. Moreover due to relatively recent emergence of these 
industries, it was possible to conduct interviews with people who played prominent roles 
from early on. Being nation-wide industries ease data access further because debates are 
more likely to be covered by the media. 
Despite these common properties, organic agriculture and Islamic banking in Turkey 
differ in some critical aspects which I assumed at the outset might influence the scope and 
the nature of debates in these industries. However I did not originally posit how these 
debates would be interconnected or linked to wider events and categorical boundaries that I 
ultimately observed. First, organic agriculture and Islamic banking differ in terms of their 
regulation structure. Organic agriculture is subjected to formal organic agriculture law. The 
control and certification bodies are authorized by the state to grant organic label by 
following the criterions outlined in the organic agriculture law and regulations. Islamic 
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banking, is subjected to two systems of law, secular banking law and sharia law. Although 
not required by formal banking law, all Islamic banks have advisory boards inside their 
boundaries which is composed of theologists (called sharia boards in other countries) that 
ensure and approve the products and services offered by the bank confirm to Islamic law. 
This feature of Islamic banking provides insights about the interplay between the state’s 
and theologist’s definitions as well as the influence of this duality on Islamic banks’ 
practices and arguments. 
Second, organic agriculture and Islamic banking differ in terms of who can offer the 
services and products. Formal banking law prohibits conventional banks to provide Islamic 
banking services or products. Although there are examples of conventional banks opening 
‘Islamic windows’ within their boundaries to provide interest-free services in the world, 
conventional banks in Turkey could not perform interest-free banking within the same 
organization when I started my research (thanks to amendments made in Banking Law, 
Ziraat Bank, a state owned conventional bank has started Islamic banking operations in 
2015 albeit under a separate entity named Ziraat Participation Bank). Organic farming can 
be done by any producer or firm as long as they follow the rules and regulations regarding 
organic farming and food production. On the same vein, organic products are commonly 
sold in supermarkets alongside with their conventional counterparts. This feature of 
organic farming adds to debates regarding ‘who is the organic food producer?’ and ‘what is 
an organic product?’. 
Third, organic agriculture and Islamic banking differ in terms of industry structure. 
There have been 7 Islamic banks licensed to operate until now. In May 2015, there were 4 
private Islamic banks functioning in Turkey. The first state-founded Islamic bank was 
licensed on May 14th, 2015 totaling to 5 Islamic banks operating in Turkey. All Islamic 
banks are legally obliged to be a member of Participation Banks Association of Turkey 
(Participation banks is the legal name for Islamic banks in Turkey) which is defined by law 
as a legal professional entity. Organic farming lacks such a legally defined professional 
association although there are local and national associations related to organic farming 
with varying degrees of focus to small farmers or larger industrialist. There are over 33,000 
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farmers active in organic agriculture as of 2014. I anticipated that this difference in 
industry structure may be linked to the variety of  accounts in these industries, and the role 
that collective producer action played in industry evolution. 
Fourth, Islamic banking compared to organic agriculture is a relatively more novel 
practice with no previous models. Organic agriculture in Turkey is usually associated with 
a memory/vision of traditional farming in older times when there were no chemicals/
hormones introduced. Islamic banking, on the other hand, has no clear referent from the 
past to be associated with. Moreover, Islamic banking, compared to organic agriculture is 
subject to more diverse contestation. Islamic banking, especially in its earlier times 
involved debates relating to role of religion in a secular Republic; such a conjunction was 
interpreted as a thereat to secular foundation of the country. Conversely, the place of a bank 
in Islamic economic model was also contested on the basis that there is no such model/
institution in fundamental sources of Islam. Associating the ‘bank’ with Western ideals and 
world views added to this debate. These political and ideological debates in Islamic 
banking brings empirical variety in debates involving industry emergence. 
!!!
2.2.1. Common Context !!
Initiation of organic agriculture and Islamic banking in Turkey coincides to mid 
1980s, a period characterized by major economic and political changes in Turkey. Below, I 
first provide factual information on national context and historical account in which both 
industries were born. My objective in this review is not to provide a detailed socio-political 
account of Turkey starting from 1980s, rather it is to highlight two events, transformation 
from state-led economy to export-oriented economy and military intervention, both 
occurred in 1980. 
The reason I am focusing on these two events, that are also related to a certain extent, 
is that their particular significance in terms of situating state’s objectives and involvement 
in organic agriculture and Islamic banking. Export oriented policies, for example, required 
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Turkey to align her legislation with EU for exporting food products. Opening up its borders 
for foreign investments, Turkey established Islamic banks to attract funds from gulf states. 
Concerns over political Islam that was part of the justification for the military intervention 
in 1980 were the driving force on incorporating Islamic banks into banking law in 1999. I 
attend to specific details of this common context as it relates to each case during the 
individual case descriptions in Sections 3.2.2. and 3.3.3. along with the key practices, 
actors and events in each industry. 
Turkey has a population of over 77 million, 91.8% of whom residing in province and 
district centers and 8.2% living in towns and villages as of December 2014 according to 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK, 2015). These figures were 77.3% and 22.7% 
respectively in 2012 and the major difference between 2012 and 2014 is due to changes in 
regulation regarding the administrative division. Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita was 10,404 $ in current prices in 2014 (TÜİK, 2015). 
Organic agriculture and Islamic banking are pretty small industries compared to their 
conventional counterparts both in Turkey and around the world. The agricultural sector 
accounts for 8.9% of Turkey’s GDP and provides 24.6% of country’s total employment as 
of 2012 (MoFAL, 2014). Proportion of organic agricultural land to the total agricultural 
land is 2% as of 2013 up from 0.2% in 2002. This is similar to that of Europe; 2.4% of 
farmland is organic in Europe (European Union 5.7%), Liechtenstein having the largest 
share 31%, followed by Austria (19.5%) (Willer and Lernoud, 2015). 0.6% of farmland is 
organic in U.S (Willer and Lernoud, 2015) 
The ratio of total assets of Turkish banking sector to GDP is 97% in 2012. As of 
September 2014, the share of Islamic banks in total banking assets, deposits and loans are 
5.3%, 6.2%, and 5.5% respectively, 3%, 4% 0.5% up from their respective values in 2000. 
In terms of the share of Islamic bank assets in total banking assets, Malaysia is the leader 
with 21% followed by United Arab Emirates with 19%. 
Prior to 1980, Turkey pursued Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy 
with highly interventionist and planned approach to economic affairs including agricultural 
production and banking system. Problems of ISI strategy coupled with international factors 
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like increases in oil prices put Turkey in severe economic crises in the second half  of the 
1970s. GNP growth rates declined from 10.7% in 1971 to -1.1 in 1980. Growth in the 
industrial sector decreased from an average of 9.3% in the first half of the 1970s to 1.9% in 
the second half (Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy, 2008). Inflation rate reached to 107.2% in 1980 
from 17% in 1972 (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). 
Following severe economic crises in late 70s, Turkey embarked upon a major 
program of structural adjustment in 1980. On 24 January 1980, a package of economic 
stability measures, which came be to be known as ‘January 24 Decisions’ was introduced 
to reduce state involvement in economic affairs. Through this stabilization program which 
was recommended and endorsed by IMF, import substitution policies of pre-1980 era 
characterized by protectionism, large public sector, and state intervention in the operation 
of market mechanisms were abandoned in favor of export-oriented, market-led economy 
(Öniş, 1992). The immediate goal of the program was reducing the inflation and the 
balancing the payment deficit; the long term goal was transferring to a market driven 
economy. To this end, certain policies such as privatization, monetarism, financial 
deregulation, reducing controls on prices, wages, exchange rates and interest rates and 
lowering taxation were pursued. The initial policy package involved a steep devaluation, 
deregulation of private-sector industrial prices, and huge increases in the prices of the 
state-owned economic enterprises (SEE) products and services; “45% for gasoline, 300% 
for paper and 400% for fertilizer against the backdrop of 70% inflation” (Celasun and 
Rodrik, 1989). 
Stabilization program provided some immediate results. The rate of inflation which 
saw three digit figures in 1980 was reduced to an average of 33.2% in the following two 
years (Boratav and Yeldan, 2000). However, some features of pre-1980 era continued well 
into mid 2000s, such as the persistence of SEEs (Öniş, 1997). The first major case of 
divestiture occurred in 1986, but stayed limited until 2002 (Republic of Turkey Prime 
Ministry Privatization Administration, 2010). The share of SEEs in Turkey’s GDP 
increased steadily from 7.9% in 1974 to 11.4 % in 1980, reaching 16.4% in 1986 and 
stayed over 10% until 2005 (compiled from Sayıştay (Turkish Court of Accounts) reports). 
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Since 2003, privatization implementations gained momentum decreasing the share of SEEs 
in GDP from 8.4% in 2005 to 2.4% in 2013 (compiled from Sayıştay (Turkish Court of 
Accounts) reports). 
Ten months after the initiation of the liberalization program, military took over the 
lead in Turkey on 18 September 1980. National Security Council (NSC) led by military 
junta governed the country for the next three years until 13 December 1983. The objective 
of the intervention was twofold; to re-establish the both economic and political stability to 
protect the unity of the country (Öniş, 1997). NSC stayed committed to the stabilization 
program as a means of establishing economic stability and kept the architect of the 
program, Turgut Özal then the undersecretary of prime minister, in charge. NSC’s 
commitment to market-orientated reform facilitated strict enforcement of the austerity 
measures. Under the military ruling, some bitter practices such as devaluation of the 
money, increases in interest rates and freeze on wages were executed without much public 
resistance since NSC seriously limited political rights such as strikes and free press. 
Domestic unrest due to violence between various political factions in late 1970s was 
another justification for military intervention. Fundamentalist demands from leftists as well 
as Islamic extremists were stated as a threat to the unity of the country and her secular, pro-
Western character (Öniş, 1997; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). In fact, one of the stated 
justifications for the intervention was a public rally of Islamic fundamentalists joined by a 
political party leader who called for the restoration of the Sharia six days before the coup. 
The military rule resulted in a drastic change in the political and social arena of 
Turkey. All the political parties were abolished and their leaders were banned from politics 
from five to ten years. Martial law commenders had taken over the administration in most 
of the country. They were vested with extensive powers over social and political life such 
as censorship of the press, radio, television and books and ban on union activities, 
meetings and any kind of demonstrations. But more importantly, NSC initiated several 
legal and structural changes including drafting a new constitution which was ratified by 
more than 90% of the population and passed on 18 October 1982. Revisions in universities 
law, in political parties law and electoral law prohibited the civil servants, educators and 
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students from joining political parties, all with the aim of restricting political activism and 
participation. 
Transition to parliamentary system occurred under the influence and control of the 
military rule. In april 1983, new political parties were allowed to be established by NSC. A 
national parliamentary election was held on 6 November 1983. Turgut Özal, who designed 
the economic liberalization program won the election and became prime minister on 13 
December 1983. After six days he took the office, on 19 December 1983, the Official 
Gazette of Turkish Republic announced a government decree no: 83/7506 regarding the 
establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey. 
!!!
2.2.2. Organic Agriculture  !!
2.2.2.1. Early beginnings !!
Certified organic agriculture started in Turkey in 1984 through the European market 
demand and with the initiation of the European companies. The aim was to produce 
certified organic dried fruits to export to Europe. Organic production in these early years 
followed initially the rules of the certification bodies based in Europe until 1991 and then 
EU regulation until 1994. In 1994, the first Turkish regulation on organic agriculture was 
issued which was similar in its core to the European Union’s regulation on organic 
agriculture, Reg: 2092/91. Current organic law (n. 5262) in Turkey was passed in 2004 and 
together with latest regulation issued on 18 August 2010 (Official Gazette n. 27676, with 
latest amendment in 2014), sets up the principles and procedures of organic farming in 
Turkey. 
According to this legislation, all kinds of inspection and certification relating to 
organic farming activities are performed either by the Ministry of Food Agriculture and 
Livestock (MoFAL) or Control and Certification bodies (CCB) authorized by the Ministry. 
Organic Agriculture Committee within the Ministry authorizes the CCBs (1) to carry out 
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the works to ensure that organic farming activities of the entrepreneurs comply with the 
provisions of the law and (2) issue organic certificates to confirm that inspected enterprise, 
organic product or input complies with the organic farming rules. The operations of CCBs 
are themselves subject to the control and supervision of the Ministry through Organic 
Agriculture Committee and the local organic farming units under 81 provincial 
directorates. As of November 2014, there are 28 authorized CCBs, 8 of which subsidiaries 
of EU based CCBs, operating in Turkey. 
Organic farming is an agricultural production system done according to certain 
principles such as sustaining the health of soils, ecosystems and people by not using inputs 
with adverse effects such as chemical fertilizers, growth hormones, and antibiotics. The 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), a leading umbrella 
non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 1972 uniting 800 member organizations 
in 120 countries, incorporates also the sensitivity to local conditions and biodiversity in its 
definition. IFOAM further states that “organic agriculture combines tradition, innovation 
and science to benefit the shared environment and promote fair relationships and a good 
quality of life for all involved” (IFOAM, 2015). 
This emphasis of common good was always present within organic farming 
community. Organic agriculture from its inception in Europe and North America after 
World War II, has been imbued with a moral plea to abandon pesticides and the chemicals 
for the sake of “our children,” the “local farmer,” and the environment, among others. 
Sustainability, animal welfare, genetically modified seeds, and the economic structure of 
food production are other issues deemed important within the scope of organic agriculture. 
Early experimentation with controlling and labeling organic agriculture practices 
started during 1940s in Europe and Northern America. In the early years, the farmers 
inspected one another on a voluntary basis, according to quite a general set of standards. 
Prior to 1985, all organic CCBs in the United States were local nonprofits (Lee, 2009). 
Until 2000, when federal level standards established in US, 35 states passed organic food 
laws exhibiting variation in their content (Lee, 2009). Turkey did not have this kind of 
experience with grass-root voluntary, non-profit, or differing control and certification 
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systems; the first CCBs in Turkey were subsidiaries of EU based CCBs following their 
homeland standards. 
Today third-party certification is a complex and formal process, required by the 
regulations of many governments for any kind of an “organic" (i.e. “ecologic” or 
“biologic”) claim on a product label. Currently there are hundreds of private organic 
standards worldwide; and in addition, organic standards have been codified in the technical 
regulations of more than 60 governments. Recently there have been concerns about the 
third party certification from both farmers and NGOs on the grounds that it is too 
expensive and cumbersome for small farmers. As a result, alternative certification systems 
such as Participatory Guarantee Systems are getting more attention and research from both 
NGOs and farmers worldwide, and to a lesser extent in Turkey. 
According to current legislation in Turkey, all the activities pertaining to plant 
production and animal breeding as well as harvesting, slaughtering, processing, packaging, 
conserving, storing, labeling, transporting, marketing, importing and exporting are 
controlled and registered by the authorized CCBs. If CCBs decide that these activities are 
carried out according to the rules in the organic agriculture legislation, then they grant 
“organic label” to the inspected enterprise, organic product or input guaranteeing an 
organic production system was followed. To this end, organic farming legislation mandates 
that before any organic farming activity is started, the entrepreneur, real or judicial person 
intending to involve in any of the organic farming activities from production to packaging 
and marketing, should apply to an authorized CCB with all the necessary information and 
documentation. If the CCB decides that the entrepreneur is eligible for starting organic 
farming, then a contract is signed between the entrepreneur and the CCB indicating a 
written agreement to comply with the provisions of the current regulation regarding to 
agricultural activities. From then on, entrepreneurs are under obligation to submit all 
information and documentation concerning the organic activities they perform to the CCB 
with which they have a contract. These information and documents provide a basis for the 
CCB’s control function and are registered to the information system within MoFAL by the 
CCB. 
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CCBs collect a detailed and a wide range of information about the entrepreneur and 
the production method including but not limited to the following: layout schematics for the 
enterprise and facilities; all plans and cadastral sketches concerning the parcels of land or 
the area; current machinery and equipment in the holding; previously applied production 
methods; product alternation plan; logbooks for all inputs to be used; the properties of the 
holding, purchasing and selling records for goods procured externally; and production 
plan, specifications of the product, inventory status, quantity, packaging type and material. 
Then CCB prepares a control plan based on these information and inspects the holding at 
least annually, with or without prior notice. If the results of the first control are satisfactory 
according to the regulation, then the entrepreneur and the products he/she produced are 
granted organic certification. 
!!!
2.2.2.2. Context  !!
Initiated by foreign demand for foreign trade rather than by state or local grassroots 
movements, organic farming in Turkey was operating pretty much independently from 
agricultural policies and regulations until 1994. The economic transformation of 1980s and 
their influence on agriculture policies, however, put Turkey in a track to accept 
international agreements and adopt European agricultural policies. These policies 
promoted environment friendly agricultural activities and become further impetus for 
organic agriculture. 
Prior to 1980, state played active role on the agricultural price supports and market 
guarantees, agricultural input production and distribution and food price controls. SEEs 
and Agricultural Credit Cooperatives were commissioned to buy commodities such as 
cereals, tobacco, tea and sugar beet from farmers at prices determined by the government. 
Milk processing and marketing, meat slaughter and marketing, sugar production, vegetable 
oil production and marketing, agricultural tractor production, seed production and 
distribution were all done by the state-owned or -controlled enterprises. Input subsidies 
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were provided on a temporary basis for fertilizers, seed, feed grain and agricultural 
chemicals. 
24 January Decisions that initiated the liberalization program in 1980 also 
hallmarked the beginning of long term changes in agricultural policies. According to this 
program, the government committed that fuel prices, agricultural products base prices and 
state-controlled enterprises’ prices will be set up in a manner that prevents inflation. What 
this decision meant in terms of agriculture policies is that government subsidies and base 
prices in agriculture were to be reduced. The number of agricultural products that were 
subsidized was also reduced from 24 in 1980 to 10 in 1990 and 3 in 1994 (Öztürk, Nas and 
İçöz, 2008). Moreover, in mid 1990s, privatization of the state-owned or state-controlled 
organizations related to agriculture was initiated. 
Although the initial changes in agricultural policies that break from pre-80’s 
protectionist policies began with 24 January 1980 Decision, it was in the beginning of 
2000 that the full blown structural changes were introduced in agriculture. The motivation 
for the agricultural reform was both to decrease the burden of agriculture on the economy 
after 1999 economic crises and to conform internationally binding and non-binding 
pressures such as Uruguay Round agreement on agricultural trade, the accession 
negotiations with the EU which put ‘adjusting to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)’ 
on political agenda, the 1999 agreement with the IMF reforming agricultural policy, and 
the agreement with the World Bank as an important financial supporter for the Agricultural 
Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) (Köse, 2012). 
In 2001, under the auspices of the World Bank, ARIP was launched and put into 
implementation over 2001-2008. Its main objective was to bring about a move towards a 
more market-oriented agricultural policy through following such measures as the abolition 
of the administered output prices; the elimination of input and credit subsidies; the 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises and Agricultural Sales Cooperative Unions 
(ASCUs); and the introduction of direct income support (DIS) decoupled from commodity 
production (OECD, 2011). 
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In addition to these measures, several additional steps have been taken to harmonize 
Turkey’s agricultural policies and institutional framework with those of the EU. For 
example, agro-environmental issues have attained more prominence with the process of the 
EU accession negotiations, as the adoption of the EU’s acquis (Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatı) 
emphasizes the integration of environmental concerns and good practices in land 
management and rural development in general. To this end, The Environmentally Based 
Agricultural Land Protection Program (ÇATAK; Çevre Amaçlı Tarım Alanlarının 
Korunması) came into effect in 2005, as part of the ARIP program. The objectives of 
ÇATAK are to protect the quality of soil and water resources in agricultural lands, to 
ensure the sustainability of renewable natural resources, and to decrease the adverse effects 
of intensive agricultural activities. 
ÇATAK was fully financed by the World Bank for the 2005-09 period. In 2009, 
Turkey assumed full financial responsibility for the project and is to run it until 2016. 
ÇATAK is exercised within the scope of Agriculture Law (not the Organic Agriculture 
Law) and promotes organic agriculture as one of the tools for environmentally friendly 
agricultural land protection in degraded areas through farmer trainings and supports. 
Organic agriculture is also promoted as a tool for rural development and is part of the 
National Rural Development Strategy within the scope of EU’s Instrument Pre-Accession 
Assistance in Rural Development program. 
!!!
2.2.2.3. Legislation !!
From its start in 1984 until 1991, organic production and exportation in Turkey 
followed the rules of the legislations of importing European countries. In 1991, the first 
EU-wide regulation on organic farming, EU Reg. 2091/91, was accepted and became the 
base for organic farming in Turkey. The following year, with EU Reg. 94/92, EU defined 
the conditions that the third countries exporting organic products to EU had to meet. One 
of the conditions was that non EU countries had to formulate their own organic farming 
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regulations and apply to EU with a file that covers the related technical and administrative 
issues. 
Exporting almost all her organic produce to Europe, Turkey issued her first 
regulation on organic farming on 24 December 1994 (Official Gazette n. 22145) to comply 
with the EU rules. This regulation was similar in its core to the EU’s regulation on organic 
agriculture and covered the rules on ecological production (the choice of term was 
ecological instead of organic) and labeling and introduced the control and certification 
system. According to this regulation, MoFAL, then the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs (MARA), would authorize CCBs to inspect and certify all stages of the organic 
production and marketing. Moreover, the regulation stated that these CCBs were obliged to 
become a member of the Association of Ecological Farming Organization (ETO) (This 
obligation was removed in later regulations). 
ETO, the earliest NGOs in organic farming founded in 1992, worked closely with 
MARA and involved actively for providing technical trainings and seminars to increase the 
awareness in organic production methods among farmers. ETO also organized conferences 
including four national organic agriculture symposiums and partnered in national and 
international projects.  
The regulation also established two committees within MARA; “Ecological Farming 
Committee” and “Ecological Farming National Steering Committee”. The former was 
composed of members coming from related departments of the MARA and responsible for 
issuing licenses to CCBs and supervising the activities of those bodies. The latter was 
composed of members from different ministries, universities, professional organizations 
and NGOs and responsible for developing the strategies for the trade and promotion of 
organic farming. 1994’s regulation was amended in 1995 to include sanction measures. 
The same year, Turkey prepared the technical file indicating her conformity to the EU 
organic farming regulation (Reg. 2092/91) to be able to export organic products to the EU, 
and submitted it to the related Commission. 
A new regulation on 11 July 2002 was issued at Official Gazette n. 24812 to follow 
up with the changes in EU’s organic regulation. Different than the 1994’s regulation, the 
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term ‘organic’ used instead of ‘ecologic’ with a note indicating that ‘organic’, ‘ecologic’, 
and ‘biologic’ were taken as equivalent terms. This new regulation also introduced Turkish 
organic logo for the first time and made the use of this logo compulsory in the labeling of 
organic products. Previously, labeling mandated the usage of phrase ‘ecologic’. 2002’s 
regulation renamed the two committees established by the previous regulation as “Organic 
Farming Committee” and “Organic Farming National Steering Committee”. It also formed 
two more committees within MARA; “Organic Agriculture National Commerce 
Committee” and “Organic Agriculture Project and Research National Committee”, the 
former worked on developing national and international trade of organic products and the 
latter worked on research and project development in organic agriculture. These two 
committees were removed in later regulations. 
In 2003, under General Directorate of Agricultural Production and Improvement 
within MARA, the Department of the Alternative Agricultural Production Techniques was 
established and made responsible for all the organic farming activities in the name of 
Ministry. Later, both the General Directorate and Department was reorganized and 
renamed as part of the restructuring in MARA in 2011 which is explained below. 
On 3 December 2004, the current Organic Farming Law n. 5262 came in force and a 
new regulation based on this law was issued on 10 June 2005 (Official Gazette n. 25841). 
This regulation was amended in 2006, 2008, and 2009 to be aligned with the changes in 
EU’s organic regulation. The law and the regulations made changes related to the control 
and certification system and explicitly defined and banned the Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMO) in organic agriculture. The law further required that national, regional 
and local radio and TV stations to broadcast educative programs about organic farming for 
at least 30 minutes a month. In 2005, Organic farming units under 81 provincial 
directorates were established and held responsible for the supervision of CCBs along with 
Organic Farming Committee. Organic Agriculture Information System was founded in the 
same year within MARA. 2008’s amendment obliged CCBs to enter a wide range of 
information regarding the farmer and the control plan to this system. Moreover, the same 
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amendment required that CCBs should be accredited according to national or international 
standards to be able to get license from the Ministry. 
EU Reg. 2091/91 was abolished and organic agriculture became regulated according 
to EU Reg. 834/2007, 889/2008 and 1235/2008 starting from January 1st, 2009 in Europe. 
To follow up changes in new EU legislation, Turkey issued a new organic agriculture 
regulation on 18 August 2010 (Official Gazette n. 27676) with further amendments 
following each year until 2014. Changes were related to the composition and duties of 
committees as well as the elaborations of rules on the method of organic plant and animal 
production, labeling and marketing. 
In 2011, MARA, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, was reorganized as 
Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock (MoFAL). The same year, under General 
Directorate of Plant Production within the ministry, the Department of Good Agricultural 
Practices and Organic Farming was established. The main responsibilities of the 
department are: developing strategies and policies to develop organic farming and good 
agricultural practices; following the changes in EU legislation and preparing legislative 
proposals as needed; providing training for organic farming units; and managing organic 
agriculture information system.  
With this restructuring both organic farming and Good Agricultural Practices are 
organized under the same department; that the Department is responsible for foreseeing 
both organic and conventional agriculture. Good Agricultural Practices is basically 
conventional farming with formal certification guaranteeing that conventional agricultural 
inputs were used properly following their suggested timeline and dosage. Production of 
livestock and fisheries according to organic farming method is regulated with organic 
farming legislation. As such, MoFAL’s current structure organizes organic livestock and 
fisheries under General Directorate of Plant Production instead of General Directorate of 
Livestock and General Directorate of Fisheries and Aquaculture respectively. 
MoFAL announced the second Organic Agriculture National Action Plan for the 
period 2013-2016 in 2013. The objectives of this action plan is very similar to the first 
Organic Agriculture National Action Plan which was introduced in 2007 by the Ministry 
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and stated as “supporting the development of organic agriculture to increase production, 
consumption and the market share of organic produces” (TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015). 
To this end, action plan addresses five main areas: development and expansion of organic 
agriculture (focusing on subtopics such as legislative issues, alternative marketing 
channels, increasing awareness in public, and support for farmers); improving control and 
certification system (focusing on subtopics such as increasing the effectiveness of 
inspection mechanism and trainings); improving traceability through data collection 
system (focusing on subtopics such as data infrastructure and information sharing); 
training (focusing on subtopics such as producer, consumer and trader trainings, media 
advertisements and conferences); and institutional capacity development (focusing on 
subtopics such as coordination and network development among stakeholders). Action plan 
was prepared by taking the opinions of several organizations from public and private 
sector, NGOs, universities, and CCBs. 
!!!
2.2.2.4. Actors !!
2.2.2.4.1. State !!
As it is explained above, initial motivation for organic agriculture in Turkey was 
strictly economic and state’s involvement in organic agriculture started through the 
obligations set forth by EU for third countries exporting organic products to EU. To 
comply with EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and organic farming regulations, the state 
stepped in and involved in organic agriculture through legislations, trainings and strategy 
building since 1994. 
!!!!!
"52
2.2.2.4.2. Associations: ETO, ORGÜDER and Buğday !!
Ecologic Agriculture Organization (ETO), the earliest NGO in organic faming in 
Turkey, is mainly concerned with the technical and economic side of organic farming 
rather than creating a social consciousness for environment, health, or biodiversity. The 
aim of the association is stated in its ordinance as: promoting ecological farming and 
supporting scientific research about ecologic farming; organizing and supporting activities 
among people and institutions who are involved in technical and commercial aspects of 
ecologic farming; working to develop domestic and foreign markets for ecologic products 
and; being a part of the solution to the problems regarding production, management and 
marketing of ecologic products by cooperating with domestic and international public and 
civil organizations (ETO, 2015). In line with this vision, ETO was mostly active in 
providing technical/agricultural trainings to farmers and communicating with and acting as 
an advisor to government on training, legislation and trading issues. 
Organic Product Producers and Industrialists Association (ORGÜDER) is founded 
by seven large organic product producers/traders in 2004. Association’s aim is to ‘develop 
the occupational solidarity and cooperation’, ensure ‘the regular, safe and stable 
functioning and development of the organic products market’ and ‘develop export 
possibilities in the foreign markets’ (ORGÜDER, 2015). Similar to ETO, ORGÜDER too 
is mainly interested in promoting, trading and legislation issues. 
In early 1990s a group of activists and farmers started to promote more holistic 
approach by advocating ecological living. The oldest of such initiative is Buğday (stands 
for ‘Wheat’ in Turkish) movement, which was started from Buğday Vegetarian Cafe 
founded by Victor Ananias in 1992. The Cafe was the first all-organic store, restaurant and 
eco-cultural center in Turkey promoting healthy food and ecological living through 
meetings, seminars, courses, and exhibitions. Ananias and his friends started publishing bi-
monthly ecological living bulletin in 1998 which was transformed to Buğday Magazine a 
year later and is still published today (under the name of Buğday Ecological Living Guide 
since 2009). Buğday was the first magazine dedicated solely to ecological living. Buğday 
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Magazine, later Buğday Ecological Living Guide, since its first issue in 1999, has been 
communicating information ranging from ecologic agriculture, eco villages, eco-tourism 
and urban gardening to international and national conferences on ecological farming. 
Healthy living and nutrition, recycling, GMO and legislation news also features frequently. 
Buğday Ecological Living Guide is sent to members in paper and made available on-line. 
Buğday movement has been operating as an NGO since 12 August 2002 under the 
name of Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological Living and played a crucial role in 
the initiation of domestic organic market. The aim of the association is explained in its 
ordinance as: creating ecological awareness and sensitivity in both individuals and in 
society as a whole; providing solutions to problems that arise as a result of fast and 
irreversible deterioration in ecological balances; and promoting living in harmony with 
nature (Buğday, 2015). 
To this end, Buğday has been active in diverse areas such as establishing TaTuTa, 
eco-agro tourism and voluntary exchange program in 2003; executing first community 
supported organic city garden project in 2005; establishing first organic farmers’ market in 
Şişli, İstanbul in 2006; founding Turkey’s seed network in 2008; and opening Çamtepe 
rural research and education center in 2010. Buğday also sends weekly electronic bulletins 
since 2004, providing news about events and projects related to ecological issues to more 
than 13,000 on-line subscribers (as of 2006). Moreover, the association runs weekly half an 
hour radio program named “Ecological living from seed to harvest”, interviewing people 
regarding various issues such as pollution, climate change, sustainability, consumption, 
healthy living and GMO. Buğday has 2000 members as of 2012.  
Buğday founded 10 nationwide organic farmers’ markets under the name of ‘100% 
Ecological Market’ with the support of local municipalities. 2 of them were later closed. 
Şişli 100% Ecological Market, the first and biggest organic farmers’ market in Turkey was 
founded by Buğday in Şişli, İstanbul in 2006. People from Buğday are always present in 
these markets and active in supervising and collecting data from sellers. Both producers, 
and traders can sell organic products in these markets, but producers dominate (47 
producers versus 18 traders according to 2013 Şişli farmers’ market data). Şişli 100% 
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Ecological Market started with 25 stalls and around 4 tons of weekly sales in 2006. As of 
2013, it has 65 stall owners having 276 stalls and weekly sales reaching to 15 tons of 
produce. 
Organic farmers’ markets that are founded by Buğday host a variety of organic 
certified products, ranging from fresh produce to packaged foods, textiles, cosmetics, 
cleaning supplies etc. Buğday uses these weekly farmers’ markets actively to increase 
consumer awareness through organizing seminars, hands-on trainings, hosting concerts and 
movie screenings and just bringing consumers and producers together. 
With the advocacy of Buğday, organic farmers’ markets were included in the 
‘Regulations on Market Places’ and became official in 2012. According to this regulation, 
local municipalities were granted legal authority to establish organic farmers’ market. As of 
2014, there are 20 organic farmers’ markets operating nationwide (two of which are 
seasonal), established with the collaboration of NGOs and local municipalities. 
Victor Ananias, the founder of Buğday Movement and the association, passed away 
in 2011 but the association continuous to play an active role in the organic farming in 
Turkey. It is well connected to international organic farming network; Buğday is a member 
of IFOAM and hosted IFOAM’s 18th Organic World Congress in İstanbul between 13-15 
October in 2014, which is the most known congress about organic agriculture in the world. 
It is also member of European Environmental Bureau (EEB), and holds the secretariat of 
ECEAT -International (European Centre for Ecological and Agricultural Tourism) and 
represents the association legally. Moreover, Buğday works closely and in cooperation 
with: MoFAL, BioFach (trade fair for organic food and agriculture), GEN-Europe (Global 
Ecovillage Network – Europe), and WWOOF (World Wide Opportunities on Organic 
Farms which facilitates placement of volunteers on organic farms). Buğday participated 
government led EU projects such as the development of national agro-environment 
program. It is also the member of Organic Farming National Steering Committee within 
MoFAL and worked in the formation of Organic Agriculture National Action Plan. Buğday 
is well informed about international trends and developments in organic farming such as 
voluntary certification systems that oppose to third party certification, and community 
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supported agriculture. However, it is one of the leading NGOs in Turkey that promotes 
formally certified organic farming. 
!!!
2.2.2.4.3. Producers who use similar methods to organic agriculture but outside the 
certification system !!
There is another group of people who do not use pesticides, chemicals, or hormones, 
practicing non-conventional agriculture, yet also stay apart form certified organic farming. 
I include them as one of the actors as they are acknowledged and frequently mentioned 
among certified organic producers either for their stance against certified organic 
agriculture or for using similar methods. 
The most vocal of them is Pınar Kaftancıoğlu who is just awarded 2014’s “woman 
entrepreneur of the year who generates local impact” by the Women Entrepreneurs 
Association of Turkey. Once a corporate businesswoman, she escaped from big city life to 
a rural area in 1997. In 2006, she founded ‘Miss İpek’s farm’ (İpek Hanım’ın Çiftliği) for 
her personal living and enjoyment. Experimenting with farming and producing her own 
food with the help of a few local people, she started to send the farm’s excess produce to 
her family and friends in cities for free. Soon her reputation grew, and the friends of her 
friends were asking for delivery. When the demand for her vegetables and fruits increased 
she started to use weekly box scheme to sell her produce. In the meantime she expanded 
her farm with the help and knowledge of local people. Currently, she employs 108 people 
from the local community, mostly women, working in farming, baking, cheese making and 
packaging. This number goes up to 200 with seasonal workers (Kaftancıoğlu, 2014). 
The farm cultivates dozens of farms in Nazilli, a province in the west of Turkey, in 
varying sizes from 5 to 200 acres totaling nearly 2000 acres. They grow vegetables and 
fruits that are suitable to the local soil and climate, like zucchini, eggplant, potato, 
cucumber, carrot etc. In 2013, she moved wheat and legume plantation to her homeland 
Kars, another city in the north east of Turkey. They also have cows and produce milk and 
milk products. In addition to that they make and sell jams, canned vegetables, a variety of 
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bakery products, soap etc. She do not produce or sell any meat products as she is a 
vegetarian. 
People who wants to buy food from the farm, send Pınar Kaftancıoğlu an e-mail 
stating their intention. She adds them to her e-mail list and the would-be customer starts to 
get weekly e-mails from her. These e-mails contain news from the farm as well as her 
opinions and insider knowledge about agriculture and food sectors. It also includes an 
spreadsheet containing the information about that week’s produce and price. Consumers 
who want to order produce reply the e-mail with a spreadsheet indicating their choices and 
make the payment when they got their delivery. She currently sends boxes to 3000 regular 
customers weekly, reaching out as many as 26000 customers with non-regular buyers 
(Portakal Ağacı, 2014). She says her customers includes mothers, business people, 
politicians, artists, writers, academicians, doctors, bureaucrats and even the owners of 
organic food producers. 
Kaftancıoğlu’s weekly e-mails are interactive, asking for the feedback and 
suggestions for products, asking for opinions and involvement for her new projects, 
answering customer questions, sharing customer comments, and giving news from the 
farm such as visitors, trainings, TV or newspaper interviews, inclusion as part of books or 
academic research etc. She also writes intensively about the problems in agriculture and 
food sector, mostly the frauds in the system, and the unfair economic structure of the food 
production. She hosts visitors (customers, schools, associations and organizations) in the 
farm, and provides advisory help for people who wants to grow his/her own food. She also 
gives frequent speeches at universities, schools, fairs, conferences and similar venues. 
Kaftancıoğlu emphasizes that she does not practice certified organic farming, and is 
opposed to organic agriculture as defined by law and as practiced by other producers. 
There are a few reasons for her distaste for organic label that she shared in her e-mails. 
First, she does not trust the certification process and claims it is impossible to control the 
non-use of pesticides, hormones or artificial fertilizers thus the system is open to abuse by 
producers and CCBs. Second, she claims that certified organic agriculture leads to 
exclusion of small farmers since they lack the resources for such an expensive and 
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cumbersome process. Third, she claims it is a foreign system that furthers the interests of a 
few international firms that monopolize the organic agriculture inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides. 
Not all non-conventional producers have such a stance against certified organic 
agriculture. The Genç family, the owner of a small-scale farm, Üç Elma Doğal Tarım 
Çiftliği (Three Apples Natural Agriculture Farm) is one of the well-known producers that 
emphasize phrases like small-scale, local seeds, biodiversity, natural and traditional 
methods based on local wisdom, avoiding the term ‘organic’ but without directly opposing 
certified organic agriculture. 
!!!
2.2.2.5. Growth over time !!
Up until 2002, there is no reliable data about organic farming in Turkey. Although 
Aegean Exporters' association collected some data on the amount and kind of organic 
products exported since 1998, MoFAL warns that those figures do not represent the whole 
figures. ETO started to collect unofficial data in 1990 through the control and certification 
bodies, but it was not systematic and comprehensive. The first regulation put into force in 
1994, officially hold Ministry as responsible for data collection starting in 1996. However 
the Ministry shares only those data collected after 2002 on the grounds that the earlier data 
is not reliable. 
With the establishment of organic farming information system in 2005, the Ministry 
collects detailed and wide range of data through control and certification bodies such as 
identity information regarding farmer, producer, controller and certifier; size and 
geographic information of the land including its usage history; kinds and characteristics of 
the products; the amount of estimated and realized production; the year of harvest and 
production; and the import and export information of the product. Currently, the ministry 
shares only the number of holdings, the size of land and the volume regarding yearly 
organic agricultural production. 
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The agricultural sector accounts for 8.9% of Turkey’s GDP and provides 24.6% of 
country’s total employment as of 2012 (MoFAL 2014). Although these figures are down 
from 22% and 50% from their respective values in 1980, Turkey ranks as the 7th larger 
agricultural producer in the world as of 2013 (OECD, 2014). However, proportion of 
organic agricultural land to the total agricultural land is mere 2% as of 2013 up from 0.2% 
in 2002. According to MoFAL, 60,797 holdings engaged in organic crop production, 
organically cultivated 769,014 hectares of land and harvested 1,620,466 tons of 213 
different agricultural crops in 2013. These values are up from 12,428 holdings cultivating 
89,827 hectares of land and harvesting 310,125 tons of 150 different crops in 2002, 
reflecting 389%, 756%, 422%, 42% increase in the numbers of holdings; the size of the 
land; the volume of the production; and the number of crops respectively. The changes in 
these figures for 2002-2013 period are shown in Table 2.1. 
!
Table 2.1 
Organic crop production (transition period included), 2002-2013 
!
 In spite of this improvement, organic agricultural land remains as low as 2% of total 
agricultural land. Organic animal husbandry is much smaller and only for domestic market; 
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151 farmers breeding just over 253,000 animals, producing 480 tons of meat and 17,627 
tons of milk as of 2013. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the main events in the trajectory of organic agriculture in 
Turkey. 
!
Table 2.2 
Main events in the trajectory of organic agriculture in Turkey 
!
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2.2.3. Islamic Banking !!
2.2.3.1. Early beginnings !!
Islamic banking is widely acknowledged to have its roots in the Mit Gahmr Savings 
Bank in Egypt, founded in 1963 and operated until 1967 (Alim, 2014). It functioned more 
along the lines of an interest-free cooperative credit union (Alim, 2014). The first for-profit 
Islamic bank opened in Dubai in 1975. Currently there are 251 Islamic banks operating in 
more than 60 countries worldwide with total assets over $1.2 trillion, more than half of 
which concentrated in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Iran (Zawya, 2014). Turkey ranks 8th, 
with nearly $45 billion Islamic banking assets. Moreover, there are more than 100 
conventional financial institutions involved with Islamic finance through ‘Islamic 
windows’, the most well-known of them are Barclays, Citi, Deutsche Bank and HSBC. 
Conventional banks’ involvement in Islamic finance under the same organization is 
legally not possible in Turkey. However it is legally possible for a conventional bank to 
establish an Islamic bank as a separate entity. In practice, though, the conventional bank 
would need interest-free capital for establishing an Islamic bank which is difficult to prove. 
A state-owned conventional bank recently established an Islamic bank on May 2015 with 
its full capital paid by the Turkish Treasury. 
The single early experiment with interest-free banking in Turkey was a state-owned 
investment bank called State Industry and Worker Investment Bank (Devlet Sanayi ve İşçi 
Yatırım Bankası DESİYAB). DESİYAB was founded in 1975 with a clear mission to 
channel remittance from Turkish diaspora especially in Europe to build and operate 
industrial firms based on multi-partnership and profit sharing (Gallina, 2006). DESİYAB 
operated without interest for its first three years until its board repealed its interest-free 
principle in 1978. It was later transformed to Development Bank of Turkey in 1988. 
The first Islamic banks in Turkey, were established in 1984 following a government 
decree no: 83/7506. The government’s aim was to attract capital from both domestic 
consumers and Gulf states by providing an interest-free banking option (Pakdemirli, 2000). 
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They were initially named Special Finance Houses (SFHs) and their first implementations 
in 1984 were Albaraka Türk and Faisal Finans which were subsidiaries of established 
Islamic banks from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia respectively. In 1999 with Banking Law no. 
4389, Special Finance Houses were brought under the same regulation as conventional 
banks without being defined as a ‘bank’. In 2005 with Banking Law no. 5411, they were 
renamed as Participation Banks and defined as a third type of banking along with deposit 
banks, and development and investment banks in Turkey. 
As of December 2015, 5 Islamic banks in Turkey operate within the banking system 
with conventional banks and are subject to the same Banking Law and supervision 
authorities. However, different than conventional banks, each Islamic banks’ products and 
services are supervised and endorsed by a group of Islamic law experts for their conformity 
to Islamic law. For this purpose, although not required legally, each Islamic bank in Turkey 
has its own Advisory Board, that is Sharia Board as commonly referred to in other 
countries. 
The term Islamic banking refers to a system of banking that is consistent with 
Islamic law principles and guided by Islamic economics. In particular, Islamic law 
prohibits transacting with interest, investing in businesses that are considered unlawful, or 
haraam (such as businesses involving alcohol, gambling etc.), and engaging speculative 
transactions (such as conventional derivate instruments) thus Islamic banks restrain from 
all these practices. 
The basis for the existence of Islamic banking is the Islamic prohibition on charging 
interest. Interest-based system is the central component of conventional banks today that 
works on the basis of a risk-free, pre-determined return. A borrower who takes a loan from 
a conventional bank to invest in a business for example, is required to pay back to the bank 
the original loan plus a pre-determined excess at the end of the term, regardless of his 
earnings from his investment. The bank’s earning does not depend on the borrower’s 
success or failure in his investment. This kind of transaction is deemed unfair and 
problematic by Islam in either way (Özsoy, 1995). If the borrower’s earnings from his 
investment is grand, pre-determined rate could be disproportional and unfair as far as the 
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bank is concerned. If the borrower’s investment failed the bank still get its money which is 
also deemed unfair and haraam in Islam. Similarly, a lender who deposit money to the 
bank earn pre-determined income at the end of the term, detached from banks’ earnings. It 
is this risk free structure of interest-based system problematized within Islamic economics 
and Islamic banking. According to this thinking, inequality in the distribution of wealth 
and stagnation in productive enterprises are related to this risk transfer nature of interest-
based system because it encourages people to put their money in a bank rather than 
actively participating in real economy and result in unfair sharing of loss and profits. 
However, there is a continuing debate about what constitutes interest and whether the 
Quranic prohibition of interest encompass the institution of interest as we know it today. 
Some argue that what Quran bans is the pre-Islamic institution of riba which involves 
charging extremely high rates of interest that may result in enslavement if the debt is not 
paid. In spite of this debate regarding the form of interest, there is a consensus that it is 
sinful and should be avoided. Moral discourse of Islamic economics encompasses wider 
moral arguments than justice and equality that are voiced within the Islamic banking 
practice. Aspects of economic life, according to Islam, should foster self sacrifice, altruism 
and brotherhood in favor of society. 
Islamic banking is based on the idea of loss and profit sharing which is the extension 
of the idea of risk sharing. The bank and the customers are conceptualized as business 
partners who share the risk of business by participating the losses and profits of the 
venture. The principle of risk sharing and participation to the losses and profits exclude a 
pre-determined, guaranteed return, i.e. interest. Thus all the operations of Islamic banks 
have to include some risk of loss and avoid a pre-determined rate. Moreover, Islamic banks 
can involve in trade by buying and selling product since trade is permissible in Islam. 
Within this framework Islamic banks utilize financing methods through direct 
partnership which is based on profit and loss sharing (mudarabah and musharakah); 
indirect trade financing (murabaha); and leasing (ijarah). Mudarabah financing is a labor-
capital partnership which is similar to venture capital in that the bank provides the capital 
and the customer invest the capital in a project. The profit is shared between the bank and 
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the customer according to a pre-agreed ratio. In the case of loss, the bank loses its money 
and the customer loses his labor. Musharakah is similar to joint venture and is based on the 
same principle as mudarabah, the only difference being both parties, the bank and the 
customer, provide the capital to invest in a business. They are still partners who share the 
risk and the loss or profit incurred in the end according to their capital contribution. While 
mudarabah and musharakah are deemed as the most appropriate financing methods that 
suit the ideal of Islamic banking, they are the least utilized. The stated reasons include lack 
of infrastructure, capacity and demand among many others. 
Murabaha is the most utilized financing method in Islamic banking in Turkey and in 
other countries and refers to a particular kind of sale. In murabaha, the bank buys the good 
demanded by the customer and sells it to the customer by adding a mark-up profit as 
compensation for its service. The cost of the good and the profit added by the bank is 
transparent and made known to the buyer. What makes this transaction legitimate 
according to Islam is that it is a trade because bank takes ownership of the product for 
some time exposing itself to risk (Kuran, 2004). 
The fact that Islamic banks in Turkey almost exclusively utilize murabaha is 
criticized on the basis that murabaha is not related to the basic tenet of Islamic banking, the 
principle of partnership, and that "service charge" or “markup profit" is merely another 
name for interest. The counterargument is that since the acts of buying and selling do really 
happen, it is considered as a trade thus the profit is legitimate and cannot be considered as 
interest. 
Islamic banks can also involve in leasing (ijarah), by making the use of equipments 
such as motor vehicles or office spaces available to the customer for a fixed period and 
price. There are some operational differences between Islamic leasing and conventional 
leasing such as; for conventional leasing, the rental starts as soon as the agreement is done 
and for ijarah it starts when the asset is supplied to the lessee, and the risk of the assets 
belongs to the lessee in the conventional leasing, while it is borne by the bank in ijarah. 
Hayrettin Karaman, the leading Islamic economics professor who is in Advisory 
Boards of at least two Islamic banks in Turkey, criticizes both murabaha and ijarah on the 
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basis that the current executions of these two services are problematic according to Islamic 
law and proposes a change in the legislation (Karaman, 2014). His criticisms involve the 
technicalities regarding the contracts for those services to be legitimate such as billing 
requirements for murabaha, and banks as being responsible for the insurance of the leased 
assets. 
!!!
2.2.3.2. Context !!
Government decree regarding to establishment of Islamic banks was announced six 
days after Turkey returned to parliamentary democracy from a three-year military rule. 
Politically, it was a time of depoliticization where extreme left and right opinions including 
the Islamist views were under the military pressure. It was also a time when Turkey was 
implementing a major economic liberalization program in financial sector and capital 
movements. 
What this economic restructuring meant in terms of banking industry is that now 
banks need to operate in an environment which was very different than the previous state-
led economy where deposit/loan interest rates, exchange rates, loan limits and banking 
commission rates were all determined by the government (Conkar, Keskin and Kayahan, 
2009; Öniş, 1992). This was a much more volatile environment where legal restrictions on 
deposit and loan interest rates were removed, banks were allowed to issue negotiable 
certificates of deposits (CDs), and new domestic and foreign banks were allowed to be 
established. Banking industry was introduced several new practices including international 
supervision and international banking standards like uniform chart of accounts and external 
audit. Some of the other important changes in terms of banking industry initiated through 
1980s were; establishment of Saving Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) in 1983, 
establishment of Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986, starting of open market operations by 
Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) in 1987, establishment of foreign exchange markets in 
"65
1988, freeing foreign exchange transactions and capital movements in 1989 and allowing 
non residents to open turkish lira and foreign exchange deposit accounts in Turkey. 
Adjustment was not easy. The first major crisis broke out in 1982 followed by 
resignation of the top economic team led by Turgut Özal who was in charge of 
liberalization program. It was during early 1980s that banks used brokerage houses, both 
their own subsidiaries and independent ones, to increase their share in deposits. Banks 
issued CDs to brokerage houses in large volumes at a discount and the brokers would resell 
the CDs to the public at par. Realizing that brokerage houses were involved in highly risky 
credit transactions, on November 1981 monetary authorities prohibited banks from 
marketing CDs through brokers. However it did not stop some brokerage firms selling CDs 
and the system collapsed, leading a major crisis, known as ‘banker crisis’ in mid-1982. 
!!!
2.2.3.3. Legislation !!
From their establishment with a government decree no. 83/7506 in 19 December 
1983 until their inclusion in banking law in 19 December 1999, Special Finance Houses’s 
(SFHs) were regulated according to the government, central bank and undersecretariat of 
treasury decrees. In their inception, they were regarded as non-bank financial institutions 
and as such were outside the banking system and the banking law. SFHs’ legal base was 
the subject of continuous criticism from their start on the basis that they were not properly 
regulated and favored against conventional banks resulting in an unfair competition. 
Debates around their legal base within a particular set of contextual conditions explained 
below, led to inclusion of SHFs into the banking system with the amendments of Banking 
Law n. 4389 twice, first in 19 December 1999 and then in 29 May 2001. 
The process that was ended with SFHs’ inclusion into the banking law in 1999 
started with the state’s intention to shut down or convert the SFHs into conventional banks 
and linked to the military memorandum in 28 February 1997. Known also as a 
‘postmodern coup’, 1997 military memorandum refers to anti-sharia decisions issued by 
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the Turkish military leadership on a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in 28 
February 1997. Memorandum reflected NSC’s critiques about what military elites 
considered as pro-sharia activities and suggested secular measures such as transferring the 
control of private religious schools to the state, abolishing sectarian groups, and controlling 
the ‘green money’. 28 February decisions initiated the process that precipitated the 
resignation of Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan and the abolishment of his 
political party. 
Reference to ‘green money’ is about NSC’s concern with multi-partnership firms, 
generally referred to as Islamic Holdings, which sprouted in 1990s. These holdings 
collected funds from Turkish workers, mostly from Germany, based on a partnership and 
profit and loss sharing and NSC was concerned about their relations with political Islam. 
During the process, disestablishment of Islamic banking came into consideration and 
Islamic bankers were given the options of either to convert to conventional banks or 
closing down their establishments. The period between 1997 and 1999 was regarded as one 
of the most difficult periods for SFHs by Islamic bankers (Akyüz, 2011). However, SFHs’ 
leaders lobbied successfully and influenced the process so that SFHs were included into 
the banking system, instead of being shut down. 
The amended banking law n. 4389, ratified in 19 December 1999, was aimed at 
strengthening of the banking system and banking regulations which was part of the 
structural reforms agreed with the IMF. What the law meant in terms of SFHs was that they 
were included in the banking system and became subject to the same regulation and 
supervision body, BRSA, as conventional banks. They were not defined as bank, however 
and were outside of Saving Deposits Insurance Fund, meaning savings in SFHs were not 
insured by the fund. SFH also lacked a professional public entity defined and mandated by 
law. Conventional banks had such an entity, the banks association of Turkey, since 1958. 
According to this amendment; (1) Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) was established as a sole independent decision-making body authorized to take 
and implement any decisions and measures regarding to banks and SFHs, including their 
foundation criteria, branch opening, systems of accounts and records, the procedures for 
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their supervision, and the temporary or permanent suspension of their activities, (2) sworn 
bank auditors on behalf of the BRSA would inspect and analyze the banks’ and SFHs’ 
assets, receivables, own funds, liabilities and profit and loss accounts and all other 
elements affecting their financial structures, (3) conventional banking terms such as “paid 
up capital”, “own funds” and reserves became valid for SFHs, (4) SFHs were treated as 
banks for the purposes of application of provisions related to checks and guarantee letters. 
Second amendment in Banking Law n. 4389 occurred on May 29th 2001 and was 
related to the banking crises of 2000-2001 and bankruptcy of one SFHs. Government’s 
initiation of exchange-rate-based stabilization program in December 1999 could not 
prevent the economic crisis of 2000-2001, one of the worst in Turkish history that resulted 
in shutting down over twenty banks. 
One of them was İhlas Finans, an Islamic bank that was founded in 1995. Operation 
of İhlas Finas was revoked in 10 February 2001 by BRSA creating a panic among the 
customers of SFHs which resulted in the withdrawal of 51% of total deposits in all SFHs in 
the following months. Just five days after İhlas Finance’s operations were stopped, on 
February 15th 2001, the remaining five SFHs (Albaraka Türk, Anadolu Finans, Asya 
Finans, Faisal Finans and Kuveyt Türk) applied to BRSA for a permit to establish an 
assurance fund and publicized their application with announcements in national 
newspapers. With the amendment of banking law n. 4389 second time on 29 May 2001, 
Association of Special Finance Institutions as a public legal entity, and the Assurance Fund 
were established. 
Association started its operation as a professional public entity on 4 October 2001. 
Its responsibilities defined by the law were (1) monitoring that SFHs operate in accordance 
with the law and in line with the needs of the economy in dignity, discipline and solidarity, 
(2) taking and implementing any action aimed at preventing unfair competition between 
SFHs. Moreover, all the SFHs were obliged to become a member of the Association and 
the Association was “assigned to and authorized with establishing an “Assurance Fund” in 
order to provide security for savings of natural persons, who have special current accounts 
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and accounts for sharing profits and losses with SFHs” (BDDK, 2002: 30). The association 
was also authorized to control and the supervise the Fund. 
Later, in 19 October 2005, SFHs were further integrated to the banking system with 
new Banking Law n. 5411. This law changed the name Special Finance House to 
Participation Bank and defined Participation Banking legally as one of the three types of 
banking along with deposit banks, and development and investment banks in Turkey. The 
name ‘participation bank’ was first proposed in 1999 by an employee of an Albaraka Türk 
(Bereket, 1999). The name of the SFH Association was changed to Participation Banks 
Association of Turkey as well. The law also required the transferring of the control of SFH 
Assurance Fund from the Association to the SDIF, bringing the assurance of the entire 
banking system under the control of the same entity. The funds contributed by Islamic 
banks to the SDIF would be kept separate from the contributions of conventional banks 
and would be directed to the funding of the interest-free sector (both domestic and abroad). 
As of December 2015, Banking Law n. 5411 is in force and regulates the whole 
banking system in Turkey. According to this law and associated regulations, BRSA 
regulates and supervise all aspects of both conventional and Islamic banking; both types of 
banking have their corresponding professional associations that each bank must be a 
member of; and the savings of both conventional and Islamic banking customers are 
protected by the same agency, SDIF. The Central Bank is also involved with regards only 
to foreign currency operations and reserve requirements and gathers money and banking 
statistics from all types of banks. 
According to the current law, there are minor differences in accounting methods and 
calculation method for Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic banking. In the law, the only 
tangible difference between conventional and Islamic banking is in their fund collection 
and utilization. In terms of loans, Islamic banks are not allowed to place cash loans. In 
terms of collecting funds, they can do it through “participation accounts that yield the 
result of participation in the loss or profit to arise from their use by participation banks, 
that do not require the payment of a pre-determined return to their owners and that do not 
guarantee the payment of the principal sum” (BDDK, 2111: 15). This is the only statement 
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in law that differentiates Islamic banks from conventional banks; that they operate 
according to loss and profit sharing principle and as a result are not obliged for pre-
determined return which is interest. There is no reference to participant banks’ Islamic 
nature or, their interest-free feature in the banking law. 
!!!
2.2.3.4. Actors !!
2.2.3.4.1. State !!
As I described above, state’s involvement in Islamic banking has both economic and 
political aspects. The changes in banking law in 1999 and 2005 were motivated to 
strengthen the banking system and banking regulations in general and was part of the 
structural reforms agreed with the IMF. These laws also brought important changes for 
Islamic banks. In 1999, SFHs were included in the banking law placing SFHs on the same 
legal base as conventional banks. In 2005, they were defined as a bank and brought under 
the same assurance fund as conventional banks. 
!!!
2.2.3.4.2. Participation banks association of Turkey !!
Participation banks association of Turkey (TKBB) was established first as 
Association of Special Finance Institutions in 2001, that was renamed in 2005. All Islamic 
banks are legally obliged to be member of association. According to its statute, TKBB 
represents the rights and interests of its members, ensures coordination in common projects 
among its members, participates in law and regulation process by providing advisory 
opinion, involves in academic research and studies to further the public awareness, publish 
educational and statistical information about participation banking and organize seminars, 
symposia, and conferences regarding to the sector (TKBB, 2006). 
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!!!
2.2.3.4.3. Islamic law, Islamic economic scholars and advisory boards !!
Although it is not required formally, each Islamic bank in Turkey has its own 
Advisory Board (commonly referred as Sharia Board in other countries) that is responsible 
for overseeing that the banks’ products and services are compliant with Islamic law. 
Islamic banks need to take the approval of the Advisory Board for every new product and 
service they plan to introduce and they are bounded by the decision of the Advisory Board. 
Although Advisory Board is clearly one of the biggest distinctions of Islamic banks 
that separates them from conventional banks, the process regarding the working of the 
Board and the members of the board are not well shared in the participation banks’ 
websites, annual reports or in the media. In fact, as of November 2014, two out of four 
Islamic banks in Turkey provide information about their advisory boards in their websites; 
one of them provides only the names of Islamic law scholars, and the other includes a few 
sentences regarding what the Advisory Board is for. The other two banks did not include 
any information in their web sites, annual reports or organization charts. 
Islamic Law Professor Hayrettin Karaman is the one of the most well-known 
Advisory Board member In Turkey. He writes regularly in a national newspaper, Yeni 
Şafak, on several issues ranging from politics to Islamic life to education and has a web 
site where he shares fifteen of his most-read books, newspaper articles, interviews and 
answers to reader questions. 
Although not in the scope of law, he has direct influence on the products and services 
that Islamic banks can offer. For example in 19 February 2012, deciding that income 
indexed securities, offered by the government and invested in by Islamic banks since 2009, 
become non-compliant with Islamic law, he wrote in his newspaper column that these 
securities involved interest (Karaman, 2012). Islamic banks then applied to Treasury to 
exchange those securities valuing 1 billion Turkish Lira with Islamic bonds. 
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Karaman is relatively moderate in his views on debated issues such as indexation, 
loans, state’s incentive credits, mortgage, insurance, and credit cards. For example, he 
states that for a person who lends money as a debt to another person, it is legitimate that 
the debt is indexed to the rate of inflation to protect its purchasing power so that the lender 
would not be disadvantaged. However, he states, if a person lends money to a bank through 
opening a deposit account, any excess he gets at the end of the term, even if it is under the 
inflation rate, it is considered as interest and not legitimate within Islam. Saying that 
“deeds are evaluated according to the intention” Karaman states that the deposit account 
contract between the individual and the bank includes interest from the beginning so that 
the fact that the interest rate is lower than the rate of inflation, does not make the incurred 
excess money legitimate to take and use (Karaman, 2006). 
On the same intention principle he regards the long term, low interest state incentive 
credits as legitimate according to Islam as these credits are given to entrepreneurs to invest 
in areas that need to be developed and bring out a public good. He is also moderate on his 
views regarding mortgage, insurance (excluding life insurance) and credit cards. He states 
that mortgage and insurance is legitimate if there is a genuine need that could not be 
fulfilled in an Islamic way. He states that home and car can be primary necessities under 
some circumstances and if not satisfied cause distress and disfunction to individual, so to 
take loan from conventional banks can be permissible. Before Islamic banks were offering 
credit cards, he also stated that using conventional credit cards is legitimate (but not for 
excess consumption) because, if the debts are paid in term, it does not include interest. 
!!!
2.2.3.4.4. Presidency of religious affairs of Turkey !!
Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey (PoRA) is a constitutional institution and 
“carries out religious affairs pertaining to faith, worship and moral principles; informs the 
society on religion; and administers the places of worship”. (Law n. 633) PoRA does not 
have a direct relationship with Islamic banks nor it has a kind of influence that Advisory 
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Boards have. However it is the formal organization of the state in religious matters and as 
such it gets questions from people regarding various matters including banking and its 
answers are shared with society through its publications and national presses. 
The High Board of Religious Affairs within the PoRA is the highest decision making 
and advisory organ on religious matters and its duties include expressing views and 
replying questions about religion. High board also examines and assess different religious 
comments made by Islamic circles, religious-social associations and traditional religious-
cultural formations in the country and abroad. The High Board of Religious Affairs 
organizes consultative meetings and conferences on various contemporary matters with a 
multidisciplinary focus since 2002. Two of ‘Consultation Meeting on Contemporary 
Religious Issues’ were related to Islamic banking one held in 2007, and the other in 2010. 
Economists, Islamic bankers, state officials, islamic law scholars and islamic economic 
scholars participated to these meetings. Therefore, through its formal role as the highest 
governmental authority in religion, its visibility and its consultation meetings that gather 
various actors on the subject, I contend that PoRA is one of the prominent actors in Islamic 
banking. 
!!!
2.2.3.5. Growth over time !!
After the establishment of first two Islamic banks, Albaraka Türk and Faisal Finans 
in 1984, the third one, Kuveyt Türk was established in1989. They were all subsidiaries of 
established Islamic banks from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait respectively. Anadolu 
Finans which was founded in 1990 was the first domestic SFH. Later, the fifth and the 
sixth SFHs were founded; İhlas Finans in 1995 and Asya Finans in 1996. İhlas Finans has 
been liquidated in 2001 leaving five SFHs remaining in the sector. The same year, in 2001, 
Faisal Finans changed ownership and was renamed as Family Finans. Family Finans and 
Anadolu Finans merged in 2005 becoming Türkiye Finans, and leaving four Islamic banks 
in the sector until 2015. The first state-founded Islamic bank started operation on May 
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14th, 2015. Currently five Islamic banks that are operating in Turkey are: Albaraka Türk, 
Kuveyt Türk, Bank Asya, Türkiye Finans and Ziraat Katılım Bankası. Kuveyt Türk is the 
biggest of all Islamic banks in terms of total assets and collected funds valuing 34 billion 
TRY and 22 billion TRY respectively, followed by Türkiye Finans (33.5 billion TRY; 19 
billion TRY), Albaraka Türk (23 billion TRY; 16.6 billion TRY) and Bank Asya (13.6 
billion TRY; 8.8 billion TRY) as of December 2014. In terms of allocated funds, Türkiye 
Finans is the leader with 24 billion TRY, followed by Kuveyt Türk (21 billion TRY), 
Albaraka Türk (16 billion TRY) and Bank Asya (8.5 billion TRY) for the same term. The 
main financial figures of four Islamic banks as of December 2014 are shown in Table 2.3. 
!
Table 2.3 
Participation banks’ key financial indicators (YTL thousands), December 2014!
!
The Turkish banking sector has 52 banks as of 2015, of which 34 are deposit banks, 
13 are development and investment banks and 5 are participation banks. The share of 
Islamic banks in total banking assets, deposits and loans are  5.3%, 6.2%, and 5.5% 
respectively in September 2014 which is far from what had been anticipated in 2009 as 
10% by 2015. As of September 2014, Islamic banks’ shares in total assets, deposits and 
loans are up almost 3%, 4% %0.5 from their respective values in 2000. Except 2001, the 
year one of the SFHs, İhlas Finans, was liquidated, Islamic banks’ shares are steadily 
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increasing albeit in small increments. The total number of four Islamic banks’ branches is 
1029 whereas the total number of bank branches is 12129 as of September 2014. The 
changes in the shares of Islamic banks in total banking asset, deposits and loans between 
2000 and 2013 are shown in Figure 2.1. The changes in the numbers of branches and 
employees of Islamic banks for the same period are shown in Table 2.4. 
!
Figure 2.1 
Participation banks’ asset, deposit and loan shares in Turkish banking sector (%) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 2.4 
Participation banks’ branches and employees 
!
Table 2.5 summarizes the main events in the trajectory of Islamic banking in Turkey. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
"76
Table 2.5 
Main events in the trajectory of Islamic banking in Turkey 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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2.3. Methods of Data Collection !!!
I collected two types of data: archival data and interview data. In addition to these, I 
did observations in two international industry-wide congresses one for organic agriculture 
and one for Islamic banking. Archival data provided me with initial understanding of 
events, actors, and the areas of debates in each industry. The interviews with influential 
actors in both fields provided the foundation of my analysis to induce themes and 
relationships. I used the observations in two congresses as an opportunity to learn more 
about these two industries as well as to build rapport with participants. Since the 
observations were done in international congresses, it was also useful to learn about 
international debates and how they were similar or different from the Turkish case. 
I collected archival data that covers the complete period from the pre emergence 
years of both industries starting from 1980 until 2013. I conducted interviews between 
2010 and 2015 and carried out observations in two international congresses in 2014. Table 
2.6 shows the distribution of data. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Table 2.6 
Data sources 
!!!!
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2.3.1. Archival Data !!
Archival data contains all the articles related to Islamic banking published in two 
national newspapers and all the articles related to organic agriculture published in one 
newspaper. I also collected all the public materials (magazines, interviews, press releases, 
annual reports, books etc.) from the web pages of Islamic banks, NGOs and individuals 
who are related to these industries. I collected news and documents going back as early as 
1980 whenever available to capture the debates related to organic agriculture and Islamic 
banking such as debates on pesticides, hormones, and interest rates, prior to emergence of 
these industries. This approach was useful in terms of understanding precursor debates in 
agriculture and banking before organic agriculture and Islamic banking were born. 
The core of archival data came from two national newspapers; Milliyet and Zaman. I 
have chosen Milliyet because it is one of the leading mainstream newspapers which has 
on-line archive from the first day it started publishing on 3 May 1950. Milliyet has two on-
line archives; the first one provides the exact replica of the printed version and covers the 
period from 3 May 1950 to 31 December 2007. It contains jpeg images of the printed 
version. When I completed data collection from this archive in the beginning of 2014, it 
covered until 30 June 2004. So when it was extended, I searched the period from 30 June 
2004 to 31 December 2007 for all the keywords to make sure I have the complete set of 
articles related to both industries. The new search yielded 126 new articles, 60 of which 
were related to organic agriculture and 66 of which were related to Islamic banking. Most 
of the new articles were from supplements such as editions devoted to specific industries, 
regions and cities. 
The second on-line archive covers the period from 23 June 2001 onwards, and 
comprised of internet edition of the newspaper in text format. This internet edition is not 
one-on-one replica of the printed version as is the first one, but comparable in content. To 
make sure the second archive was as comprehensive as the first archive, I examined the 
search results for the period from 23 June 2001 to 30 June 2004, which was the period 
covered by both archives initially. I searched for the same keywords in the overlapped 
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period and got the same results with a few exceptions. The differences were due to 
keywords being at the end of the line and had to be cut off or some spelling errors in print 
version. This gave me confidence that the second archive was as comprehensive as the first 
one. 
From Milliyet’s two on-line archives, I collected all the articles related to organic 
agriculture and Islamic banking between 01/01/1980 and 31/12/2013 covering 34 years 
period. The key words that I used for searching organic agriculture related articles included 
all the possible references to organic agriculture such as ecological agriculture and 
biological agriculture as well as related terms and phrases such as fertilizer, seed, 
pesticides, hormones, GMO and their inflected forms and synonyms. The key words that I 
used for searching Islamic banking related articles included all the possible references to 
Islamic banking such as interest-free banking, participation banks, special finance houses 
and their inflected forms. The search results from Milliyet’s two on-line archives yielded 
3692 entries for organic agriculture and 1440 entries for Islamic banking for the period 
between 01/01/1980 and 31/12/2013. The exact keywords in Turkish used for archive 
search for organic agriculture and Islamic banking are shown in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 
respectively. 
!
Table 2.7 
Keyword list in Turkish for online archival search: organic agriculture 
!
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Table 2.8 
Keyword list in Turkish for online archival search: Islamic banking 
!
I have chosen Zaman as the second newspaper to collect archive data about Islamic 
banking as it is known for its affiliation with Islamist community. I expected Zaman could 
have more coverage of and a different view about Islamic banking thus would supply me 
with complementary data to Milliyet’s data about Islamic banking. 
Zaman started publishing on 3 November 1986 and its on-line archive is available 
starting from 3 September 1994. Thus, for the first 8 years from 3 November 1986 to 3 
September 1994, I had to collect data manually from printed versions. I have spent two 
months in three libraries to access to complete period; Beyazıt State Library in İstanbul, 
National Library of Turkey in Ankara and the Library of National Journalists Association 
of Turkey in İstanbul in the summer of 2013. I have done a quick read of each and every 
page of Zaman to identify the Islamic banking related articles for the first 8 years period. I 
took picture of all the related articles and entered the date and the title of the articles into a 
spreadsheet. 
For on-line archive searching in Zaman, I used the same key words that I used for 
searching Milliyet’s archive that is shown in Table 2.8. The search from Zaman’s printed 
and on-line archives together yielded 2567 entries for Islamic banking between 03/11/1986 
and 31/12/2013 covering a little over 27 year period. 
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After finishing collecting data from Zaman’s internet archive, I realized that the year 
1996 in which one of the Islamic banks was founded yielded a small number of articles. I 
though it was suspicious as the Islamic bank founded that year was related to the owners of 
the newspaper itself. Later, with the help of a little bit luck, I found out that Zaman’s 
internet archive between 1996 and 1998 included some articles with english characters. So 
I searched this period for all the keywords written with english characters using ‘o’, instead 
of ‘ö’ and ’s’ instead of ‘ş’ etc. This additional search yielded 75 more articles between 
1996 and 1998. To make sure this was not the case in Milliyet’s archival data, I made the 
complete search with english characters which did not yield any additional articles. 
Although I have collected and read organic agriculture related articles from Zaman’s 
printed archive between 3/11/1986 and 3/9/1994 that yielded 1125 entries, I did not include 
Zaman’s articles on organic agriculture in the analysis. The reason was that, for the first 8 
years, the way Zaman covered organic agriculture did not differ from the way Milliyet 
covered organic agriculture substantially, and I did not have a reason to think that it would 
change for the remaining period. Considering the time that it took me to collect archival 
data manually, I decided it was a reasonable compromise. 
Apart from the articles from two newspapers, I also collected the magazines, books 
and published interviews in different venues that NGO’s, Islamic banks, academicians or 
practitioners produced related to these two industries. I collected all of Buğday’s 
publications from its web page. I also collected the articles, interviews and statements of 
vocal individuals such as Hayrettin Karaman and Pınar Kaftancıoğlu from internet 
pertaining to Islamic banking and organic agriculture respectively. 
One main archival source regarding Islamic banking was ‘Consultation Meeting on 
Contemporary Religious Issues’ of PoRA. PoRA held two national three-day meetings 
regarding Islamic banking one in 2007, and the other in 2010. Economists, Islamic 
bankers, state officials, Islamic law scholars and Islamic economic scholars from various 
universities participated to these meetings and all the questions and debates were taped, 
transcribed and published as books totaling 800 pages. 
!
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2.3.2. Interviews !!
I started doing interviews in 2010. My initial informants were certified organic 
farmers that I have met in organic farmers’ markets in Istanbul (6), NGO leaders (3) in 
organic farming and an Islamic banker totaling 9 interviews. In these initial interviews, I 
asked my informants about their personal involvement with the industry and then inquired 
about their views on the challenges and the critical events in the industry’s history. My 
objective was to understand the informants’ representation of their industry. Although I 
conducted these interviews before completing archival data collection and narrowing my 
research focus, they are still filled with relevant information regarding the current study. In 
these early interviews, the questions that tapped into the informants’ understanding of the 
industry usually provided information on how they see the industry and how it is different 
from some other view that they mention. Also, the question about the challenges in 
industry yielded relevant information regarding debates and different views in the industry. 
Thus I included these early interviews in data analysis. 
For the interviews that I conducted after archive data collection and analysis I had a 
more focused interest. I approached those people whose names I have been seeing in 
archival data and hearing from previous informants. I tried to probe informants’ accounts 
and interpretations of a set of specific topics; legislation, names used for the industry 
(SFH/participation bank/Islamic bank/interest-free bank and organic/ecologic/biologic 
agriculture), similar ventures (Islamic holdings and local/natural/Anatolian/traditional 
agriculture) and certain practices that were contested (such as late due payments in Islamic 
banking and seed/GMO in organic agriculture). I talked with managers or former CEOs of 
Islamic banks (6), NGO leaders (5), a commerce law professor, Islamic economic scholars 
(2) and certified organic food producers (2) and a non-certified organic farmer. In total I 
have conducted 27 interviews with 23 people; 10 interviews with 9 people from Islamic 
banking, and 17 interviews with 14 people from organic agriculture. I conducted all 
interviews face-to-face, except two, in the informant’s choice of place that varied from 
organic farmers’ markets to cafes to workplaces. Two interviews were held through skype. 
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The interviews lasted 87 minutes in median, varying from 25 to 130 minutes. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Before the interviews I searched the internet for informants’ previous statements, 
interviews, presentations, scholarly papers and books if available. I have checked their 
social media accounts such as facebook and tweeter, watched their videos and listened their 
podcasts if available. Before each interview, I also listened the previous interviews I have 
conducted with other informants and read my notes on those to freshen my memory and be 
able to recognize any similarities and differences in the accounts. My aim with this 
preparation was several: to get an initial idea about my informant; to identify the specific 
areas that my informant could provide detailed information; to be prepared to probe better 
during the actual interview; to be able to ask more specific questions by directly referring 
his/her statements; and to convey my genuine interest and respect in their ideas and the 
time they spared for the interview. 
During the interviews, I tried to learn as much as possible about the informant’s 
account of events. I would ask who were involved, what were the concerns and differing 
views and what was the basis for those different views. I would ask if they had any 
influence in the course of events and if yes how and to what extent. I would also ask for 
clarifications on any questions that I came up when I was preparing for the interview. 
Although I inquired the same broad topics in each interview, some topics would take 
longer to cover than the others depending on the informant’s experience and knowledge in 
that topic. Appendix 1 provides the guiding questions used in the interviews. 
!!!
2.3.3. Observation !!
I did observations in two international congresses; 18th IFOAM Organic World 
Congress in İstanbul, Turkey between 13-15 October, 2014 and 11th Harvard University 
Forum on Islamic Finance in Boston, USA between 25-27 April 2014. 
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IFOAM Organic World Congress occurs every three years and it is the largest 
meeting of the organic sector in the world. It attracts people as diverse as scientists, 
government officials, activists, NGOs, practitioners and certifiers around the world. The 
congress’s aim is to provide an opportunity to discuss and be informed about a range of 
major issues that concern organic sector. 
In this particular congress, participants tried to answer such questions as: What does 
the organic world today look like?, What are the shortcomings of organic agriculture and 
how can we address them?, How do we compare to the other sustainability initiatives?, 
Which objectives do we want to achieve? Who will have to do what, how and by when? 
What are the main messages and how should participants communicate them? 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance occurs every two years and provides a 
venue to discuss specific topics as well as more general topics, such as takaful and 
alternative cooperative finance and challenges and opportunities in Islamic Finance. 
Participants includes scholars, economists, bankers, government officials and Sharia 
experts from different countries. 
At these congresses, I attended formal sessions where there were either presentations 
or panel discussions. Formal presentations provided the opportunity to observe the ways 
participants presented their views. In the question and answer sessions I could observe the 
issues that the listeners regarded as relevant or important. During the brakes, I would meet 
people, introduce myself and listen to ongoing conversations and/or ask questions. 
I took notes at the formal sessions, and recorded when it was possible. I also 
recorded some of the informal conversations with the informants who gave permission to 
do so. These observations provided me with information about diverse issues and views in 
each industry from an international perspective. 
!!!!!!
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2.4. Methods of Data Analysis !!!
I analyzed archival and interview data according to principles of grounded theory 
that I explained its fundamental principles in Section 2.1. above. The analysis in grounded 
theory approach is a process of building a theory that evolves gradually during data 
collection and analysis process. This approach requires that data and evolving theory be 
constantly compared and the theory to be modified according to data. The aim is to 
develop a theory that accounts for and encompass the various views in the data. 
!!!
2.4.1. Archival Data Analysis !!
Archival data collection from libraries and internet was itself was part of my very 
early analysis in line with the grounded theory practice (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As I 
stated above, I needed to collect Zaman’s articles between 1986 and 1994 from the 
libraries. To do that, I manually searched all the pages of Zaman published in this period 
and made a copy of the related articles. And since the content was not always clear from 
the headlines or the columns’ titles, I had to do a quick read of each day’s newspaper. 
Reading 8 years’ of content of a newspaper in a concentrated time provided early insights 
and hunches that I took note of for further analysis. When I was identifying and copying 
related newspaper articles, I wrote down any preliminary ideas, questions, words or 
phrases along with the articles’ names and dates that prompted those ideas. And when I 
was indexing all the articles with their date, title and identification number in a 
spreadsheet, I opened a separate column named ‘data collection notes’ for those ideas. 
Collecting newspaper articles from the on-line archive followed a similar process; 
scanning through all articles and choosing the related ones to be included in the corpus of 
newspaper data. Reading of three decades of newspapers in a relatively concentrated time 
during newspaper data collection provided me with an initial familiarity with the events 
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and debates in the data. I could already observe the general discussions and topics around 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture in each newspaper such as secular concerns 
regarding Islamic banks, healthy and tasty food emphasis around organic agriculture and 
critique of current banking system or agriculture. 
I started systematic analysis of newspaper data by reading each article in 
chronological order for an intensive reflection and analysis. I attempted to analyze the 
complete newspaper data comprised of 7774 files for Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture in total. I have loaded all files to Atlas.ti v6.2 and did a close reading (line-by-
line reading of each article), open coding (segregating and grouping data by identifying 
similar ideas and assigning them a summative, and essence-capturing label, i.e. code), and 
writing memos for initial codes and ideas (analytical notes to reflect on codes and to 
reconstruct the coded data to a higher abstract level). I carried these procedures for the first 
3 years of Islamic banking articles in Zaman and realized that it was not possible to do 
open coding for any and all ideas for all the newspaper data as it was simply taking too 
much time. 
To overcome this, I decided I would only concentrate on those articles that directly 
referred to Islamic banking or organic agriculture. To this end, I first read complete 
newspaper data comprised of 7774 files and identified all the articles that were directly 
related to Islamic banking and organic agriculture. Thus, I excluded all the articles that 
were about Islamic economics, interest, banking crisis, hormones, pesticides, seed etc. but 
did not refer to Islamic banking or organic/ecologic agriculture directly. This selection 
process yielded 2595 articles with a main focus on Islamic banking or organic agriculture. 
The distribution of newspaper data and those with direct references to Islamic banking in 
Zaman and Milliyet are shown in Figures 2.2 and Figure 2.3 respectively. The distribution 
of newspaper data and those with direct references to organic or ecologic agriculture in 
Milliyet is shown in Figures 2.4. 
!
!
!
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Figure 2.2 
Islamic banking articles in Zaman 
!
Figure 2.3 
Islamic banking articles in Milliyet 
!
Figure 2.4 
Organic agriculture articles in Milliyet 
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Realizing that the remaining 2595 articles were still too many to be analyzed with the 
procedures in the first cycle, I plotted the article numbers across years and identified the 
years with the highest number of articles. My assumption was that those years with the 
highest number of articles were the years that critical events or debates carried out in the 
focal industry. I read the newspaper data and created comprehensive summaries for those 
years. In the end, I had a detailed descriptions of data for years with the highest number of 
articles for each industry. I put these descriptions in a spreadsheet and identified the course 
of events and debates as reflected in the newspapers. In the end of this process, I listed 
several events and debates for each industry. Then I compared these events and debates 
across Islamic banking and organic agriculture and identified the ones common to both 
industries. This yielded 4 common debates around naming of industry; law and regulations 
and relations with the state in general; similar ventures that were associated with these 
industries; and the debates about the contested practices. Appendix 2 provides the 
summaries of Islamic banking articles in Zaman and Milliyet in 1989 as an illustrative 
example of detailed descriptions of newspaper data for years with the highest number of 
articles for each industry. Appendix 3 provides topics around which there were salient 
discussions in Islamic banking and organic agriculture in newspaper data. 
From the analysis of newspaper data, I identified these 4 topics and the accounts 
related to these topics as reflected in newspapers. In the meantime, I read other sources: 
Bereket, Albaraka Türk’s magazine (39 issues between 1997 and 2015), TKBB’s annual 
books about Islamic banking in Turkey and the world (12 issues between 2002 and 2014), 
PoRA’s publications of ‘Consultation Meeting on Contemporary Religious Issues’ in 2007 
and 2010 that were related to Islamic banking, Buğday’s magazines (21 issues between 
2009 and 2014) and Pınar Kaftancıoğlu’s 44 articles in magazine Kuraldışı between 2011 
and 2015 and her weekly emails from 2010. I have read articles, books and personal web 
pages of prominent Islamic law scholars such as Prof.Dr. Abdülaziz Bayındır and Prof.Dr. 
Hayrettin Karaman and Prof.Dr. Servet Bayındır. My detailed reading of these sources 
created additional information and questions regarding the four topics. For example, 
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Albaraka Türk’s magazines and PoRA’s books provided rich data about contested practices 
in Islamic banking and Kaftancıoğlu’s articles provided the criticism related to organic 
agriculture. From Islamic law scholars’ publications, I have gained initial understanding of 
Islamic law, its sources and techniques. 
The archival data analysis was a crucial first step that provided me with an 
understanding of actors, events, the context, and the debates in each industry and the initial 
ideas that needed to be further evaluated. In particular, through archival data analysis i. I 
have learned about main actors, events and debates in each industry, ii. observed how 
actors tried to influence the courses of events and how they were enabled and/or 
constrained, iii. identified four main issues (naming, law, similar ventures and contested 
practices) that were most salient and common to both industries, iv. collected all the 
published discussions around those four topics and v. had initial insights about how and 
why the events and discussions played out as they did. Archival data analysis also directed 
my interview process in both guiding theoretical sampling and preparing interview 
questions. 
!!!
2.4.2. Interview Data Analysis !!
I conducted interviews to learn about my informants’ perceptions, concerns and 
thoughts about four main topics that I identified through archival data analysis. In these 
interviews, I inquired about missing details and contradictory accounts in archival data. If I 
realized an informant’s account is different than her previous accounts captured in archival 
data, I would focus on how she would reconcile her accounts. I also used the interviews to 
test and refine the initial findings from archival data. 
The goal of the analysis of the interview data was to find out the ways in which my 
informants discussed and interpreted the four issues. I organized verbatim transcriptions of 
the interviews by issue in a spreadsheet. A column includes an informant’s accounts on all 
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topics, and a row includes all informants’ account on a specific topic. I find this kind of 
organizing helpful as it allowed me to navigate easily among accounts and topics. 
First, I read these verbatim accounts in detail. I tried to map the structure of an 
account by noting all the arguments used and how they were related. For example I would 
note which arguments were put forward for a specific preference for the industry name. I 
would note which concerns were salient for a specific account. I would identify on which 
grounds the contested practices were criticized or defended and try to figure out their 
relations to larger concerns. 
As I went back and forth between informants’ accounts of the same events within 
industry and similar events across the two industries, I tried to create more abstract 
accounts of original verbatim quotes. For example, Islamic bankers’ and certified organic 
farmers’ defenses of contested practices involved arguments on how they were constrained 
by legal structure. Legal structure came up again on Islamic bankers’ and certified organic 
farmers’ accounts about similar ventures but this time not as a constraining factor but as a 
feature that separated them from unregulated alternatives. Transition from original 
accounts to more abstract descriptions was not linear but iterative. I needed to modify and 
adjust my initial interpretations of data in response to new interview and/or archival data to 
account for and encompass the new evidence. Thus all the findings presented in the next 
chapters are based on the text rather than being deduced from prior theory. An example of 
an interpretation of original verbatim accounts regarding the use of Islamic references is 
provided in Appendix 4. Figure 2.5 summarizes data collection and analysis process.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Figure 2.5 
Summary of data collection and analysis process 
!
I present my findings in the following three chapters. In Chapter 3, I explain the 
distinct actors and roles in Islamic banking and organic agriculture. In Chapters 4 and 5, I 
provide the accounts of the interactions and communications among different actors first in 
relation to legal codification of Islamic banking and organic agriculture and then in relation 
to contested practices.  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3. !!
3. ACTORS AND ROLES !!!!
I identify and named five main types of actors that play similar roles in Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture: state, certified producers, non-certified producers, moral 
certifiers, and idealists. These actors were directly or indirectly involved in main debates 
and were influential in the trajectory of these industries. 
State includes references to government, the government officials and bodies such as 
ministries, bureaucrats, undersecretaries, state-owned enterprises and the military. Certified 
producers refer to both Islamic banks and the small and large farmers and businesses that 
produce certified organic products. ‘Certified’ here refers to formal status of these actors’ 
products and services; they are registered and regulated by the state and certified by 
authorized bodies as conforming to related laws and regulations. Non-certified producers 
refer to ventures that can be perceived as associated with and comparable to organic 
agriculture or Islamic banking but outside the formal organic or banking law. What I label 
as moral certifiers refer to people, groups of people, or NGOs who work closely with 
certified producers, sometimes within the same organizational boundaries (but outside of 
the state apparatus), and exercise an informal regulation and control on the certified 
producers and the industry. I use the term idealists for people, groups of people, or NGOs 
that have a mission of presenting morally informed alternatives to dominant conventional 
banking and conventional agriculture. Idealists differ from certified producers and moral 
certifiers in some crucial aspects of that mission that I will explain below in detail. 
Moral certifiers and the idealists in Islamic banking are publicly known sharia 
scholars with similar educational and professional backgrounds. Almost all of them are 
graduates of Theology and a few hold economic degrees too. They usually work at 
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universities, and some of the them worked previously as imam or mufti. Moral certifiers and 
the idealists in organic agriculture have more divergent educational and professional 
backgrounds. Some left corporate careers and moved to villages to practice farming, while 
others define themselves as ‘farmers’ by stating that their fathers and grand grand fathers 
were also farmers. They usually call themselves ‘activists’ and are involved in some kind of 
agricultural production, either farming or gardening. 
Some actors simultaneously occupy a few of the five roles. There are some idealists 
who are at the same time certified or non-certified producers in organic agriculture. Some 
idealists previously played moral certifier roles. There are moral certifiers in Islamic 
banking whose views are very close to idealists’ views. Nevertheless, for the reasons I 
explain below, it is possible to think these roles as distinct in both industries. 
The salience of these roles in archival data change over time. Some non-certified 
producers in Islamic banking and organic agriculture did not exist in the early stages of 
these industries. Idealists in organic agriculture become more salient in the later stages of 
the industry. 
I do not include conventional banking and conventional agriculture as one of the 
actors/roles that shaped Islamic banking and organic agriculture respectively. Even though 
there are frequent references to conventional banking and conventional agriculture in 
archival data, they are almost exclusively the subject of accounts presented by industry 
insiders. Accounts of people who are associated with conventional banking or conventional 
agriculture are nearly absent in archival data. Interview data supports the conventional 
counterparts’ disinterest in these industries. 
In the following pages, I explain the five types of actors and the roles they played 
throughout the history of the focal industry. My aim in this chapter is to establish the 
distinctness of each role played by different sets of actors. I provide detailed accounts of 
conversations among these actors regarding legal definitions and contested practices such 
as murabaha and late payment fines in Islamic banking, and hybrid seed, mono-culture 
production and greenhouses in organic agriculture in the next two chapters. 
!
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3.1. State !!!
State is one of the main actors in industry creation and development. New markets 
and industries are generally assumed to benefit from receiving state authorization. From 
neoinstitutionalists’ perspective the benefit stems from state’s role as rationalizing and 
selecting appropriate organizational forms (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). State regulation 
and accompanying legal formalization validates the industry as a rational and appropriate 
venture. 
At least some actors within the Turkish state were eager to recognize and ratify 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture due to the anticipated economic benefits. The first 
legal codes regarding these industries, which came into effect in 1983 and in 1994 
respectively, started public debates about the appropriateness of these industries and their 
place in economy and society. This debate was much more heated in the case of Islamic 
banking than in organic agriculture. Data suggests that political contestations and larger 
ideological forces were more influential in state regulation of Islamic banking than in 
organic agriculture. In Islamic banking case, legal establishment of the industry in 1983 did 
not grant an initial acceptance; the contestation over the place of Islamic banking in a 
secular system persisted until early 2000s. 
Below I show that Islamic bankers interpreted state’s specific legal attempts as a 
direct threat to the very existence of the form until early 2000s, when the government was 
transferred to the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). Supporters of organic 
agriculture do not report such ideological battles though there are some accounts of conflict 
starting in 2013 as the government started to associate them with the opposition. These 
cases are consistent with literature on the Turkish state acting not as a unified and impartial 
authority but as being a fragmented and politically motivated collection of actors (Özel, 
2014; Özen and Akkemik, 2012). 
!!!
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3.1.1. Islamic Banking and the State !!
When my respondents refer to the state they usually mean the government, the 
government officials and bodies such as ministries, bureaucrats, undersecretaries, state-
owned enterprises and the military. They use ‘soldiers’ or ‘army’ to refer specifically to 
military officials. In newspaper data, I interpreted references such as ‘certain segments of 
the bureaucracy’, ‘state authority’, ’political authority’, or ‘lawmaker’ as referring to the 
state. 
Regulation process of Islamic banking is the main arena where the state and Islamic 
banks interact. The defining characteristic of this interaction is the discussions around the 
perceived incompatibility between secularism and Islamic banking. Secularism critique is 
usually carried out through state’s perceived partiality for or hostility to Islamic banking. 
Common theme in these criticisms is references to Islamic banks’ legal base and their 
origins and political and sectarian connections. The secularist oppositions around the 
origins and the political and sectarian connections of Islamic banks are usually articulated 
by journalists and politicians. Secularist opposition on legal grounds are more prominent in 
the state officials’ and politicians’ accounts. Islamic bankers participate in these debates by 
refuting these claims on the basis that they are regulated and transparent establishments. 
!!!
3.1.1.1. Debates around the origins and the political and sectarian connections !!
Islamic banking in Turkey was legalized with a government decree by a six-day old 
government that was formed after a three-year military rule. Legality based on a 
government decree was itself problematized in some newspaper articles by people who 
interpreted government’s Islamic banking initiative as a proof for its lack of adherence to 
the secularism principle of Turkish Republic. One of my respondents explained this by 
referring to Turgut Özal, then the head of government, himself never being completely 
welcomed by secular segments because of his conservative outlook. 
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The fact that the first three Islamic banks established in Turkey were subsidiaries of 
established Islamic banks from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and that their local 
founders were prominent political and religious leaders linked to Islamic sects added to this 
secular criticism. For example an influential local founder of Albaraka Türk was Eymen 
Topbaş, the brother of Nakşibendi sheik Musa Topbaş (Yavuz, 2003). Salih Özcan, one of 
the founders and the vice president of the board of directors of Faisal Finans, was a 
prominent leader of Nur movement. İhlas Finans was founded by Enver Ören who was the 
leader of Işık movement. Asya Finans was founded by businessmen who were linked to 
Gülen movement. Moreover, at various times, former politicians from conservative parties 
served as founders and managers of Islamic banks such as Ali Coşkun (İhlas Finans), 
Gündüz Sevilgen (Faisal Finans) and Kemal Unakıtan (Albaraka Türk) among the most 
known. 
Related to origin and the political and sectarian connections, the debates around 
Albaraka Türk provides a revealing example. Korkut Özal, brother of prime minister Turgut 
Özal, and follower of  Nakşibendi sect denies any privileges Albaraka Türk is claimed to 
have due to its Arab origin and its relations with him. In an article in Milliyet on Feburary 
17th, 1987, Korkut Özal states that: 
!
   “Özel Finans kurumları gibi önemli bir yeni finans sistemi kararnamesinin iki 
gün içinde oluşturulup yayınlandığı gibi bir iddia ise fevkalade gayri ciddi ve 
gülünç olur. Bilediğim kadarıyla bu çalışmalar Sayın Ulusu'nun başbakanlığı 
sırasında ele alınmış ve gerek Hazine gerekse Merkez Bankası tarafından bu 
mevzuat üzerinde yıllarca çalışılmıştır. Sadece Suudi sermayesiyle değil, bütün 
dış ve iç sermayeye açık olan bu müessesenin sırf bizim hatırımız için, Suudi 
sermayesine tanınmış bir ayrıcalık olarak gösterilmeye kalkışılması, bir cümle 
ile ne gerçeklerle, ne ciddiyetle ve ne de aklıselim ile bağdaşmaz.” (Özal, 1987) !
   “Allegations that a new finance system decree of such importance as Special 
Finance Houses could have been formed and executed in two days, are 
remarkably frivolous and ridiculous at best. As far as I know, work on this 
started in Mr. Ulusu’s prime ministry and both the Treasury and the Central 
Bank have worked on the statutes for years. Open not only to Saudi capital but 
also to all domestic and foreign capital, claiming that this is a privilege handed 
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over to Saudi capital just for our sake does not abide by the truth, seriousness 
or reason.” (Özal, 1987) !
On the same vein, Yalçın Öner, the general manager of Albaraka Türk, in an article in 
Zaman on June 2nd, 1989 highlights the prejudices stemming from the bank’s origin: 
!
   "Biz yatırım yapmaktan bir nevi çekiniyoruz. Basın bizi doğru şekilde lanse 
etmiyor. Üzerimizde baskı var. Al Baraka değil de, Al Amerika olsaydık bu baskı 
olmazdı.” (Öner, 1989) !
   "In a way we refrain from making investments. The press does not reflect us in 
the right manner. If we were Al America and not Al Baraka, there would be no 
such pressure.” (Öner, 1989) !!!
3.1.1.2. Debates around secularism and Islamic banking !!
The defining characteristic of state - Islamic banking interaction, from these banks’ 
inception in 1983 to the early 2000s in Turkey is the ever-present tension between secular 
ideology and Islam. Secularism is one of the pillars of the Republic of Turkey in her 
foundation in 1923 following the dissolution of Ottoman Empire. Through secularization 
process, several institutional changes were introduced that marked a profound break from 
the previous social and political order such as abolition of caliphate and Islamic law courts, 
dismantlement of Islamic institution of education, adoption of secular civil code, and 
declaration of secularism as a constitutional principal in 1937 (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; 
Göle, 1997). The aim was to retrieve the religion from public arena to individual domain so 
that it would not be used as a political instrument. To this end, state was heavily involved in 
overseeing religious education and practice but was limited in transforming a religion-
centered system of public morality to a non-religious system of values, paving the way for 
an enduring conflict about the idea of secularism and the place of Islam in Turkish society. 
(For a detailed discussion see Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). 
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Secularist criticism of Islamic banking for the first half of its existence is best 
understood within the historical context. As it is explained in Chapter 2, Islamic banking 
started in a period that marked Turkey’s integration into global market economy that was 
accompanied by military intervention in 1980. This period is also characterized by the rise 
of Political Islam that refers to an understanding of Islam different from pre-1980’s in its 
explicit assertion that Islam informs not only private moral life but also political, social and 
economic aspects of public life (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). Secular segments of the public 
and of state bureaucracy saw Islamic banking as part of political islam’s aspiration to 
redesign socioeconomic institutions in order to conform to Islamic principles. 
According to Islamic bankers, these concerns were visible in state’s treatment of 
Islamic banks as ‘stepchildren’ through its rules and regulations. Newspaper accounts of 
second half of 1980s and through 1990s are abundant with Islamic Banks’ managers’ 
statements about what they refer as ‘hostile attitudes’ of the state bodies like Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey, Undersecretariat of Treasury and state-owned economic 
enterprises towards these banks. These statements almost always refer to some legal 
regulation or legal constraint understood to be intentionally limiting the Islamic banks and 
usually compared with the regulations for conventional banks. 
One feature of these kinds of statements of Islamic bankers is that both the same and 
different legal treatment of state in relation to inventional banks could be criticized as 
disfavoring Islamic banks. For example, when there is a same rule or regulation applied to 
both Islamic banks and conventional banks, Islamic bankers claim that they operate on a 
different mechanism from conventional banks and criticize the state as not acknowledging 
or taking these differences into account. However when a different rules or ratios applied 
for Islamic banks and conventional banks, then Islamic bankers usually refer to unfair 
consequences of that treatment for these banks or their customers. 
Some examples of the legal rules and regulations that were described as hostile by 
Islamic bankers were: the limitations on opening branches (Islamic banks could open 
maximum 10 branches per year upon permission whereas there were no limits for opening 
new branches for conventional banks and they could open first 10 branches each year 
"100
without permission), the problem with the status of Islamic banks’ letters of guarantee 
(Islamic banks’ letters of guarantee were not accepted by state-owned economic 
enterprises), tax regulation (that decreased the ratio of retention tax from 10% to 5% for 
conventional banks’ deposit accounts whereas kept it at 10% for Islamic bank’s loss and 
profit accounts), and the increase in the reserve requirement ratios (it was increased from 
1% to 8%, the same level to the ratio applied to conventional banks). 
A joint statement by all the four existing SFHs published on June 10th, 1994 in 
Zaman, regarding the reserve requirement ratios is an example for criticism of the same 
regulation being applied to both Islamic banks and conventional banks: 
!
   "Kuruluş amaç ve felsefeleri, çalışma tarzları, tasarruf sahibinden fon 
toplama usulleri münhasıran kar/zarara katılım esasına dayanan ve bu yönüyle 
borç/faiz esasında düzenlenen klasik banka mevduat hesabından tamamen 
farklı olan kar/zarara katılım hesabıyla, banka mevduatlarını aynı kategoride 
değerlendirmek bilimsel ve mantıki hiç bir yanı olmayan hatalı bir yaklaşımdır. 
Tasarrufunun bir bölümünü bankaya diğer bölümünü ÖFK'na yatıran bir kimse 
bankadan vadesinde anapara ve faiz olarak ne alacağını önceden kesin 
rakamıyla bilmekte; ÖFK'ndan ise, vade tarihi itibariyle kar elde edilmiş olura, 
işlem tarihinde miktari belli olmayan bu karın sadece yüzde kaçını alacağını, 
ve hatta zarar halinde, doğacak zarar nedeniyle ana parasının azalacağını 
bilmektedir. Böylece, tamamen farklı iki ayrı işlemi mukayese etmeden aynı 
düzenlemeye tabi tutmanın savunulabilir bir açıklaması mümkün değildir. Karı 
ve zararı tamamiyle yatırımcılara ait olan bir hesaba blokaj ayrılmasının, 
bankalarla rekabet ediliyor mesnetsiz endişesi dışında, haklı hiç bir açıklaması 
yoktur ve yapılamamaktadır. Nitekim, Sermaye Piyasası Kanunu uyarınca 
sadece bankalar tarafından kurulabilen ‘yatırım fonları’ için, sabit bir faiz vaya 
gelir taahhüt edilmediğinden, hiç bir şekilde munzam karşılığı ve blokaj 
yapılmamaktadır.” (Özel Finans Kurumları Ortak Açıklama, 1994) !
   "With their establishment purpose and philosophy, working style, ways of 
collecting funds from account owners based exclusively on participation in 
profit/loss and in this respect are completely different from standard banking 
accounts regulated based on debt/interest; there is no scientific or reasonable 
side to assessing banking accounts and these participation accounts within the 
same category and it is a faulty approach. A person who deposits part of his 
savings to a bank and the rest to a Special Finance House will know in exact 
numbers how much his capital and interest will be at the end of maturity at a 
bank; whereas in SFH, he will only know the percentage of the profit, if such a 
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profit is made at the end of the term, which is not predetermined at the time of 
the transaction and that if there is loss at the end of the term, his capital will 
also decrease. Consequently, there is no defensible argument to subject two 
completely different transactions to the same regulation without comparing 
them. Attempting a blockage onto an account, which the investor holds 
complete profit and loss liability, has no rightful explanation – except for an 
unfounded concern that they are competing with banks – and an explanation 
cannot be done. There is no prospect of required reserve and blockage for’ 
‘investment funds’ that can only be set up by banks as per the Capital Market 
Law, because there is no assurance of a fixed interest of income.” (Special 
Finance Houses Press Release, 1994) !
The general manager of Anadolu Finans Ünal Arslan's criticism of the different ratios 
of retention tax for the deposit accounts and loss and profit accounts is an example for 
criticism of the different regulation applied to Islamic banks and conventional banks. In an 
article in Milliyet on February 18th, 1994, Arslan states that: 
!
   "Yüzbinlerce tasarruf sahibinin elde ettiği gelirden yüzde 5 daha fazla gelir 
vergisi kesintisinin yapılmasının nedeni nedir? Bu karar çok fazla seçeneği 
olmayan katılma fonu sahiplerini mağdur etmektedir. Toplam mevduat 
içerisinde stopajın yüzde 5'e çekilmesiyle devlet büyük fedakarlıkta 
bulunmuştur. Ama bu fedakarlık bankacılık kesimi için yapılmıştır. Yüzde 4 paya 
sahip finans kurumlarına da aynı uygulama getirilmelidir.” (Arslan, 1994) !
   "What is the basis for an extra 5 percent income tax cut than the income of 
hundreds and thousands of savings owners? This decision is a mistreatment of 
participation fund owners who do not have much of an alternative. The state 
has made a big sacrifice in decreasing withholding tax to 5 percent within total 
savings. However this sacrifice was made for the banking sector. The same 
should be done for finance houses that hold a 4 percent share."(Arslan, 1994) !
The military elite is usually perceived as the fierce defender of secularism in Turkey 
as the protector of the Republic and its founding principles. That’s why it is curious that 
government decree that paved the way to establish Islamic banking is announced just six 
days after the transition from three-year military rule to civil parliamentary that was 
suppressive of extremist Islamic and leftist ideologies. There is no way for me to know 
military elites’ view on Islamic banking at the time it was established. However, Salih 
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Özcan who was one of the founders of Faisal Finans, the second Islamic bank established in 
Turkey, explains arranging a meeting between Saudi Prince Faisal and six high ranking 
military officials in early 1980s. In an interview on September 19, 2004 on Zaman, Özcan 
states that: 
!
   “Faysal, askerlere ‘Buraya para kazanmaya değil hizmet yapmaya geldim. 
Burası annemin (Kral Faysal'ın eşi Ülfet Hanım Adapazarılıydı) memleketi.’ 
dedi. Onlar da kurulmasına onay vererek Başbakan Bülend Ulusu’ya telefon 
açtı. Ulusu, bize ‘Yakında Özal iktidara gelecek, bu imzayı o atarsa daha iyi 
olur.’ dedi.” (Özcan, 2004) !
   “Faysal said to the soldiers; ‘I came here not to make money but be of 
service. This is my mother’s country (King Faysal’s wife Mrs. Ülfet was from 
Adapazarı).’ They in turn granted approval to set up and called Prime Minister 
Bülent Ulusu. Ulusu told us, “Soon Özal will hold office, it would be better if he 
signed this.” (Özcan, 2004) !
This statement clearly suggests Islamic banking was established by the approval of 
military elites. My respondents could not provide information on this, however, they 
highlighted the urgency of attracting capital of the time and speculated that nobody, even 
the military elite, had the option to resist any venture that would bring in capital. 
In interviews, all respondents agreed on the state’s hostile attitude towards Islamic 
Banking in its early years. According to these accounts, state understood Islamic banking as 
associated with Political Islam. Specifically, military elites considered Islamic banks to be a 
financial vehicle for a fundamentalist agenda that is against the Western and secular 
character of the Republic. Exclusion of riba/interest in Islamic Banks’ accounts is 
considered, by the state, to be essentially political. 
Accounts of the draft banking law of 1999 process that resulted in Islamic banking to 
be included in banking law in 1999 is the basis of these interpretations. All respondents 
linked the process of Banking Law of 1999 to the military memorandum in 28 February 
1997. The memorandum reflected military elites’ criticism about what they refer as pro-
sharia activities and suggested secular measures such as transferring the control of private 
religious schools to the state, abolishing sectarian groups, and controlling the ‘green 
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money’ that was associated with political Islam. Islamic banks were lumped in ‘green 
money’ along with Islamic holdings that I will explain in Section 3.3. below. Osman Akyüz 
in an interview in the magazine Aksiyon, refers to that period as one of the most difficult 
periods for SFHs. He explains: 
!
   “Büyük zorluklar yaşadık. Kamu otoritesindeki muhataplarımıza ulaşıp 
sorunlarımızı aktaramıyorduk. Zamanın ekonomi bakanı Güneş Taner’e ulaşıp 
kendisinden yardım istedik. Bize cevabı, ‘Gidin derdinizi askerlere anlatın. Ben 
sizin için bir şey yapamam.’ olmuştu.” (Akyüz, 2011) !
   “We have been through great hardships. We could not reach addressees 
within the public authority and convey our problems. We reached the then 
Minister of Economy Güneş Taner and asked for help. His response was: ‘Go 
and tell your problems to the military. I cannot do anything for you.’ ” (Akyüz, 
2011) !
According to one respondent, Islamic bankers indeed met with military elites in the 
course of draft Banking Law of 1999 to explain themselves. My respondent talked about 
arranging and attending a meeting between Islamic bankers and military officials in the 
events of draft Banking Law of 1999. This interaction with military officials presents 
second example of military involvement in Islamic banking. Similar to seeking military 
elites’ approval in the down of the establishment of Islamic banking in Turkey that Özcan 
explains above, Islamic bankers sought the approval of military elites’, this time, to survive. 
These accounts referring to the military and Islamic banking during the second half of 
1990s suggest the tendency of the military elite to view Islamic banking as part of a larger 
agenda of Political Islam. However, the fact that the military could be convinced on the 
establishment and later on survival of Islamic banking also suggests that the military elite 
did not see these banks as a real threat to secularism, given that they seemed to have the 
power to intervene. 
All of my informants agreed that the discussions around secularism and Islamic 
banking lost its heat starting from early 2000s. They also agreed that these banks enjoyed 
much easier and closer relations with the state after Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
came to power at the end of 2002. Newspaper data supports both claims. 
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Some respondents attributed the state’s more ‘objective’ treatment of Islamic banking 
to political and economic stability that came with a single majority government. Yet others 
pointed to the decreased influence and involvement of military in civil politics. Another 
reason may be that Islamic banking was included in the Banking Law in 1999 and 
integrated into the banking system completely in 2005. So the arguments around Islamic 
banks being favored or disfavored through their legal regulation were not valid anymore as 
Islamic banks and conventional banks are being subjected to the same Banking Law. 
!!!
3.1.2. Organic Agriculture and the State !!
Turkey follows the European Union’s rules and regulations as the basis of her legal 
framework for organic agriculture from the very beginning. Changes in regulations and law 
in organic agriculture in Turkey were almost always to adapt to the changes in European 
Union’s regulations. These changes were usually related to elaboration of production 
method and establishing institutional structure such as specifying permitted agricultural 
inputs and detailing control and certification processes and the organization of the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
Unlike Islamic banking, there are no widespread debates captured in archival data 
over specific legal framework of organic agriculture. The discussions of legal regulations in 
my informants’ accounts are usually related to wider laws and regulations that are 
perceived to be related to agriculture in general. Laws regulating seedlings, soil 
conservation and land use, trading of agricultural products, regulations on open markets and 
bio-safety are the examples that figure in the discussions of state regulation in agriculture. 
However the salience of these discussions differ in the accounts of different sets of actors. 
As I will explain below in Section 3.5. legal criticism usually figures most prominently in 
the accounts of people I refer to as idealists.  
The main claim in these accounts is that state and state regulations are being used as a 
tool by capitalist corporations to further their interests. This interpretation of regulation in 
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organic agriculture parallels the arguments of capture theories of regulation that posit the 
capitalist interests as driving force of regulation (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). 
State - organic agriculture interaction is much less politicized compared to state - 
Islamic banking interaction at least at the level of central government. However a few 
respondents pointed out disrupted relations with local municipalities and with the Ministry 
of Food Agriculture and Livestock after Gezi Park protests. Gezi protests were triggered by 
an urban development project in Istanbul over demolition of Gezi park and spread 
throughout the country over the course of two month from the end of May 2013 to the end 
of July 2013. Gezi protests’ presence in my account of state-organic agriculture relations is 
due to the amendment in the regulation of open markets on July 13th, 2013 that restricted 
local municipalities to form joint projects with NGOs on the opening and management of 
open markets including organic farmers’ markets. Previously NGOs were opening and 
managing organic farmers’ markets through joint projects with local municipalities. The 
new amendment stated that local municipalities will be responsible for the opening and 
management of these markets and cannot transfer their authority to third parties. They 
should, however, make protocols with NGOs if they want some services regarding the 
management of open markets to be carried out by the NGOs. What this amendment meant 
for the existing organic farmers’ markets is that now NGOs needed to pay rents for the area 
that the open market is located including occupancy fees for previous years’ usage. This 
requirement resulted in the closing down of two organic farmers’ markets in İstanbul. 
According to my respondent, this amendment in the regulation of open markets was one of 
central government’s ‘intimidation methods’ of those supportive of Gezi protests. 
While it is not possible to establish a clear relationship between Gezi protests and the 
change in the aforementioned legislation, it is still possible to make observations about the 
government’s reactions to Gezi supporters to have a sense of the reference to government’s 
‘intimidation methods’. One of the notable example to this end is the legislation change on 
July 10th, 2013 that ended the right of the Chamber of Turkish Engineers and Architects 
(Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları, TMMO) who was opposing the demolition of Gezi 
park, to approve construction projects. Another example is a legal investigation against 
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İstanbul Medical Chamber that started on June 13th, 2013 regarding some doctors’ 
involvement in Gezi protests to provide first aid services. The investigation questioned 
doctors’ unauthorized medical services during the protests. Later, with Law No. 6514, 
passed on January 2nd, 2014, an article that restricts doctors’ first aid emergency 
administration without government authorization was added to Law n. 3359. The fact that 
these legislative changes were carried out while Gezi demonstrations were still the main 
topic of the country seems remarkable and conforms to Buğra and Savaşkan’s (2014) 
arguments about the current government’s use of legislation as a tool to reshape the interest 
representation structure. 
One of the respondent’s account about his experience on the ‘local seed’ campaign 
against hybrid seeds and GMOs is revealing about the influence of political factors in 
organic agriculture. He explained how a local government, run by an opposition political 
party, with whom he tried to organize a ‘local seed’ campaign wanted to transmute it into a 
‘national seed’ campaign with complete Atatürk posters, the Turkish flags and a political 
criticism of AKP. So it is not only the central government’s but also the local governments’ 
approach to organic agriculture could be politically informed. Newspaper data is supportive 
of this account: the regional news about the organic agriculture includes the statements of 
local government authorities usually on how these initiatives are supportive of economic 
and social development of the region and the small farmers with a note to a detrimental or 
supportive agricultural polices of the central government depending on whether they are 
representing opposition or incumbent political party respectively. 
All in all, in the accounts of my respondents, the state, the central government  and to 
a lesser extent the local governments have a prominent place in the trajectory of both 
Islamic banking and to a lesser extent in organic agriculture. However, this influence is not 
always perceived to be positive and supportive by the industry incumbents. Islamic bankers 
and organic producers described the state as hostile at certain episodes as in the case of 
attempting to shut down Islamic banks and to restrict the NGOs to establish organic 
farmers’ markets. These accounts provide evidence on how state authorities’ understandings 
and treatments of these industries are influenced by the sociopolitical context and how new 
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industries could be or become a part of a political project. It also shows the fragmented 
nature of the state in its approach to Islamic banking and organic agriculture. The military, 
local government and central government do not represent a unified set of actors in their 
understanding and treatment of Islamic banking and organic agriculture. 
!!!
3.2. Certified Producers !!!
I refer to managers and owners of Islamic banks and the small and large producers 
and businesses who produce certified organic products as certified producers. ‘Certified’ 
here refers to formal status of these actors’ products and services; they are registered and 
regulated by the state and certified by state-authorized bodies as conforming to related laws 
and regulations. 
The structure of certified producers is strikingly different in Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture. There are currently five Islamic banks operating in Turkey with a 
formal professional association that provides them a space for a regular interaction. There 
are thousands of farmers involved in organic agriculture production nationwide positing a 
coordination problem for organic producers compared to Islamic bankers. 
Certified producers in both industries are divided on their understanding of the focal 
industry. In Islamic banking, the division comes down to different views on proper and 
distinct legal definition of Islamic banking. Understanding of law as a marker that separates 
Islamic banking from conventional banking irrespective of its benefits or drawbacks versus 
understanding of law as a tool for symbolic and material gains was the main axis of the 
division among Islamic bankers. 
The division about the understanding of organic agriculture among certified 
producers stems from atomistic versus holistic approach to organic farming. Understanding 
of organic agriculture as defined in the formal law -a farming method prohibiting harmful 
inputs for the benefit of human and environmental health-, reflects the atomistic approach. 
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Understanding of organic agriculture as not only a production method but as a part of 
ecological living challenging the industrialized production and consumption systems 
represents holistic approach. 
Certified producers are similar in their depiction of their industry. Islamic bankers 
almost always elaborate Islamic banking in terms of its economic and societal benefits due 
to exclusion of interest. Organic agriculture producers refer to environmental and health 
benefits due to exclusion of chemicals. 
In the following pages, I present more detail and evidence regarding certified 
producers’ accounts of their industries first for Islamic banking and then for organic 
agriculture. 
!!!
3.2.1. Islamic Bankers and Islamic Banks !!
As I explained in Chapter 2, 7 different Islamic banks were established in Turkey 
since 1985. There have been a maximum 6 Islamic banks operating at the same time 
between 1996 and 2001, 5 between 2001 and 2005, 4 from 2005 until May 2015. The first 
state owned Islamic bank was established in May 2015 making 5 Islamic banks in total 
operating in Turkey as of December 2015. All Islamic banks’ headquarters are based in 
Istanbul. The five existing SFHs established a voluntary union on December 25th, 1995 
that was not very active in producing and disseminating public information, so I do not 
have archival data related to/from that establishment. With the amendment of banking law 
n. 4389 on May 29th, 2001 the Association of Special Finance Houses was established as a 
public legal entity and it started its operation on October 4th, 2001. All the Islamic banks 
are required to be a member of the association and the association is the main channel 
through which the industry rights and interests are represented. 
With a limited number of players and a formal association gathering members under a 
roof, Islamic bankers are in close communication. Archival and interview data provide 
evidence that the managers of Islamic banks were interacting regularly. Data also suggests 
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that Islamic bankers do not represent a homogenous group but differ in their understandings 
about the proper and distinct legal definition of Islamic banking. 
!!!
3.2.1.1. Different views among Islamic bankers !!
Islamic banker differ in their views regarding formal definition and regulation of 
Islamic banking as captured in debates over the inclusion within the Banking Law in 1999; 
definition as a ‘Bank’ in Banking Law in 2005; and the product and services of Islamic 
banks. The differences come down to the Islamic bankers’ different understandings about 
the proper and distinct legal definition of Islamic banking. Islamic bankers hold different 
views regarding the content, structure and the scope of the formal law in relation to legal 
definition of Islamic banking. Specifically, Islamic bankers differed in their views on: How 
should Islamic banking be defined in legal terms: as a bank or as a financial institution? ; 
How should legal framework of Islamic banking devised: as part of a larger financial law 
and regulations outside of banking law or within the banking law? ; and how should the 
practice of Islamic banking be codified and which practices should be enforced legally: 
should Islamic banks have deposit guarantee funds or not? To be sure, not only Islamic 
bankers but also the state, moral certifiers and idealists are involved in the conversations 
around these questions. I discuss the debates around specific legal regulations in detail in 
the next chapter where I examine the legal creation and formation of both industries. 
The question Osman Akyüz, then the general manager of Albaraka Türk, posed to 
Prof. Sabahaddin Zaim, one of the prominent thought leaders of Islamic banking in Turkey 
in 1998 reflects this division among Islamic bankers. Akyüz asks: 
!
   “Hocam, bir de şunu öğrenmek istiyorum. Biz pratik çalışmalarımızda şöyle 
bir ikilem içerisindeyiz. Kendi aramızda zaman zaman bunu münakaşa 
ediyoruz. Bir kısım arkadaşlarımız diyor ki; Türkiye’de ki özel finans kurumları 
mevzuatı bu haliyle bizim ihtiyacımıza cevap vermiyor. İstikbalde bu 
kurumların korunabilmesi için belli bir yer edinebilmesi için bugün mutlaka 
bankacılık şemsiyesi altına girmelidir. Bu müesseseleri faizsiz bankacılık veya 
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faizsiz banka sözcüğü altında hükmi şahsiyet haline getirmemiz lâzım. 
Dolayısıyla Türkiye’deki yasal düzenlemede de bankalar kanunu bünyesinde 
bunları bir yere monte ettirmemiz lâzım, diyorlar. Bir kısım arkadaşlar da der 
ki, Hayır bu tamamen klasik banka sisteminin dışında farklı bir finans 
anlayışıdır. Bunun ayrı korunması, ayrı geliştirilmesi, banka sözcüğünün 
terminolojiye sokulmaması gerekir. Adına işte faizsiz finans kurumu ve benzeri 
adlar altında bugünkü ismi ile hükmi şahsiyetini muhafaza etmenin çok daha 
asli bir fonksiyon olduğunu iddia ediyorlar. Bu konuda ne dersiniz bize 
hocam.”(Akyüz, 2000: 175) !
   “Sir, there is something else I would like to know. We are in a predicament in 
our practical studies. We sometimes debate this among ourselves. Some of our 
colleagues say, the special finance houses regulation in Turkey does not answer 
our needs with its present state. For these establishments to keep existing in the 
future and gain a place, they must be taken under the umbrella of the banking 
system as of today. We must give legal personalities to them under the name 
interest-free banking or interest-free banks. Therefore we must have them 
installed somewhere in the banking legislation within the legal regulations in 
Turkey, they say. Others say, no, this is a totally different understanding outside 
the standard banking system. It should be protected and developed apart from 
banks, and the word bank should not be included into the terminology. They 
claim that it is a much more essential function to maintain them under their 
present legal personality with the name interest-free financial houses and such. 
I would like to hear your opinion on this.” (Akyüz, 2000: 175) !
Data do not provide sufficient evidence to make suggestions regarding sources of 
different views among Islamic bankers. However, it is plausible to think that differences in 
affiliations, both country and Islamic sect, may play a role. Local founders of Islamic banks 
in Turkey were prominent political and religious leaders linked to Islamic sects. Islamic 
sects differ in their interpretation of Islam. The more stringent interpretation of Islam may 
inform a more distinct understanding of Islamic banking that may reflect in debates around 
legal definition of Islamic banking. Similarly, differences in the origin country of Islamic 
banks may account for variance in Islamic bankers’ understandings of their work. 
!!!!!
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3.2.1.2. Common views among Islamic bankers !!
Although there are different views among Islamic bankers regarding legal definition 
and regulation of Islamic banking, they are generally in agreement on depicting their 
industry in terms of its economic and societal benefits in their public statements. In that 
sense, they have more pragmatic account of Islamic banking compared to moral certifiers 
and idealists who elaborates Islamic banking in relation to Islamic law. This may be related 
to being practitioners with banking and finance backgrounds as well as perceived 
ideological/secular limitations. They acknowledge and refer to ideals regarding Islamic 
banking and use them as normative aspirations. However they frequently refer to 
difficulties of operating in a global system shaped by a debt financing instead of equity 
financing as obstacles to reach those ideals. 
!!!
3.2.1.2.1. Islamic banks as financial institutions that are good for entire economy !!
Islamic bankers define Islamic banks as ‘financial institutions’ when interacting with 
state. They elaborated these banks in terms of their public/societal benefits by i. appealing 
to domestic savings that stay out of the banking system because of ‘interest sensitivity’, ii. 
attracting Gulf capital that looks for new investment areas that exclude interest, iii. 
supporting economic development by financing small and medium sized enterprises, and iv. 
being more resilient to financial crises. The first two arguments about appealing to 
domestic and foreign capital are the justifications that the sate officials used for Islamic 
banking during their establishment. The last two statements about local development 
through financing real sector and the resilience arguments also appear in the state officials’ 
accounts about Islamic banking albeit starting with 2000s. Before then, these arguments 
were exclusively used by Islamic banks and their supporters. 
Islamic bankers usually state that Islamic banks are ‘complementary’ to conventional 
banks, filling a gap in the sector by appealing to a different niche. According to this view, 
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they are offering an ethical option for those who do not want to participate in the dominant 
system based on their religious beliefs; as such they are supplementing the financial system. 
This view is different than those that use ‘alternative’ to refer to a view of Islamic banking 
as creating a new social and economic order separate from hegemonic capitalist and 
secularist system with an aspiration to substitute it one day. ‘Alternative’ account is usually 
invoked by the people I refer to as idealists. 
!!!
3.2.1.2.2. Islamic banks as financial institutions that embody universal values !!
The most salient characteristic of the ‘financial institutions’ accounts of Islamic 
bankers is that they understate ‘Islamic’ and sometimes even ‘interest-free’ aspects of these 
banks. Islamic bankers meticulously avoided Islamic references and the name ‘Islamic 
banking’ from the very beginning. They use phrases like ‘ethical’, ‘ahlaki/moral’ or 
‘compatible with tradition’ (tradition is vaguely referring to practices of Prophet) to refer to 
their Islamic character, and even then, they add that these criteria should be guiding all 
banks and business life anyway. 
Even though Islamic bankers use ‘interest-free’ more freely, they also use phrases like 
‘fixed income’, ‘risk-free income’ or ‘pre-determined profit’ to refer to interest. Moreover, 
Islamic bankers usually highlight the existence of the prohibition of interest throughout the 
history of mankind and the ethical as well as economic bases for this prohibition. The 
historicity and the ethical and economic bases of the prohibition of interest, Islamic bankers 
add, makes the ban on interest not exclusive to Muslims but instead a universal principle 
for all. 
The emphasis on Islamic banking embodies and is compatible with modern universal 
values in these accounts also conveys implicitly or explicitly that ‘dilemma’ between Islam 
and modern economy is false and that Islamic principles can be enlisted in modern 
economic systems.   
!!
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3.2.1.2.3. Islamic banks as financial institutions following Islamic rules !!
Islamic bankers framed Islamic banks as ‘financial institutions following Islamic 
rules’ when interacting with people I refer to as moral certifiers and idealists. There are 
common references in Islamic bankers’ accounts while interacting with the state on the one 
hand and the moral certifiers and idealists on the other hand. For example ‘appealing to 
domestic savings’ would figure on both accounts. While interacting with state, appealing to 
domestic savings would be tied to bringing much needed ‘money under the pillow’ into the 
use of economy and promoting formal economy and development. While interacting with 
moral certifiers and idealists, however, appealing to domestic savings would be tied to 
social and economic inclusion of devout Muslims who stay out of financial system due to 
interest-based banking and have to bear social and economic disadvantages. Appealing to 
domestic savings is elaborated by its benefit to formal economy and development in the 
first account, and by its role in fostering social equality and justice in the second account. 
These banks’ dual roles and normative contexts are most salient in the conversations 
between Islamic bankers and moral certifiers and idealists. Islamic bankers often refer to 
social and economic factors as obstructs. In these expressions, depositors’ greedy nature or 
borrowers’ unethical business practices constrain these banks. However, the customers are 
also frequently referred as disadvantaged devout Muslims who avoid interest based on their 
beliefs. This simultaneous and seemingly contradictory characterization of customers are 
not expressed as incompatible though. Usually these arguments are linked to the need for 
these banks to be financially competitive to appeal to customers and as a justification for 
the application of some controversial practices according to Islamic law. 
!!!
3.2.2. Small and Large Organic Producers !!
Different than Islamic banking, thousands of producers, small and large, are engaged 
in organic agriculture nationwide. According to Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock 
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71,472 holdings, engaged in organic crop production, organically cultivated 842,216 
hectares of land and harvested 1,642,235 tons of 208 different agricultural crops in 2014. 
Organic farming lacks a formal professional association for the whole industry. Instead 
there are local and national associations related to organic farming with varying degrees of 
focus on small farmers or larger industrialists. This producer structure of organic farming 
cautions me against the tendency to make generalizations about organic producers, since 
large and small producers typically hold different views regarding central issues. 
My interpretations about organic producers are based on the interviews with people 
associated with organic agriculture, both producers and non-producers and archival data 
produced by two associations, ‘Organic Product Producers and Industrialists 
Association’ (ORGÜDER) and ‘Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological Living’. 
ORGÜDER was founded by seven large organic product producers/traders in 2004, 
currently having thirty-two members. Buğday initially formed as a health food store in 
1991 transformed to a formal NGO in 2002 and is generally considered to be a small farmer 
oriented NGO. It is important to note that Buğday is not a farmer-founded association but 
works closely with small farmers through its organic farmers’ markets in different cities. 
Data regarding large producers comes from ORGÜDER. Data regarding small producers 
comes from Buğday and the small farmers who were or are still related to Buğday. 
Although ORGÜDER and Buğday do not represent all the organic producers, they are the 
most visible associations in media with links to organic producers in different cities. 
The common theme in ORGÜDER’s and Buğday’s accounts is that they both 
highlight the production method of organic farming as different than conventional farming. 
‘Chemical free’ aspect of organic production method and its implications for environmental 
and human health are frequently communicated through their public accounts. 
ORGÜDER and Buğday differ in their interpretation of the scope and the aim of 
organic agriculture. ORGÜDER tends to understand and communicate organic farming as 
defined in formal law: as a production method that excludes inputs with adverse 
environmental and health effects such as chemical fertilizers, growth hormones, and 
antibiotics. ‘Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological Living’ holds a more holistic 
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approach to organic farming. The most visible manifestations of this difference between 
these two associations is in their choice of the term that is also reflected in their names. 
Buğday and small organic producers use ecological farming instead of organic farming on 
the basis that the name ‘organic’ does not provide a complete definition for the industry as 
they understand it. Theirs is not only about a farming method that excludes chemical inputs. 
It is about ecological living, a holistic way of life that involves protection of the nature with 
all the living things in it and ecological farming refers to the understanding of a production 
and consumption system that is compatible with such a view of being. Thus, compared to 
reductionist accounts of organic farming of the large organic producers as being chemical-
free, small farmers tend to understand ecological farming linked to the question of how to 
live, produce and consume. 
It is again important to note that these accounts are not suggested as being shared by 
all the small farmers or all the large producers. On the contrary, my respondents from 
Buğday stated that there are many small organic farmers in the field just to do business. 
However the accounts where ecological farming is tied to ecological living often figure in 
the accounts of small producers, but not large producers. 
Below I provide the differences in terms of focus and the aim of large and small 
organic producers. 
!!!
3.2.2.1. Large organic producers !!
ORGÜDER is highly interested and involved in commercial and legislative aspects of 
organic farming. ORGÜDER’s aim and activities are stated as “to contribute to the 
development of the Organic Agriculture and Organic Product Industry in Turkey by 
combining all the organic product industry sector under one roof”; to develop “occupational 
solidarity and cooperation” in the industry; “to work in collaboration with the relevant 
public Institutes/Institutions in the preparation of regulations and guidelines”; “to create 
sufficient demand for the growing production”; and  “to develop export possibilities in the 
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foreign markets” (ORGÜDER, 2015). This does not mean large producers do not refer to 
ecological and health benefits of organic farming, they do, but in a rather atomistic way. In 
these accounts, ecological and health benefits are strongly linked to being chemical-free. 
Organic production is harmless for environment because it does not use chemical inputs. 
Organic consumption is kind of insurance policy to protect oneself from the possibility of 
future health risks due to chemical residues in conventional food. Şerif Ayhan Sümerli, the 
most vocal large organic producer who is the president of ORGÜDER and the owner of the 
largest and oldest organic food company, City Farm, in Turkey states that: 
!
“Organik gıda bir sigorta poliçesi. İstikbal’de kaybettiğiniz sağlığı geriye 
getirmek adına harcayacağınız paranın çok daha azını, daha sağlıklı yaşamak 
için bugün harcıyorsunuz. Bir manada bir sigorta poliçesi satın alıyorsunuz. 
Bir noktası bu. En azından ben bu işin böyle olduğuna inanıyorum. Niye 
tüketilmeli çünkü her aşaması kontrol ediliyor, denetleniyor. Kimyasal ve 
sentetik madde barındırmıyor.” (Sümerli, 2014) !
“Organic food is an insurance policy. You spend a fraction of the money that 
you would spend in the future to regain your lost health, today, to live a 
healthier life. In a way you buy an insurance policy. This is one point. At least I 
believe it to be so. Why should we consume them? Because every phase is 
controlled and supervised. It does not harbor chemical or synthetic 
material.” (Sümerli, 2014) !
in an interview published in magazine called ‘Organik Türkiye’ on March 2014. 
The conversations around seed (hybrid seed vs local seed, hegemony in seed 
production), small farmers (organic farming as supporting small farmers against 
agribusiness) and living in tune with nature do not figure much in their accounts and when 
they do they differ strikingly from those articulated by small producers. 
Local seed is interpreted as an utopia by larger organic producers, there is no 
possibility that the local seed would fit in organic production process as it is not feasible to 
produce large amounts of domestic and export goods due to yield inefficiency of local 
seeds. In these accounts, the idea of local seed is referred as nostalgic and its place in food 
production is articulated in a way corresponding to that nostalgia; to produce food in your 
garden for your own consumption. 
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Organic production is not linked to the survival of small farmers in these accounts as 
it usually finds expression in small producers. On the contrary, fragmentation of farming 
lands is seen as problematic in terms of production efficiency since small farms are used 
mainly for subsistence farming. This makes these lands to be difficult to utilize for large 
scale organic production. ORGÜDER’s one of the activities in its web-page stated as 
working for ‘stopping fragmentation of plantations by cooperatives’ (ORGÜDER, 2015). 
The view of organic farming as part of a way of life based on environmental 
consciousness and less consumption is not present in these accounts. They acknowledge 
Buğday and activists having a holistic view around organic farming but large producers 
seem to put them in a different category. According to large organic farmers, organic 
farming is just a production method and consuming organic products is a choice, a choice 
those who can afford to make. 
The most salient characteristics of the large organic producers’ accounts is that the 
definition of organic farming closely corresponds to formal definition of the state. The 
reference to Organic Farming Law n. 5262 is used frequently to highlight both the 
chemical-free and the regulated nature of organic farming. They do not claim superiority in 
taste or aroma as these are subjective criterions. I interpreted this objective and technical 
description of organic farming in large organic producers’ accounts as compatible with their 
commercial view of the industry. In these accounts, what makes an organic product distinct 
is the formal certification based on the Law that proves no chemicals are used in the 
production. So organic certification is regarded as the only tangible proof that gives 
distinction to organic products; the superiority claims based on taste, aroma and to a certain 
extent, environmental and health benefits are considered to be subjective, secondary and 
distant. 
!!!!!!
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3.2.2.2. Small organic producers !!
As explained in the case history of organic agriculture in Turkey in Chapter 2, 
certified organic agriculture started with the initiation of the European companies to 
produce organic dried fruits for European markets in 1984 and it was in 1994 that the state 
was involved in the sector with the first national regulation. Thus, organic farming in 
Turkey lacks an initial set of farmer-activists that mobilized other producers and consumers 
as in the case of North America and Europe. 
Buğday, as ORGÜDER, involves in commercial or legislative issues regarding 
organic agriculture but it holds a more holistic approach to organic farming. Buğday and 
the small farmers associated with Buğday have a much broader scope in their 
understanding of organic agriculture compared to large organic producers. They do not talk 
about only ‘chemical free’ aspect of organic agriculture. They are also concerned about the 
seed, biodiversity and agribusiness and perceive these issues within the scope of organic 
agriculture. In their accounts organic agriculture is not just for human and environmental 
health, it is also supporting small farmers and connecting producers and consumers through 
their common interest in a better alternative to conventional agriculture. I discuss these 
debates in detail in Chapter 5 where I examine the moral fundamentals of the industry as 
informed by rules and models in Nature. 
!!!
3.3. Non-Certified Producers !!!
Non-certified producers refer to ventures that may be perceived as comparable to 
organic agriculture or Islamic banking but outside the formal organic or banking law. Some 
of these ventures utilize similar and sometimes the same labels that connote association 
with the claims of Islamic banking and organic agriculture. For example, multi-partnership 
firms generally known as Islamic Holdings collect funds from their members based on a 
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‘partnership’ and ‘profit and loss sharing’ contract. Any kind of product may be labeled as 
‘natural’, ‘local’, or ‘traditional’ (NLT labels) in the case of organic agriculture. 
Some of these ventures are possible due to loopholes in the law and regulations. For 
example, any large or small producer/trader can refer to their products as ‘natural’, ‘local’, 
or ‘traditional’ , irrespective of the production method. NLT claims are not need to be 
substantiated since these labels are not formally codified. Islamic holdings were able to 
collect funds from the public directly by selling ‘shares’ and avoid registration with the 
Capital Markets Board due to a misspecification regarding the holding companies in 
Turkish Commercial Code (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2006). 
As such, NLT labels and Islamic holdings are unregistered, unlicensed ventures that 
are outside the regulation of formal authority, thus their contracts and/or claims are not 
legally binding. NLT claims cannot be challenged legally as there is no legal definition for 
these terms. Islamic holdings’ shares do not provide legally defined property rights such as 
voting or right to sell shares. This ‘non-certified’ character of these producers creates the 
questions of legal accountability, legal validity and transparency for these ventures. 
Non-certified producers’ legal base is not the only source of their questionability. In 
the case of Islamic Holdings, part of the story is their ideological stance and activities. 
Islamic holdings were generally perceived as subversive entities aiming to throw out 
secularist regime among the secularist social and political groups and the military elite. 
To a lesser extent, Islamic holdings also created concerns within the conservative 
circles. Archival data suggests some conservatives were hesitant about Islamic Holdings’ 
choice of methods such as raising money in mosques. These people were hesitant about the 
true conformity of Islamic Holdings’ activities to Islamic principles. 
Moreover, not all of the Islamic holdings have found to be genuine, some of them 
existed only on paper and most of them bankrupted in early 2000s (Özcan and Çokgezen, 
2006). 
In the case of organic agriculture, part of the confusion and questioning about NLT 
labels stem from the existence of both counterfeit and genuine usages of the terms. All of 
my respondents were cognizant of counterfeit and genuine producers who use NLT labels. 
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Respondents also acknowledged that these labels created confusion and stated that 
counterfeit NLT labels created unfair competition either for organic agriculture, or for 
conventional products, or for genuine NLTs. 
When the respondents referred to counterfeit NLT examples they usually talked about 
the products that are sold in large supermarkets, small shops, open markets or even in the 
fruit and vegetable stalls on the highways. These products regarded as counterfeit because 
the NLT labels used without any substantiation, transparency and observability.When the 
respondents referred to genuine NLTs, they would count a few producers with their names, 
places and products. as examples. These producers were acknowledged as using similar 
methods to organic agriculture but not preferring or affording formal certification. 
Other than Islamic Holdings and NLT labels, non-certified producers include 
consumer and producer cooperatives and informal mutual assistance organizations that are 
organized to operate outside the formal agriculture and finance system. These ventures 
utilize direct relationships among its members for the purpose of setting preferred terms of 
conduct such as chemical-free food production as in the consumer and producer 
cooperatives and interest-free financing as in the mutual assistance organizations. As such, 
they also create an informal space for agriculture and finance outside of the dominant 
formal system. 
Consumer and producer cooperatives and informal mutual assistance organizations 
are marginal in terms of scale and visibility compared to NLT labels and Islamic holdings. 
Moreover, these ventures seem to escape the ‘sincerity questioning’ present around the NLT 
labels and Islamic holdings and enjoy a more unquestioned existence. It is important to 
highlight again that not all NLT labels and Islamic holdings are perceived as complete 
frauds. There exist highly respectable and visible producers who use NLT labels and some 
of my respondents believed in sincerity of some Islamic holdings. However both NLT 
labels and Islamic holdings have counterfeit examples that create a tainted view of these 
ventures. 
There is also an agricultural production method called Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAP) that could be referred as non-certified producers for organic farming. GAP is 
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basically conventional farming with formal state certification guaranteeing that 
conventional agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides were used in 
accordance with their prescriptions. 
The name Good Agricultural Practices suggests antithesis of stigmatized agricultural 
practices such as use of chemicals and hormones that figure frequently in newspaper data. 
Some examples of such newspaper articles are news regarding exported fruits and 
vegetables that were sent back due to chemical residues and now marketed into domestic 
consumption or health news that refers to cancer risk due to exposure to chemicals and 
hormones. Although GAP is different from NLT labels in that it is a formally certified 
practice, it is similar to those in the sense that it connotes a ‘better than conventional’ 
practice. Moreover, organic farming and GAP are organized under the same department, the 
Department of Good Agricultural Practices and Organic Farming, within the Ministry of 
Food Agriculture and Livestock in Turkey that may suggest similarities and create 
confusion. 
I examine how non-certified producers figure in the accounts of certified producers, 
moral certifiers and idealists as related to definition of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture in the next chapter in Section 4.1.4. 
!!!
3.4. Moral Certifiers !!!
I refer to people, groups of people, or NGOs who work closely with certified 
producers, sometimes within the same organizational boundaries (but outside of the state 
apparatus), and exercise an informal regulation and control on the certified producers and 
the industry. What I mean by informal regulation and control is that moral certifiers do not 
have legally defined roles as control, regulation or certification bodies but nonetheless 
perform very similar roles carried out by formal bodies. Additionally, moral certifiers also 
endorse the industry as a moral enterprise through their active promotion of the industry as 
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a proper and appropriate alternative to its conventional counterpart. Below I explain each 
role, informal regulative role and moral certification role in detail. 
!!!
3.4.1. Informal Regulative Role !!
Moral certifiers corresponds to Advisory Boards (commonly referred as Sharia Board 
in other countries) and Sharia scholars within that board in the case of Islamic banking. 
Advisory Boards have never been formally defined and enforced in Banking Law, however 
each Islamic bank in Turkey has its own Advisory Board within its organizational 
boundaries from the very beginning. Advisory Board is responsible for overseeing the 
banks’ products and services in terms of their compliancy with Islamic law. Islamic banks 
need to take the approval of the Advisory Board for every new product and services they 
plan to introduce and they are bounded by the decision of the Advisory Board. 
One revealing example of that boundedness is the case about government revenue-
indexed securities that Islamic banks have been investing since 2009 with the approval of 
Hayrettin Karaman, a respectable sharia scholar who was in the Advisory Boards of three 
Islamic banks at once. Karaman announced his account of these securities and why he 
approved them in his website by publishing his assessment letter that he provided to Islamic 
banks dated as November 4th, 2008 and can be found at http://www.hayrettinkaraman.net/
sc/00461.htm. Upon his approval, Islamic banks invested heavily to those securities that 
Treasury started to issue on January 2009. On May 21st 2009, Osman Akyüz, General 
Secretary of TKBB stated in Zaman as: 
!
   “1,3 milyar lira civarında GES ihracı oldu. Bunun yüzde 90'ından fazlasını 
katılım bankaları alarak, bu kâğıda 1,2 milyar lira yatırım yaptılar.” (Akyüz, 
2009) !
   “Revenue-indexed securities valuing around 1,3 million Turkish lira has been 
issued. Participation banks acquired more than 90% of those securities 
investing 1,2 million Turkish lira.”(Akyüz, 2009) !
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These securities were also celebrated as broadening the scope of these banks by 
Yunus Nacar, General Manager of Türkiye Finans and TKBB in his statement on May 17th, 
2009 in Zaman: 
!
   (Bugüne kadar katılım bankacılığının iki ayağının bulunduğunu, bunların fon 
toplamak ve fon kullandırmak olduğunu ifade eden Nacar,) "Krizle birlikte 
elimizde çok büyük bir fon toplandı. Bu nakiti, Hazine'nin, ocak ayında 
oluşturduğu gelire endeksli senet alımında kullandık. Gelire endeksli senetle 
katılım bankacılığı, fon toplayan, fon kullandıran ve menkul kıymetleri 
kullandırabilen hale geldi." (Nacar, 2009) !
   (Stating that participation banking had two legs up until today; gathering and 
supplying funds, Nacar goes onto say,) “Due to the crisis, we gathered a lot of 
funds. We used this cash in the acquisition of revenue-indexed securities that 
the Treasury formed in January. Together with the revenue-indexed securities, 
participation banking became a fund gatherer, fund supplier and securities 
supplier.” (Nacar, 2009) !
However, almost two years later on February 19th, 2012, Hayretin Karaman declared 
that these securities involved interest. He wrote in his newspaper column in Yeni Şafak: 
!
  “GES''ler ilk çıkarıldığında "endekslendikleri gelir kaynakları" helal 
gelirlerin kaynakları olduğunu ve devletin bu kaynaklardaki hakkını senet 
mukabilinde satın alana devrettiğini göz önüne alarak (böyle olması 
gerektiğini, buna çevrilmesi lazım geldiğini söyleyerek) müspet karşılamıştık. 
Bu gelir kaynakları şunlardı: T.Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO), Devlet 
Malzeme Ofisi (DMO), Devlet Hava Meydanları İşletmeleri (DHMİ) ve Kıyı 
Emniyeti Genel Müdürlüğü''nden (KIYEM). Bunlardan bütçeye aktarılan 
hasılat payları, mali bir hakkın devri yoluyla "senet alanlara" devredilmiş 
olacaktı. Özel görüşmelerde bazı ilgililere "Bu senetlerin "gelire endeksli senet 
(GES)" değil, "gelir ortaklığı senedi (GOS)" olması gerektiğini, maksat bu ise 
adının da böyle olması gerektiğini, ayrıca bu senetlerin "devletin borçlanma 
enstrümanlarını çeşitlendirme" amacı ile ve borçlanma mahiyetinde olmaması, 
devletin hakkı olan bazı helal gelirlerin "senet mukabilinde bedeli ile geçici 
devri" mahiyetinde olması gerektiğini ısrarla söylemiştim. Medyaya düşen 
haberlerden, eski şekilde (gelire endeksli olduğu için faizli borçlanma olarak) 
devam edeceğini üzülerek öğrendim. Gelire endeksli senet (GES) olduğu sürece 
bu senetler de "devlet tahvili gibidir. Gelir ortaklığı senedi (GOS) haline 
gelmedikçe bunların geliri de faizdir.” (Karaman, 2012) 
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   “When the revenue-indexed securities (RIS) were first established, taking into 
consideration that “the revenue sources that they were indexed to” were halal 
sources of income and that the state was turning its right in these sources over 
to the purchaser in the form of bonds (and stating that it had to be done this 
way, turned into this form), we received them positively. The revenue sources 
were: Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), State Supply Office (DMO), 
General Directorate Of State Airports Authority (DHMİ) and Directorate 
General of Coastal Safety (KIYEM). The revenue shares that were to be 
transferred from these to the budget would be turned over to the “bond 
purchasers” via the transfer of a fiscal right. In private sessions, I had 
insistently told some authorities that these bonds should not be “revenue-
indexed securities (RIS)” but “revenue-sharing securities (RSS)”, that if this 
was the intention than the name should match it, additionally that these bonds’ 
aim should not be “diversification of the state’s debt instruments” and not be in 
the form of debts and that they should be in the form of “temporary transfer of 
halal revenues that are the right of the state, in return for bonds”. From the 
news I got from the media, I reluctantly found out that it would go on as it used 
to (debt instrument with interest because it is revenue based). As long as they 
are revenue-indexed securities (RIS) these bonds are also like treasury bonds. 
As long as they do not become revenue-sharing securities, their revenue will 
continue to be from interest.” (Karaman, 2012) !
Upon his declaration that these securities involved interest and thus against Islamic 
law, Islamic banks needed to exchange those securities with interest-free alternatives. On 
March 29th 2012, Osman Akyüz, General Secretary of TKBB says in Milliyet: 
!
   “Hayrettin Karaman Hoca’nın söyledikleri bizler açısından bağlayıcıdır. 
Dolayısıyla artık bu noktadan itibaren yeni bir yol haritasına ihtiyacımız 
olduğunu düşündük ve Hazine yetkilileri ile bir araya geldik. Bizim önerimiz şu 
oldu; katılım bankalarının elinde halen yaklaşık 1 milyar liralık GES var. 
‘Bunları alın, karşılığında bize kira sertifikası (sukuk) verin’ dedik. Bu takas 
işlemiyle hem katılım bankalarının yaşadığı sorunlar çözülmüş olur, hem de 
uzun zamandır tartışılan kira sertifikaları devlet eliyle hayata geçirilmiş olur. 
Talebimiz itfaların gerçekleşeceği Ağustos ayına kadar Hazine’nin Türk lirası 
üzerinden kira sertifikası çıkarması.” (Akyüz, 2012) !
   The words of Mr. Hayrettin Karaman are binding for us. Therefore, we 
thought that, from this point on, we needed a new road map and we came 
together with officials from the Treasury. Our suggestion was; there are still 
around 1 billion worth of RISs in the hands of participation banks. We said, 
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‘Take these and give us lease certificates (sukuk) in return’. With this barter 
transaction, both the problems of participation banks will be solved and lease 
certificates, which have long been a topic of debate, will have been realized by 
the hand of the state. Our request is for the Treasury to issue lease certificates 
over Turkish lira by August when the amortizations will be realized. (Akyüz, 
2012) !
Buğday performs a similar role for certified organic producers to that of Advisory 
Boards for Islamic banks. In fact Buğday is performing a control function that is assigned 
to two different authorized bodies. Fist, only local municipalities can control the open 
markets but Buğday controls its own organic open markets. Second, that is parallel to that 
of Advisory Boards in Islamic banking, Buğday also controls the certified organic 
producers in its open markets that is a role assigned to authorized Control and Certification 
Bodies (CCB) by the state through organic agriculture Law. Buğday arranges field visits to 
control production methods of those organic producers who have a stall in organic open 
markets Buğday operates. It also works closely with the CCBs and have access to their 
producer data. Buğday compares the data from CCBs with the data they gather in their own 
field visits. Moreover, Buğday keeps track of the volume of produces each seller brings into 
the open markets and comperes it with its own producer data to make an additional check to 
make sure conventional produces are not brought into market. Buğday also takes random 
samples from the produces in its open markets and makes them analyzed for any chemical 
residues and shares the results publicly. When there is a fraud detected, and my respondents 
from Buğday said there were a few frauds, the formal authorities were informed and those 
people were banned from the organic open markets. 
Thus, Advisory boards and Buğday perform very similar roles to those legally 
authorized bodies albeit with a different twist in Islamic banking. Buğday’s technical 
control is about making sure the agricultural inputs, forbidden in the organic law and the 
regulations, were not used during the process. As such Buğday is doing an additional 
control very similar to those done by authorized CCBs by referring to the same criterions 
defined in the formal organic law. However, the control that Advisory Boards perform in 
Islamic banking is based on Islamic law, not on formal banking law. It is still technical 
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control in that the main aim of Advisory Boards is to make sure that interest, forbidden in 
Islamic law, is not involved in the practices of Islamic banks. However this control differs 
from the formal controls done by authorized Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
in terms of both its focus and criterion which is informed by Islamic law instead of formal 
banking law. 
The accounts of my respondents suggest that this additional technical control is 
regarded as a necessity to convince the consumers on products being chemical-free or 
interest-free. My respondents from Buğday explained their control procedures in open 
farmers’ markets as “a model that was developed through the years with regard to 
consumer demand”. She explained that the people who are coming to organic open 
farmers’ market come because they trust Buğday’s guarantee rather than the formal 
certification. When I asked about the producers’ reactions on these additional controls 
Buğday perform, my respondent claimed that the producers and also the CCBs are 
supportive of their activities as producers and CCBs too acknowledge that consumers do 
not necessarily trust formal organic certificate. 
One reason for the need for Advisory Boards in Islamic banking seems to be 
knowledge related that may also be linked to credibility and trust issue. Islamic bankers in 
Turkey, except a few, lacks Islamic law and Islamic economics education. In fact, Islamic 
economics, as Islamic banking, is a fairly new concept and only recently started to be 
taught at universities in Turkey. Moreover a religious judgement on the permissibility of a 
practice or product could only be made by those who are regarded as having a deep 
understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, usually sharia scholars. Lacking such a formal 
education and a deep understanding of Islamic legal system, Islamic bankers’ own claims 
regarding interest-free practices wouldn’t be convincing and would create trust issue. 
Moreover, Turkey as a secular state, do not have formal institutions that would be 
authorized to make judgements about the conformity of dealings and transactions in public 
life to Islamic law. As such, in Islamic banking, the necessity for Advisory Boards stems 
from not due to distrust to formal control and regulation bodies as it is the case in organic 
"127
agriculture but due to non-existence of such bodies in a secular system to validate interest-
free claims based on Islam. 
!!!
3.4.2. Moral Certification Role !!
Apart from this technical control about the exclusion of chemicals in organic 
agriculture and of interest in Islamic banking, moral certifiers also perform what I refer to 
as moral certification role. Formal control and certification bodies in organic agriculture 
and regulation authorities in Islamic banking are involved in the technical operation of 
these industries and they are not actively part of the conversations around these industries. 
Their relation with the industry and the certified producers is confined to their regulative 
role. 
Unlike formal regulation authorities, moral certifiers endorse the industry as a moral 
enterprise in addition to their regulative role. These are the people who, in their accounts, 
link the exclusion of chemicals and interest to a moral and proper way of doing agriculture 
and banking respectively. Their role as moral certifiers involves developing a consciousness 
in public around the specific issues of chemicals and interest and guide the public 
preferences towards these industries instead of their conventional counterparts. They are 
well connected to both producers and formal bodies and active in the preparation of law 
and regulation drafts regarding the industry. One respondent explains his role as he 
perceives it succinctly: 
!
   “Bizim fonksiyonumuz çok basit, insanların falanca semt pazarından 1,5-2 
liraya aldığı ıspanağı gelip 6 liraya organik pazardan almasını sağlayacak, 
bilinç ve kültürü sağlayan biziz aslında. Yani insanlar oraya geliyorsa, bir 
kuruma güvendiği için geliyor başlangıçta. O da örgüttür, sivil toplum 
örgütleridir. Bu Buğday’dır, biziz, odur budur hiç fark etmez. Yani sivil toplum 
örgütleri aslında ekoloji düşüncesini tüketiciyle buluşturan, bunun doğru 
olduğunu, işte insanlara yararını anlatan, organik beslenmesi gerektiğini 
anlatan, sigara içmemesi gerektiğini, poşeti anlatan, ne bileyim dünyadaki 
ekolojik ayak izini anlatan, sivil para kazanma amaçlı olmayan, düşünsel 
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faaliyetler, etkinlikler…Bunların hiçbiri para kazanma amaçlı değil ya da para 
kazanacak bir mekanizma değil. Bunlarla siz, sen aslında güveni sağlıyorsun.” !
   “Our function is fairly simple; we are actually the formers of the awareness 
and culture that make people who would buy their spinach from any 
neighborhood market for 1.5-2 liras to buy it from the organic market for 6 
liras. I mean if people come at all, they come because they trust the 
establishment. And this is organization, non-governmental organizations. It may 
be Buğday or us or anyone else, doesn’t matter. I mean non-governmental 
organizations are actually the ones who convey ecological thinking to 
consumers, that this is right, I mean its benefits to people, that they should eat 
organic food, that they should not smoke, plastic bags, I mean, what else, that 
the ecological footprint of the world should be decreased, that they are not out 
to make profits and are non-governmental, intellectual operations, activities… 
None of these are profit-oriented mechanisms that make money. Through these, 
what you do is, you establish trust.” !
Due to their informal regulative role, moral certifiers are highly involved in the 
technical operation of being chemical-free and interest-free, however their concerns are 
larger than these specific issues. They advocate more holistic view of these industries. For 
the Islamic law scholars in advisory boards, Islamic banking is not just about refraining 
from interest but it is part of living Islam in everyday life that is what being a Muslim 
means. According to their accounts, Islamic banks are not just banks, through their dealings 
they have to foster solidarity and social justice. These banks are considered to be a vehicle 
for a fair distribution of wealth as they share the risk instead of transfer it. In these 
accounts, Islamic banking is sometimes positioned as the solution of Islamic civilization for 
the evils of Western/Modern/Secular/Capitalist banking system. 
For Buğday, organic agriculture is a food production and consumption system that is 
only meaningful within ecological living. Ecological living refers to being in harmony with 
natures’ rules, models and cycles, respecting all other living things including soil, weather, 
and water and realizing we, as humans, are not separate from but part of the nature. In these 
accounts, only such a living is sustainable. 
Moral certifiers’ endorsements of these industries as moral enterprises do not mean 
that they are content with these industries as they are. On the contrary, moral certifiers’ 
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understanding of these industries is less than perfect. Moral certifiers usually see these 
industries as a transition phase to reach an ideal state and, claim that they must be evaluated 
on that basis. Moreover, these industries, although they are imperfect, are considered to be 
fulfilling an important function and must be supported to survive even if it means that some 
practices that are regarded as problematic must be tolerated. Besides, those problematic 
practices are usually understood to be linked to the contextual constraints rather than the 
flaws in Islamic banking or organic agriculture. 
!!!
3.5. Idealists !!!
I use the label idealists to refer to people, groups of people, or NGOs who are at same 
camp with certified producers and moral certifiers regarding their desire for alternatives to 
conventional banking and conventional agriculture. They may or may not have direct 
relationship with certified producers and moral certifiers but all of them are known to each 
other. Idealists do not play a direct technical regulative role similar to moral certifiers 
explained above although some might have played in the past. Idealists’ engagement with 
certified producers and moral certifiers is through their alliance to a common mission: a 
morally informed alternatives to dominant conventional counterparts and not only in the 
scope of the specific industries but encompassing a whole social, political and economic 
transformation. The content and the scope of that morally informed alternative is what 
differentiates idealists from moral certifiers. 
A crucial part of idealists’ accounts is a particular construction of the moral universe. 
These people have an ideal of the purer model for the industry in specific and society in 
general that may or may not have the basis in an idealized past. However they are not 
ignorant of the social and structural constraints for this ideal. On the contrary, they are well 
aware of the constraints that certified producers and moral certifiers raise regarding the 
prevalence of certain problematic practices in Islamic banking or organic agriculture. 
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However idealists’ references to social and structural constraints are not elaborated as they 
are related to these industries but elaborated as they are related to agency, interest and 
hegemony. As such the system critique is a big part of their accounts that I explain in detail 
in Section 3.5.3. below. 
Idealists have an assumption of a pure and natural set of always-already there, 
universal qualities about human nature and the physical world. These qualities are not 
necessarily good or bad in the context of organic agriculture, but refer to beneficence (i.e. 
‘güzel ahlak’) when invoked for people in the context of Islamic banking. According to 
idealists’ accounts in Islamic banking, man’s true nature predisposes him to live 
harmoniously with himself, society and nature. According to idealists’ accounts in organic 
agriculture, everything has a way of being that is considered natural. In both Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture, the system, usually meant to refer one or more of the 
concepts such as modernity, urbanization, industrialization, globalization, capitalism, 
science, secularism, culture etc., is believed to be taking the Existence/being apart from the 
qualities that is regarded to be present in its initial formation. These qualities are not 
explicit set of characteristics but usually invoked by references such as ‘being accord with 
nature’ or ‘being accord with Creation (fıtrat)’. 
!!!
3.5.1. Being Accord with Nature !!
Respondents generally refer to people’s place in and relationship with nature when 
they invoke living harmoniously with nature. Humans’ disregard of rules, cycles and 
models in Nature figure prominently in these accounts. The accounts always include a 
criticism of human disturbance to and domination over nature. Greed over materialism and 
power is the distinctive feature of the human relation to nature in this view. International 
corporations and the states they influence usually figure as representing those greedy actors 
within the context of food production. 
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Sustainability as it relates to domination over nature is another theme that figures 
prominently in these accounts. The only sustainable system is nature; the systems humans 
create to control the nature can never be sustainable and are doomed to fail unless people 
understand the rules and models in Nature and the intricate relations among all things. Only 
then, people could realize the futility of dominating the nature and could instead try to live 
harmoniously within it. 
What is fiercely criticized when ‘being accord with nature’ is invoked is the 
anthropocentric approach to human existence. Idealists conceive humankind as one of the 
millions of nodes in a network called Universe or Nature. Another metaphor, that is also 
used by idealists in Islamic banking, is the metaphor of human body as a nature or society 
and the cells or organs as individuals. Human body is exemplified as a perfect system 
composed of millions of cells or several organs each being interdependent and in harmony 
with each other creating a sustainable whole. In this system, everything is interconnected, 
there is no waste or redundancy, each part is necessary and has a specific function 
producing and consuming just the way and the amount needed for all the other parts and the 
whole to function properly. Human body as a system is idealized as the perfect society 
informing humans place in the Whole. 
Being accord with nature requires to realize this interdependency among the parts 
constituting the Whole and being in accord with the Laws of that Whole. The humans are 
criticized for trying to create their own Laws in these accounts to dominate over nature and 
other fellow beings. 
!!!
3.5.2. Being Accord with Creation, Fıtrat !!
When respondents refer to Creation or fıtrat, they generally refer to the natural 
essences of things in their initial form when they are brought into the existence. It is related 
to the concept of ‘tawhid’ (‘tevhid’ in Turkish) in Islam that refers to a specific 
understanding of the relationship between the Creator and the Created, i.e. God and all the 
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rest. It supposes a divine unity among all the Created and the Creator as the Created is 
understood to be reflection of God. As such, idealists do not see sacred-profane duality 
within human nature, within the world and between human and the world in a Durkheimian 
sense, rather, all belongs to the plenitude of divine unity. Only by being true to that ‘natural 
essence’, humans can be part of that unity. 
In these accounts, for humans to be in accord with the Creation usually involves a 
statement about humans being created based on ‘güzel ahlâk’, that can be translated as 
‘beautiful morals’. Therefore, being accord with the Creation, i.e. ‘fıtrat’, for humans refer 
to living based on ‘beautiful morals’ that is in their natural essence. 
These accounts referring ‘fıtrat’ and ‘beautiful morals’ usually include how the 
motivations and interests shaped within the hegemonic systems, be it modernity, 
secularism, rationality, capitalism, the West, or tradition and culture create a tension for 
living true to ‘fıtrat’. Therefore the blame is put into the system that is understood to be 
forcing or shaping people to live against the true aim of their existence and, therefore, 
creates all the ills of the modern world, usually elaborated in terms of social justice. 
A harmonious existences is only possible by adhering to ‘fıtrat’ that is elaborated by 
Sharia, Islamic legal system, based on God’s words in Quran and the exemplary life of 
Prophet. That’s why ‘the system’ is almost always juxtaposed with Sharia or Islamic law in 
these accounts. Bayındır, in the beginning of his book named Ticaret ve Faiz (2007a) 
explains the relationship between fıtrat, Quran, human nature and the prohibition of interest 
as: 
!
   “Fıtrat varlıkları oluşturan yaratılış, değişim ve gelişim ilke ve kanunlarını 
ifade eder. Göklerin, yerin, insanların, hayvanların, bitkilerin yani her şeyin 
yapısı ve işleyişi buna göredir. Bilimde, teknolojide ve insan ilişkilerindeki 
temel kanunlar da bunlardır.  
 Kur’an fıtratın Allah tarafından bildirilmiş şeklidir…Fıtrat İslam’dır. Kur’an 
ile fıtrat arasında tam bir uyum vardır. Fıtratı anlamak için Kur’an’dan, 
Kur’an’ı anlamak için fıtrattan yararlanmak gerekir.  
 Fıtrat kanunları insanda da geçerli olduğundan Kur’an’a aykırı davranışlar 
onu rahatsız eder. Ama o; menfaatleri, beklentileri veya özentileri sebebiyle bu 
tür davranışlara girer. Sonra alışır ve zevk almaya başlar. Ama içinde gizlenen 
rahatsızlık, zaman zaman ortaya çıkar…Peygameberler de onları tezekküre 
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yani bir iç muhasebesi yapmaya çağırırlar. Tezekkür zihinde var olan bilgiyi 
harekete geçirmektir… 
 Kur’an’ın her yasağı gibi faiz yasağı da fıtratla ilişkilidir. Yani bu yasak, mutlu 
insan ve mutlu toplum için olmazsa olmaz bir yasaktır. Faiz anlatılırken 
konunun bu yönü dikkate alınacaktır.  
 Kur’an’ın gösterdiği yoldan gidince fıkıh usulünde olan şekliyle icma ve kıyasa 
ihtiyaç kalmaz. Ayrıca ‘olayların sınırsız, nasların sınırlı olduğu, bu sebeple 
başka yollara başvurma zorunluluğu doğduğu’ şeklinde yanlış düşüncelere yer 
olmaz. İşte elinzdeki kitabı farklı kılan bu usuldür.” (Bayındır, 2007a: 33) !
   “Fıtrat expresses the principles and laws of creation, change and 
development that make up beings. The form and function of the sky, the earth, 
people, animals, plants, everything in short is based on this. It also governs the 
fundamental laws of science, technology and human relations.  
 Quran is the reported form of fıtrat by Allah… Fıtrat is Islam. There is total 
harmony between Quran and fıtrat. One needs to make use of the Quran to 
understand fıtrat, and fıtrat to understand the Quran.  
 Because the laws of fıtrat are also prevalent for people, conduct contradicting 
the Quran will disturb them. But they go into such conduct for their benefit, 
expectations or out of envy. Then they get used to it and take pleasure in it. But 
the uneasiness festering in them will surface from time to time… Prophets call 
upon them to do tezekkür, which is inner evaluation of oneself. Tezekkür is 
putting into action the information already present in the mind…  
 Just like any prohibition in the Quran, the one about interest is also associated 
with fıtrat. In other words, this prohibition is a must for a person and a society 
to be happy. When talking about interest, the topic will be handled through this 
perspective.  
 In following the path of the Quran, there will be no need for icma (the 
convergence of religious scholars on a certain topic) and kıyas (the 
convergence on an idea through comparison) as per the methods of fiqh. 
Furthermore, there will be no place for thinking like ‘events are infinite, 
decrees are finite, and therefore there is obligation to take different action’. 
This method is what sets the book you have in your hand apart.” (Bayındır, 
2007a: 33) !
There are some crucial similarities between the references to ‘being accord with 
nature’ and ‘being accord with the Creation, fıtrat’ that I observe in the accounts of idealists 
in organic agriculture and Islamic banking explained above. First both idealists’ accounts 
have an understanding of interconnectedness and unity. The unity is about everything being 
part of Nature/Universe in organic agriculture and everything being part of divinity in 
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Islamic banking. Second, there is an understanding of overarching system of laws that 
needs to be obeyed that ensures that unity. Rules and models in Nature and Islamic Law 
provides the framework for humans to be harmoniously exist within the unity. Moreover, 
both Nature’s rules and models and Islamic law are tended to be understood as universal 
and fixed. Third, a hegemonic system usually to refer to capitalism, modernity, 
industrialization, urbanization etc. is believed to force an overarching system of law-like 
principles that contradict with Natures’s rules or Islamic Law. Fourth, dominant capitalist 
system is criticized along the dimensions of sustainability and social justice in both 
accounts albeit with different emphasis. Sustainability criticism seems to be more 
prominent in the accounts of organic agriculture whereas social justice criticism seems to 
be more prominent in the accounts of Islamic banking. Moreover a system based on 
Natures’s rules and models or Islamic Law is usually set forth as an alternative against both 
capitalism and socialism. 
!!!
3.5.3. System Criticism !!
The concepts such as power, hegemony, domination, exploitation and colonization of 
mind and lives of people figure prominently in the accounts of people I refer to as idealists. 
In organic agriculture, hegemony of capitalism, the domination of men over nature; 
agribusiness over small farmers; science over nature; scientific knowledge over local 
knowledge; urbanization over community are some of the examples of those challenged 
relationships. In Islamic banking, hegemony of capitalism; domination of West over East; 
secular over religion; modernity over Islam; tradition and culture over Islam are some of 
the examples figure in system criticism. 
It is important to note that, some of those criticized hegemonic relations are present in 
the accounts of certified producers and more so in the accounts of moral certifiers both in 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture. However there are two important differences 
between those criticisms of idealists’ on the one side and the certified producers’ and the 
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moral certifiers’ on the other. Idealists and certified producers and moral certifiers differ in 
the way they use the ‘system criticism’ and in their understanding of the scope of the 
system that I explain in two sections below. 
!!!
3.5.3.1. System criticism as a tool !!
In the accounts of idealists in Islamic banking and organic agriculture, system 
criticism figures to depict the ills of the economic and social structure to warn, inform and 
empower people and to convince that a better alternative is needed. In the accounts of 
certified producers and moral certifiers, system criticism usually figure as a tool to defend 
Islamic banking or organic agriculture against criticisms on the grounds that they fall short 
of their claims and ideals. 
Islamic bankers’ and moral certifiers’ critical accounts of system is tied to specific 
issues and usually expressed as obstacles for practicing Islamic banking. In these accounts, 
formal banking law designed for a secular system, for example, is the reason for why 
murabaha contract can not be realized as the way the idealists prefer. Capitalist criticism is 
usually linked with the explanations of why Islamic banks cannot utilize mudarabah, a 
contract that is based on true partnership. Idealists’ accounts of system criticism, however, 
involves themes like exploitation, domination, and enslavement of both individuals and 
societies. Their accounts of system criticism are not to explain why Islamic banking is not 
the way it should be but why individuals and societies are as the way they are. System 
criticism is framed as it is linked to Islamic banking and used as a tool to defend and 
develop the industry in the Islamic bankers’ and moral certifiers’ accounts whereas it is 
linked to individual and society and used as an ideological tool to depict the ills of the 
system in idealists’ accounts. 
Parallel to these observations, certified producers’ and moral certifiers’ system 
criticism is less direct and less confrontational compared to idealists’ system criticism in 
organic agriculture. Idealists’ system criticism is very much aligned to the socialist criticism 
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of capitalism. Some of these accounts explicitly refer to socialism that is almost always 
elaborated on the capital-labor relation. However, capital-labor relation in these accounts is 
appropriated to encompass not only the exploitation of labor, but also the nature. One 
respondent explained his view of system as: 
!
   “(Sol görüşe göre) dünyadaki en temel çelişki, emek-sermaye arasındaki 
çelişkidir denilir, çok kabaca böyle tarif etmek gerekir. Biz tarım alanında da 
aynı şeyi düşünüyoruz. Yani nasıl insanın sömürüsü, emek sermaye temelinde, 
doğanın sömürüsü de bunun içindedir. Onlardan hani sosyalizmin o temel 
ayrımından farkımız şu, biz sadece canlı emek sömürüsü ya da artı değer 
sömürüsü (değil), doğanın sömürüsünü de bu işe katıyor. Evet emek sermaye o, 
ama bu emek sermaye çelişkisini de salt canlı emek sömürüsü değil, doğanının 
sömürüsü de var ve içine katıyoruz. Sol, klasik sol, sosyalist sol emek sermaye 
çelişkisi, bunun dışında işte tarım, çevre, kadın sorunları, (onlara) yanal 
sorunlar olarak bakar….Yani işi böyle spritüel alanlardan, soyut şeylerden 
çıkartıp bizzat emek sermaye temel çelişkisine götürme, onun üzerinden bakma 
ve tabii ki liberalizme kafa tutma.”  !
   “ (according to socialism) it can be said that the most fundamental conflict in 
the world, to put it very bluntly, is the one between labor and capital. We think 
like this about agriculture too. Just as exploitation of people is grounded on 
labor-capital conflict, the exploitation of nature is also in there. Our main 
difference from them, from the fundamental distinction in socialism is that we 
include not only the exploitation of live labor or added value exploitation but 
also the exploitation of nature. Yes that is labor-capital, but this labor-capital 
conflict is not solely live labor exploitation, there is also the exploitation of 
nature and we include this as well. Leftist view, standard leftist, the socialist 
leftist view look at issues such as agriculture, environment, women’s issues as 
secondary problems to the labor-capital conflict… I mean like, taking this away 
from spiritual fields, abstract fields and taking it directly to the labor-capital 
conflict, viewing it from there and of course challenging liberalism.” !
Not all idealists explicitly make the capital-labor analogy in their accounts of system. 
However there is always a reference to the problems of production system, 
commodification of agriculture and life in general that I interpret as an example of general 
capitalist criticism. 
Idealists’ account of system almost always involves how hegemony is sustained and/
or enhanced in accordance with capitalist interests. In these accounts legal system is usually 
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understood as serving the capitalist actors’ agendas to control the economic and social 
system. For example, the seedling law that requires the seeds to be patented is elaborated as 
an example of the commodification of agriculture that helps transforming farming to 
agribusiness. Agribusiness is usually linked to a few countries’, usually the USA’s and 
Israel’s, interests to control the world. My data suggests, there are two common ‘evidences’ 
provided for this argument. First, origins and activities of multinational agrochemical and 
agricultural biotechnology companies, most notably Monsanto’s are frequently referred as 
an evidence for their argument. A few of the biggest agrochemical and seed companies are 
stigmatized for controlling agricultural inputs at the expense of the rest. Second, a fairly 
common quote is cited although without mentioning its owner, ‘Control oil and you control 
the nations; control food and you control the people’. This quote is commonly attributed to 
Henry Kissinger, an American diplomat, allegedly used in his account of using food as a 
weapon to induce targeted population reduction in 1974. My respondents would not 
necessarily refer to Henry Kissinger as the owner of the quote but they would link the quote 
with some concealed agenda to control population growth especially in the underdeveloped 
countries through agricultural interference. It is important to note that these two ‘evidences’ 
are not exclusively used in Turkey, they are fairly common in anti-GMO web pages in 
English too. Parallel to these arguments, idealist in Islamic banking would point to the 
fluidity of capital via complex and abstract finance operations and its potential to be 
mobilized when needed to destroy specific economies. 
!!!
3.5.3.2. Scope of the system criticism !!
In the accounts of idealists in Islamic banking and organic agriculture, system 
criticism involves the discussion regarding dominant understanding of Islam and the place 
of science and technology in organic agriculture respectively. 
Idealists in Islamic banking challenge the validity of traditional interpretations and 
commentaries of Quran. Idealists perceive the current understanding of Islam as reflecting 
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the interests and motives shaped within the cultures and traditions of Islamic societies 
throughout the history. In these accounts, returning to the original sources of the religion, 
Quran and sunna (deeds of Prophet) is essential for revival of pure Islam that is sometimes 
depicted as lived in the age of Prophet and the first four caliphs. Organization of all life 
domains according to the fundamental sources of Islam is proposed as the only solution to 
break free from Muslims’ problems. Although this view is usually expressed for the Muslim 
world, the envisioned salvation is imagined for all mankind. As such, Idealists in Islamic 
banking are at the center of many controversies related to not only Islamic banking, but also 
to other aspects of Islam such as worship, religious obligations, prohibitions and sanctions. 
There is no comprehensive criticism of Islam in Islamic bankers’ and moral certifiers’ 
accounts. At most, Islamic bankers and moral certifiers point the different interpretations on 
interest, contracts, risk etc. and their negative influences on Islamic banking when those 
divergent interpretations are perceived as obstacles. In some of their accounts, however, 
there is also celebration of the pluralism when different interpretations could be used as a 
justification for certain questionable practice. Unlike idealists, their accounts do not include 
the discussions of the origins of such differences and their meanings. Here, again, Islamic 
bankers’ and moral certifiers’ accounts on divergent interpretations is linked to Islamic 
banking and used instrumentally while Idealists’ accounts are more concerned with their 
larger meanings and implications. 
Although it is not completely parallel to criticism of dominant understanding of Islam 
in Islamic banking, idealists’ criticism of science and technology in organic agriculture is 
similar to that in the sense that it is one of the markers that differentiates idealists from 
moral certifiers and certified producers in organic agriculture. Science is usually understood 
by idealists as a tool mobilized to dominate both human knowledge and the nature. It is not 
that idealists ignore the benefits of science and technology, on the contrary, its role in labor 
and yield efficiency is well understood. However, science and technology is challenged on 
that very same benefit. The increased efficiency enabled by science and technology is not 
sustainable as it comes at the expense of disrupting the Nature’s rules, cycles and models. 
"139
Technology and science can only be helpful as long as it takes Nature’s rules and the 
indigenous knowledge as its basis. 
Certified producers and moral certifiers in organic agriculture usually deem science 
and technology as necessary and helpful. Science is understood to help ‘tired’ and ‘worn-
out' earth. Science also helps to develop sustainable practices that were not present in 
traditional cultural knowledge of agriculture. 
!!!
3.5.4. Idealist Role !!
Idealists, as moral certifiers are actively involved in consciousness raising activities 
for a better alternative by producing and disseminating knowledge through their writings, 
public appearances and events. However, unlike moral certifiers, idealist do not represent 
Islamic banking or organic agriculture in its current form as conducted by certified 
producers as ‘the better alternative’. Although most of the idealists have some sympathy for 
the idea of Islamic banking or organic agriculture, they do not perceive these industries as 
‘the’ best alternatives both in terms of content and scope. Idealists’ views regarding the 
alternatives are informed by the concepts of  ‘being accord with nature’ or ‘being accord 
with the Creation (fıtrat)’ as explained above. 
Idealists are not only concerned with production and consumption systems but also 
the way people should live their lives as conscious human beings. They want to transform 
the consumer to co-producer and the deposit lender and borrower to a partner. The 
conceptions of people as co-producers or partners are present in the accounts of certified 
producers and moral certifiers however idealists’ conception refers to a more encompassing 
transformation. A co-producer does not only participate in specifying what and how the 
food is produced. A co-producer is also concerned with the preservation of the land, air and 
water and the well beings of fellow animals and human beings, and she aligns her life 
accordingly. A partner is not a person who opens a participation account in Islamic banks, 
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but is knowledgeable about the legal and religious bases of the contracts she is making with 
the bank. 
Idealists also differ in the nature of their consciousness raising activities. Unlike 
moral certifiers, idealists are very active to produce and disseminate counter-hegemonic 
accounts of the capitalist system. In these account, they usually refer to how individuals are 
manipulated by the system. They try to educate and empower the people as a whole. 
Idealists produce and disseminate their counter-hegemonic accounts through their 
newspaper columns, blogs, social media accounts, magazines, books, regular video/audio 
podcasts and public seminar series. Some founded associations and waqfs. They organize 
public campaigns to raise consciousness on specific issues (such as endangered species or 
GMOs), or establish economic research centers. İKAME is one such example, that is 
acronym for İKtisadi Araştırmalar MErkezi, translated as Economic Research Center. 
İKAME also means ‘to substitute’ in Turkish. Its aim is stated as “creating a natural 
economic order that does not contradict fıtrat” (İKAME, 2015). 
The events that provide opportunity for face to face social interaction is especially 
valuable for consciousness-raising activities of idealists. These are the venues idealists 
recount the problems of the system, their roots, the pain and injustice they cause and the 
relations among seemingly unrelated problems. They encourage people to actively question 
and to recognize the relationships between problems, practices and institutions. They also 
suggests solutions elaborated by referring to ‘being accord with nature’ or ‘being accord 
with the Creation, fıtrat’. Audience is involved in these accounts by bringing personal 
experience and/or asking questions thus helping the account to be more detailed and 
elaborated. Idealists try to make people enraged at the system and persuade them an 
alternative is possible at the same time. 
Idealist usually refrain to be associated with the third parties. Those associations are 
usually understood to be restricting counter-hegemonic speech and action. “If you only be 
servant to God, then you are the most powerful man in the world” one respondent said 
while talking about his confrontational encounters with different people with various 
powerful positions. While talking about a research center in Islamic economics he 
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established and probed if the center will be cooperating with other institutions in the field, 
he says: 
!
   “Yol göstermek için yapılıyor bunlar. Olmazı da söyleyeceksin; ama nasıl 
olacağını da söyleyeceksiniz… Bizim herhangi bir şeyle işbirliğimiz söz konusu 
değil. Yani biz iş yaparken, çalışma yaparken, ekonomik olarak 
düşünmüyoruz… bilgi olursa da özgür bilgi olarak düşünüyoruz. Yani herhangi 
bir kurum ve kuruluşun güdümünde olan bilgiyi kabul etmiyoruz.” !
   “These are done to guide people. You have to say what not to do as well; but 
you also have to tell how it’s going to be… We are not in league with anyone. I 
mean, when we work, do something, we do not think of it economically… If 
there is information we think of it as free information. I mean, we do not accept 
any information in the guidance of any foundation or establishment.” !!!
3.5.5. Relations with Moral Certifiers !!
In both Islamic banking and organic agriculture there are idealists who played moral 
certifier roles previously. These idealists refer to a specific event as a breaking point that 
led them to leave their roles as moral certifiers. The breaking points referred in data were a 
start of a certain application of late payment fees in Islamic banking in early 2000s and the 
seed law that was passed in 2006 in organic agriculture. 
Islamic banks started to charge late payment fees based on ‘deprived profit model’ 
that was proposed by Hayrettin Karaman a Sharia scholar mentioned previously. Rationale 
for the proposed model was, if the borrowers made their payments on due, the bank would 
have used them, made profits and shared them with the participants, i.e. lenders. Those who 
do not pay on due are extorting others’ money and a fine is necessary to discourage them. 
According to Prof. Abdülaziz Bayındır, then the Advisory Board member of an Islamic 
bank, the proposed scheme was simply charging interest that made him to leave his role as 
an Advisory Board member. In organic agriculture, Buğday’s perceived lack of stance on 
the seed law led some members to leave as they understood the Law as a tool for furthering 
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agribusiness. The crux of the issue was whether the seed can be patented and whether the 
farmers could be forced to use patented seed that was associated with agribusiness. 
Idealists and moral certifiers usually acknowledge each other about being in the same 
‘camp’ in respect to the stance against conventional counterparts, and follow each other’s 
works and statements. However their relations are not necessarily harmonious. There are 
examples of strenuous relations between some moral certifiers and idealists in both 
industries and they usually consciously avoid each other by, for example, not attending or 
inviting to an industry-wide seminar or conference. 
But what are the conditions that make possible these idealists’ counter-hegemonic 
accounts? Based on the reading of data, I suggest that both independence and knowledge/
experience are associated with counter-hegemonic accounts. Idealists in both industries 
tend to refer to being independent as a prerequisite for their activities. They view moral 
certifiers’ relations and involvement in private or government projects like EU funded 
projects questionable. They do not oppose to relations or collaborations per se but are 
cautious about the power dynamics that would bring in. They prefer to produce and 
disseminate knowledge through their own channels like establishing associations, waqfs, 
research centers and web pages. 
Knowledge and experience seems to be an important criterion for evaluating each 
other in both industries. Idealists and moral certifiers in Islamic banking almost always 
have similar theology education. But they sometimes criticize each other for their lack of 
economics knowledge or trading experience. Some idealists refer to their degrees in 
economics or experience in trade to support their arguments. In organic agriculture, being a 
‘real farmer’ or having a comprehensive understanding of farming as it is done traditionally 
seems important. Some idealists and small farmers dismissed agricultural engineers who 
work for Control and Certification Bodies for their lack of knowledge. One respondent 
says: 
!
“Benimki anam babam usulü tarım, ben bir çiftçiyim. Hem ürün üretiyorum, iyi 
üretildiğini söylüyorum, tadının da iyi olduğunu söylüyorum. Tadarsın alırsın, 
bakarsın beğenmezsin. Benim ismim o evraktan (organik sertifikası) daha net.. 
"143
Sen kimsin de bana sertifikayı gösterirsin ya da niye 3 bin Euro vereyim, ben 
patates ekemiyor muyum? Benim yaptığım işi onaylatıyorsun, onaylatman için 
benden daha üstün, daha tarım bilen, daha diken, daha başka türlü olman 
lazım. Bahçedeki pamuğu ürün verene kadar tanımıyorlar. Geliyorlar buralara 
ne dikilmiş diyorlar. (Sertifikasyon kuruluşlarındaki ziraat mühendislerinden 
bahsediyor)” !
“I am a farmer; my methods are that of our ancestors. I grow products, I say 
they are grown well and I also say they taste well. You taste it you buy it, you 
see it you don’t like it. My name is much more clear than that document 
(referring to formal organic certification)… Who are you to refer me to that 
certificate or why should I pay 3 thousand euros, am I not capable enough to 
plant potatoes? You have what I do approved but in order to do this you have to 
be greater, more knowledgeable in agriculture than me, you have to be 
something else. They can’t tell the cotton on the field without it blooming first 
(referring to certification controllers). They come and ask what is planted 
here.” !
Idealists in organic agriculture seem to value greatly the efforts for organizing fellow 
farmers, working on alternative models, and establishing cooperatives or farmers’ markets. 
They seem to disregard people whom they perceive as a trader or wholesaler even though 
those people practice alternative/traditional agriculture methods and vocal on raising 
consciousness among consumers. 
In this chapter, I explained the distinct actors and roles in Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture. In Chapters 4 and 5, I provide the accounts of the interactions and 
communications among different actors first in relation to legal codification of Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture and then in relation to contested practices. 
!
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!!!
4. !!
4. LEGAL CREATION OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM !!!!
Newly organized industries either in their inception or when they reach to a certain 
scale are usually included in formal legal system. Inclusion within the legal system poses 
many challenges: codifying key features of the industry, establishing a legal framework and 
regulatory agencies and identifying their place within the larger legal framework. When the 
new industry is strikingly different in terms of its operation from the incumbent industries 
this may require modification in a wide array of law and regulations. 
In young industries, ambiguity of product definitions and features may make their 
legal codification challenging. Formal codification of an industry can be especially 
complicated in cases where the key features of the industry are difficult to accommodate 
within the formal system either because of their abstract nature or incompatibility with the 
incumbent system. The history of legal codifications of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture in Turkey contains such challenges and complexities, albeit more intensely in 
Islamic banking. 
As I explained in Chapter 2, both Islamic banking and organic agriculture were 
established top down by the state with economic goals in mind. The state saw the rationale 
for establishing and supporting these industries in their potential benefits to the economy. 
Islamic banking was seen as a tool to attract foreign and domestic funds to the economy at 
the time when Turkey was going through economic liberalization. The state established and 
aligned the legal framework of organic farming according to EU requirements to be able to 
continue to export organic products. 
While the government often highlighted these industries’ economic benefits due to 
exclusion of interest in banking and exclusion of chemicals in agriculture, producers, moral 
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certifiers and idealists emphasized benefits of the industries beyond economic interests. The 
focus of law on objective features with economic benefits and the focus of industry 
participants on identity, culture, and moral values and their societal goals was the main axis 
of contention in various debates. 
Exclusion of interest is one of the main injunctions of Quran and as such, it is a 
matter of belief, not economic benefit. To be sure, avoiding interest is said to be  beneficial 
for economy but its main intention according to Islamic belief, is protecting social 
solidarity. Interest is believed to be a tool of exploitation hampering fair distribution and 
social justice. In organic agriculture, a group of farmer activists understood exclusion of 
chemicals as not only about human and environmental health but as part of a stance against 
industrial hegemony over life. As such the key features of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture in the law, exclusion of interest and chemicals respectively, are not merely 
objective, technical issues. They are embedded with identity, culture, and moral values. 
Regulation process of both industries provide evidence regarding the continuous 
efforts and contention on incorporating the moral into the realm of objective. How to 
encode the moral aspects of Islamic banking and organic agriculture into the legal 
definition? Discussions of this question is one of the main themes in the data and the focus 
of this chapter. I examine the process of creation, definition and incorporation of Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture within the legal system by attending to accounts that refer 
to formal law and regulations in relation to the codification of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture. My focus will be on how the ideas of Islamic banking and organic agriculture 
were encoded within the formal law. The nature of the ideas of Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture is the topic of the next chapter. 
!!!
4.1. Different Positions with Respect to Formal Codification !!!
Legal codification of a new industry and its products imposes a definition of the 
industry. It is plausible to think that legal definition may not always reflect insiders’ self 
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definitions, especially when the industry is established top-down by the state. Moreover, 
industry insiders rarely have uniform ideas about the features of their products during the 
initial formation of the industry and that may add to the gap between formal definition and 
industry insiders’ definitions. 
But the top-down nature of the industry or ambiguity regarding product features may 
not be the whole story about the debates regarding formal codification of industries. The 
cases of Islamic banking and organic agriculture posit a more complicated account. Part of 
the challenge for Islamic banking is the strong incumbent system which makes 
accommodation of Islamic banking within a secular system problematic. A bigger challenge 
is the fragmentation among Islamic scholars regarding their understanding of Islamic law 
and Islamic economics. Even the concept of interest, -its content and the boundaries- 
heatedly debated among Islamic scholars. The complicated nature of modern financial 
instruments and figuring out their status in Islamic law creates ongoing challenges for 
Islamic scholars and in turn for Islamic bankers who need Sharia scholars’ approval for 
their products. For organic agriculture, a strong incumbent system devised for conventional 
agriculture creates challenges for the accommodation of a particular understanding of 
organic agriculture that values local culture and traditions. 
The legal definition of Islamic banking in Turkey changed incrementally from Special 
Finance Houses as financial institutions outside the banking law to Participation Banks as 
a third type of banking subject to the same regulation and assurance institutions as their 
conventional counterparts. Recently, the plans for major legal changes were announced 
with Participation Banking Strategic Plan on May 2015 regarding product development 
and structural changes such as formalizing advisory boards and establishing a formal 
central advisory board. The debates around legal definition and changes are persistent 
throughout the years from Islamic banking’s inception in 1983 to 2015. These debates 
involve detailed discussions regarding the technical operation of Islamic banking as defined 
in formal law. 
Legal changes specific to organic law and regulations are frequent too. For example 
most recent organic agriculture regulation, issued in 2010, was amended yearly until 2015. 
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However, accounts related to legal changes in organic agriculture almost never figure in 
archival data. Participants’ accounts regarding regulation of organic agriculture usually 
involve references to other laws and regulations such as seedling law, or bio-safety law. 
What explains the persistence of debates around the formal codification of Islamic 
banking? And why are not the changes in legal codification of organic agriculture, but the 
larger legal framework debated among industry insiders in organic agriculture? Data 
suggests two possible explanations. First, different positions and priorities with respect to 
formal codification among industry insiders play a role in the debates around the formal 
codification. Second, the larger legal space and socio-economic context pose specific 
challenges for incorporating the focal industry into incumbent formal law that adds to the 
debates around legal definitions of the focal industry. 
In the accounts of the actors that I refer to as idealists and moral certifiers, legal 
codification of Islamic banking is about aligning Islamic banking with the contractual 
forms in Islamic law while simultaneously separating it from conventional banking. 
Idealists and moral certifiers are usually in favor of detailed legal codifications of Islamic 
contracts and establishing industry-wide standardizations. 
In the accounts of the Islamic bankers, legal codification of Islamic banking is about 
ensuring safe and viable operation of Islamic banking. To be sure, Islamic bankers are too 
invested in form alignment with respect to Islamic law and separation from conventional 
banking, but in their view, formal codification, first and foremost, should help the 
development of Islamic banking. Islamic bankers are usually less enthusiastic regarding 
strict, detailed regulations and setting up industry-wide standards compared to idealists and 
moral certifiers. 
Unlike in Islamic banking, the discussions of legal regulation in organic agriculture 
revolve around a criticism of capitalism. Focus is not on the technical definitions in specific 
organic agriculture law and regulations but on the general legal framework. And the 
discussions are not about the differences from conventional agriculture, but how the law is 
used as a tool to further agribusiness at the stake of small farmers, society and ecology. 
Similar to accounts in Islamic banking referring Islamic law, the accounts about legal 
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regulations in organic agriculture involve references to the way Nature works, i.e. rules, 
cycles and models in Nature. Producers, moral certifiers and idealists involve in these 
debates with distinct positions. 
Below I provide detailed accounts of and evidence for how different positions with 
respect to formal codification (separation from conventional counterparts; alignment with 
the ideal form; ensuring a viable operation; and separation from similar ventures) played 
out at different episodes throughout the history of legal codification of Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture. In the next two sections in Sections 4.2. and 4.3., I will explain how 
larger legal space and socio-economic context played out in the debates around legal 
definitions of the both industries. 
!!!
4.1.1. Formal Codification as Separation from Conventional Counterparts !!
4.1.1.1. Separation of Islamic banking from conventional banking !!
Islamic banking in Turkey was established with a government decree in 1983, 
according to which Islamic banks were to be regulated according to the government, central 
bank and undersecretariat of treasury decrees. In their inception, they were named as 
Special Finance Houses (SFHs) and regarded as non-bank financial institutions within the 
financial field but outside the banking system. They were regarded as a new form of 
finance institutions excluding interest-based instruments in their transactions. 
SFHs had their own legal regulation different from conventional banks but the details 
of the regulatory framework were unclear. According to informants who served as 
managers of first Islamic banks, Turkey created her Islamic banking model and legislation 
from scratch. Although the inception of Islamic banking dates back to 1960s and 1970s in 
the world, and the first Islamic banks established in Turkey were subsidiaries of established 
Islamic banks in other countries, my respondents explained how they needed to figure out 
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the technical operation of Islamic banking from the ‘three documents’ referring to 
government, central bank and treasury decrees in 1983. 
My respondents agreed regarding the ambiguities in the legal definition with respect 
to how to do Islamic banking in practice. They also agreed that the formal name, Special 
Financial Houses, created ambiguities with respect to whether these are banks or similar to 
other kinds of financial organizations. They frequently referred to obstacles their name, 
SFH, created in their operations as in the case of refusal of their letter of guarantees by 
state-owned economic enterprises on the grounds that the public procurement law only 
referred to ‘banks’ and not to ‘Special Finance Houses’ as the entities who could provide 
such guarantees. 
Similar confusions and debates around the legal definition and framework of Islamic 
banking are persistent throughout its history. As I show below, these debates are about 
properties, forms, implementation and execution of Islamic banking as defined in the 
formal law and almost always discussed in relation to conventional banking and the Islamic 
law. As such I interpret these debates as discussions of drawing technical boundaries -as 
grounded in technical implementation- between Islamic banking and conventional banking. 
Debates around legal codification of Islamic banking show conflicting positions and 
motives among Islamic bankers, moral certifiers and idealists. Islamic bankers in general 
wanted to be recognized as banks. Some Islamic law scholars, however, preferred a legal 
code that separated these organizations from conventional banks altogether. This debate 
continued throughout the industry’s history in discussions around specific banking products 
and became most heated around current Banking Law n. 5411 issued on October 19th, 
2005. 
In 2005, with the banking law n. 5411, SFHs were completely integrated into the 
banking system. Although SFHs became subject to the banking law for the first time in 
1999 with the law n. 4389, they were not defined as a ‘bank’. In 1999, SFHs were brought 
under the same regulation body, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) as 
their conventional counterparts. With an amendment in 2001, SFHs were to establish their 
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own Association as well as Assurance Fund similar to conventional banks’ Banking 
Association and Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) respectively. 
With law n. 5411, SFHs were defined as a third type of ‘bank’ along with deposit 
banks, and development and investment banks in Turkey. The name Special Finance 
Houses was changed to Participation Bank. The law also transferred SFHs’ Assurance Fund 
to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund . 
Current banking law n. 5411 is fiercely criticized on several grounds by some Islamic 
scholars for blurring the boundaries between Islamic banking and conventional banking. 
Some Islamic scholars opposed to transfer of assurance fund to SDIF. The transfer meant 
that the assurance of all funds, both interest-free and interest-based funds brought under the 
same entity. Some Islamic scholars deemed this as problematic according to Islamic law on 
the grounds that the interest-free funds should not be mixed with interest-based funds to 
stay pure. Some Islamic scholars said that assurance of Islamic banking funds was against 
the spirit of the participation principle in the first place, an argument that was also stated 
previously by Islamic bankers themselves (e.g. Güler, 1996). Yet others claim that the 
assurance was needed but the risks it should cover differ from the risks that SDIF covers. 
According to these arguments, conventional banks and Islamic banks make different 
contracts with their customers that differ in terms of their risks. The only risk that must be 
covered for participation accounts is the risk of mismanagement and abuse and not the risks 
that are associated with trade (Battal, 2007). Besides, putting the distinct risks associated 
with two different contracts into the same risk pool is against the insurance technique 
anyway (Battal, 2007). 
Abdülaziz Bayındır, a former Advisory Board member of an Islamic bank is one of 
the most vocal Islamic scholar in the debates around the current banking law. He claims 
according to current banking law, there is no difference between Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. He wrote a letter, dated May 28th, 2005 and sent to the formal 
bodies explaining his views on the draft version for current Banking Law. He published this 
letter in his book Ticaret ve Faiz (2007a). He sees the draft banking Law that became in 
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force eventually, as a last step in Islamic banks’ transformation to conventional banks 
through the formal regulation. He wrote: 
!
   “Yürürlükteki kanun (önceki Bankalar kanunu no. 4389’e atıf) finans 
kurumlarının fatura kesme şartını kaldırarak bankalar lehine oluşan haksız 
rekabete son vermiştir. Kanunun yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra gerekli 
düzenlemeler yapılmadığından finans kurumları, mal ve hizmet satışı yerine bu 
tür satışları finanse eden bir çeşit yatırım bankasına dönüşmüşlerdir. Geciken 
alacaklarına ‘kar kaybının telafisi’ adı altında faiz tahakkuk ettirmeye 
başlamakla da faizli banka olma yolunun sonuna gelmişlerdir. Son engeller bu 
Tasarıyla kaldırılmaktadır. Tasarı kanunlaşırsa onların kimliğini oluşturan mal 
ve hizmet satışı sona erecek ve bu tür işlemlere kredi veren kuruluşlar haline 
dönüşeceklerdir. Bunu faizli bankalar zaten yaptığından bu Kanunla Finans 
Kurumlarının varlık sebebi ortadan kalkmış olacaktır.   
Katılım Bankaları faizsiz olarak topladıkları fonları, faizli olarak kullandıran 
kuruluşlar haline geleceği için bu Tasarı, finans kurumları lehine haksız 
rekabete de yol açacak mahiyettedir.  
Bu duruma engel olmak için herkes elinden geleni yapmalıdır.” (Bayındır, 
2007a: 278) !
   “The law in force has annulled the obligation for finance houses to make out 
invoices, putting an end to the unfair competition that was in favor of banks. 
Because the necessary regulations were not realized after the law was 
effectuated, finance houses have become a kind of investment bank that do not 
sell goods and services themselves but finances their sale. And by accruing 
interest onto their past due receivables under the name ‘the compensation of 
lost profits’, they have reached the end of the road in becoming interest banks. 
The final obstructions are being removed with this draft. If this draft is enrolled, 
the sale of goods and services that makes up their identity, will come to an end 
and they will become establishments that give credit to these kinds of 
transactions. Since interest banks do this already, with this law the reason for 
the existence of Finance Houses will become obsolete. 
Because Participation Banks will become establishments that lend funds, that 
they have collected without interest, with interest, this draft will have the 
prospect of causing unfair competition in favor of finance houses. Everybody 
should do whatever they can to stop this from happening.” (Bayındır, 2007a: 
278) !
The discontent with the latest banking law regarding Islamic banking is also salient 
among the participants to the Consultation Meeting on Contemporary Religious Issues-II 
and -III held by Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey (PoRA) in 2007 and 2010 
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respectively. Participants usually refer to Banking law in general or relevant articles in 
particular and usually claim that, according to formal law, there are no clear differences in 
actual operations of Islamic banks and conventional banks. Referring to another 
participant’s concern with legal separation of Islamic banking and conventional banking, 
Servet Bayındır, an Advisory Board member of an Islamic bank says: 
!
   “Hocamız -anladığım kadarıyla- katılım bankaları ile mevduat bankalarının 
hukuki anlamda gerektiği gibi birbirlerinden ayrılmadığı, olması gereken 
farklılıklarının uygulamaya konulmadığını ifade ettiler. Elimde yeni ve son 
(2005 yılına ait) bankacılık kanunu var… Bu kanunun 4. maddesinde faizli 
bankalarla katılım bankalarının yapabilecekleri işlemler madde madde 
sıralanmış durumda. Burada toplam 20 madde var ve bir istisna yapmış. Şöyle 
diyor madde: Mevduat bankaları şu iki işlemi yapamazlar. Bir, katılım hesabı 
altında para toplayamazlar. İki, finansal kiralama yani leasing yapamazlar. 
Peki katılım bankaları ne yapamazlar. O da mevduat kabulü yapamazlar, yani 
kanun katılım hesabıyla mevduat hesabını birbirinden ayırmış. Peki bunun 
dışında ne yapabilirler? Herşeyi yapabilirler. Burada 20 madde sıralanmış. 
Şimdi katılım bankalarının yöneticileri, ilgililer şunu diyor olabilirler -ki 
diyorlar-: “Tamam bu kanunda bize bütün bu yetkiler verilmiştir ama biz 
işlemleri birtakım süzgeçlerden geçirerek uyguluyoruz; mahsurlu olanlardan 
kaçınıyoruz.”..katılım bankalarının faizli işlemden kaçınacakları hususu bir 
şekilde kanuna eklenmelidir.” (Bayındır, 2010: 315-316) !
   “As far as I can understand, he has stated that participation banks and 
deposit banks were not distinguished as they should be in the face of the law 
and that the necessary differences were not implemented. I have here the new 
and latest banking law… In the 4th amendment of this act are listed the 
operations that interest-based banks and participation banks can carry out. 
There are a total of 20 amendments here and there is one exception. The 
amendment reads: Deposit banks cannot undertake the following two 
operations: One, they cannot collect money under the name participation 
account. Two, they cannot carry out leasing operations. Then what can’t 
participation banks do? They cannot accept deposits. The same law has 
distinguished between participation accounts and deposit accounts. And what 
can they do apart from this? They can do everything. 20 amendments are listed 
here. Now participation bank managers, authorities might be saying – and they 
are saying it –, “Alright, with this act we have full authority. But while we apply 
our operations we run them through various filters; we avoid unfavorable 
ones.” ... The fact that participation banks will avoid operations involving 
interest should somehow be added to the law.” (Bayındır, 2010: 315-316) 
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Within the context of current banking law, similarities between Islamic banking and 
conventional banking regarding consumer financing, deposit collecting, treatment of late 
payments, and the jargon used are other criticized topics. These accounts usually involve a 
concern about the similarities in form and legal treatment of these practices with their 
conventional counterparts and question the distinctions between the two types of banking. 
These accounts usually assert a need for categorical separation between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks before the formal law. Formal law is understood to be a marker or “a 
red line” (Battal, 2007) that further differentiates Islamic banks from conventional banks. 
For example, Prof. Ali Bakkal compares the house financing of conventional banks and 
questions the difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks: 
!
   “Şimdi bankanın yapmış olduğu bu işlem ile katılım bankasının doğrudan 
doğruya evi satan kişiye parayı ödemesi arasında şekil itibarıyla ne kadar fark 
var? Yani bankadan ev alan müşteri, bankadan kredi mi almış oluyor, yoksa 
katılım bankalarında olduğu gibi vadeli olarak ev mi satın almış oluyor? 
Müşteri hiçbir zaman bankanın kendisine verdiği krediyi para olarak eline 
geçirme ve başka işlerde kullanma imkânına sahip değildir. Netice itibariyle 
eline geçen evdir. Bu bir kredi işlemi midir; yoksa bir satım muamelesi 
midir?”(Bakkal, 2007: 283-284) !
   “Now, how much difference is there in form between what a bank does and 
what a participation bank does by directly paying the person who is selling the 
house? I mean, is a customer who buys a house from a bank taking out a credit 
loan from the bank or is he buying a house from the bank in deposits just like 
with participation banks? The customer never has the opportunity to receive the 
money loaned in cash and use it for other transactions. As a result what he gets 
is the house. Is this a credit transaction; or is it a sales treatment?”(Bakkal, 
2007: 283-284) !
In various accounts similar to above, the operation of Islamic banking and its 
products as defined in formal law were compared to conventional banking and its products. 
Technical implementations of products in Islamic banking and conventional banking were 
compared with a focus on interest-free character. In these accounts, operational processes 
are approached with a rather technical understanding, focusing on tangible, concrete 
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properties of the contracts. As I will explicate in detail below in Section 4.1.2., in moral 
certifiers and idealists’ accounts, there are usually concurrent references to contractual 
forms in Islamic law, with similar technical focus on properties, implementation and 
execution. 
To be sure, the comparison is always about evaluation of Islamic claim, usually 
understood to be exclusion of interest within the accounts regarding legal definition. This 
claim is assessed by comparing technical implementation of Islamic banking as defined in 
the law with the implementation of conventional counterpart as well as with the contractual 
forms in Islamic law. I interpret these accounts comparing form, implementation and 
execution of Islamic banking with respect to conventional banking and the Islamic law as 
conversations about establishing technical boundaries between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. 
!!!
4.1.1.1.1. Naming as separation from conventional banking !!
Although not completely in the context of formal codification of technical operation 
of Islamic banking, the choice of legal and informal naming for the Islamic banking reveals 
industry specific and societal level conditions that limit adopting a formal name that 
invokes  a sharp separation from conventional banking. 
The formal name of Islamic banking as defined in law and regulations was first 
Special Finance Houses and then Participation Banks. Although the informal term, 
interest-free banking was used frequently both by industry insiders and the media, industry 
insiders rarely used the term Islamic banking. As one of the salient markers that separates 
these banks from their conventional counterparts, why do Islamic bankers, moral certifiers 
and idealist avoid the term ‘Islamic’? 
Data points to three explanations for actors’ avoidance of Islamic references in 
relation to Islamic banks. First reason is related to sacredness of Islam. Naming an action or 
institution explicitly ‘Islamic’ in general is regarded inappropriate virtually by all of my 
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respondents. This view does not refer something similar to secular ideology, in a sense that 
the religion is to be lived in personal life and not to be visible in public life. On the 
contrary, these actors all agree that the teachings and the rulings of Islam should guide 
people in everyday matters, private and public. But they also have an understanding of 
Islam as independent from worldly existence that is sacred and not to be tainted by its 
representation in life. 
According to this view, Islam should guide all the deeds in life but observable world 
of people and their actions should not be perceived as reflecting Islam. As people are 
flawed and can make mistakes, Islam can not be assessed on the basis of people’s deeds. 
According to this view, explicit naming of an action or institution as ‘Islamic’ may result in 
wrongdoings to be attributed to Islam that is regarded as a disruption to its sacredness and 
its claim of being true and valid everywhere and all the time. Therefore, in these accounts 
naming a practice ‘Islamic’ is inappropriate because it confounds observable and material 
world with Islam’s transcendent and sacred character. 
Second reason, that became more salient in 2000s, refers to social and instrumental 
contradictions the terms ‘Islamic’ creates. According to this view, the name Islamic banking 
contradicts it’s claim of appealing to everyone and not just to Muslims. The use of ‘Islamic’ 
as part of definition, suggests exclusivity and creates a group of ‘others’. It also contradicts 
with Islamic banks’ growth aspirations. If these banks claim to increase their shares in 
banking sector and to compete with conventional counterparts, it would be restrictive to call 
these banks Islamic that may alienate potential customers. Social exclusion argument is 
usually expressed by idealists, moral certifiers and Islamic bankers, while financial 
restriction argument is usually expressed by Islamic bankers. 
Third explanation, that was implicit in several statements in newspaper data in 80s 
and 90s but lost its prevalence after 2000s refers to hostility of secular ideology to Islamic 
references. These accounts usually involved criticism and resentment of secular ideology 
inhibiting the clear and explicit representation of these banks. Respondents acknowledged 
the ‘secular’ restriction on calling these banks ‘Islamic’ in early stages, however, they 
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emphasized sacredness and exclusivity arguments over secular limits on calling these banks 
Islamic. 
When inquired about the prevalence of the name ‘Islamic banking’ in other countries, 
especially in Muslim countries my respondents highlighted the specific sociopolitical 
contexts and the motivations of those countries for Islamic banking in the first place. 
According to these accounts, for western countries, the motivation is to appeal the 
Muslims’ funds anyway, so it would just make sense to call these banks Islamic. For 
Muslim countries, their sociopolitical context is invoked as determining the preference for 
the name Islamic banking. The most cited example is Malaysia and to lesser extent is 
Pakistan, in both countries, Islamic banking is believed to be developed by the state as part 
of the nationalist project to create solidarity and mutuality among their Muslim citizens 
after they gained their independence. 
For a few of my respondents, the issue about naming these banks as ‘Islamic’ is 
specific to Turkey. According to these accounts, the issue does not apply to Western 
countries as they are Christians and without ‘Islamic sensitivities’ and does not apply to 
Muslim countries, as they acknowledge that they are Islamic states so it’s just normal to call 
these banks Islamic. However Turkey is in the middle, 98% of her population is Muslim but 
with no official state religion that creates an odd contradiction to call these banks Islamic. 
However, in his ethnographic study of Islamic banking based on a fieldwork in 
Indonesia and the conversations in London and the United States, Maurer (2005) reports 
otherwise. He argues that, although the industry settled on the term ‘Islamic banking’ to 
refer itself in the world, there are voices within the field who prefer the term lariba 
(interest-free) on the basis that it is exclusion of the interest that makes these banks distinct 
(Maurer, 2005). Maurer elaborates that, the arguments of those people for the term 
‘interest-free’ highlights the potential of the term to reach a wider audience as it avoids the 
negative connotations the term ‘Islamic’ may have and also more in line with the claim of 
these banks’ for being everyone and not just for Muslims (Maurer, 2005), that resonates 
with the exclusivity and financial restriction argument of my respondents in Turkey. 
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When inquired about the name ‘interest-free’ for referring these banks, my 
respondents argued that it is a shallow and incomplete definition as it does not say what it is 
but what it is not. They claim that these banks are not about being interest-free but about 
participation to losses and profits, that the alternative to interest is trade and profit hence the 
term ‘Participation Banking’, ‘Katılım Bankacılığı’ in Turkish, better captures what it is 
that makes its activities unique. 
! !!
4.1.1.2. Separation of organic agriculture from conventional agriculture !!
Unlike Islamic banking, there are no widespread debates captured in archival data 
over legal changes in organic agriculture. The discussions of legal regulations in my 
respondents’ accounts are usually not about organic agriculture law and regulations but 
about a wide range of laws and regulations that are understood to be directly or indirectly 
influencing organic agriculture. Some of the referred laws and regulations are, law on 
seedlings (law no. 5553), law on soil conservation and land use (law no. 5403), law on the 
trading of fruit and vegetables (law no. 5957), law on municipalities and related regulations 
that define local administrations’ role about the open markets (law no. 5393), and bio-safety 
law (law no. 5977). Some of these laws are usually referred with pseudo names such as 
GDO law to refer to law on bio-safety or food market law to refer to law no. 5957. 
The common theme in these accounts is the understanding of legal regulations as 
sustaining hegemonic relations. Idealists usually elaborated legal regulations in terms of 
how they help to sustain or further the dominant relations. Seedling law is commonly 
referred to as an act of ‘patenting life’ which furthers the domination and control of a few 
international firms over local seeds and small farmers. Law on soil conservation and land 
use that introduces land consolidation measures to prevent land fragmentation is interpreted 
as an act to further the interests of agribusiness at the expense of small farmers. Law on the 
trading of fruit and vegetables is criticized for furthering an infrastructure of distribution 
channels which favors intermediaries over real producers. Bio-safety law is interpreted as 
"158
the domination of science over nature with a full account of its health, environment, social 
and economic effects. The themes of domination and hegemony is the most salient aspect 
of these accounts that was not explicitly articulated in the accounts of regulation in Islamic 
banking. 
In the accounts of formal regulation in organic agriculture, legal regulations are not 
discussed in terms of technical details regarding implementation and process as it was the 
case in Islamic banking, but discussed in terms of their influence on agriculture, ecology 
and society. Unlike Islamic banking, the debates regarding the similarities and differences 
between conventional agriculture and organic agriculture as defined in formal law is not 
salient in data. According to data, organic agriculture as a production method is understood 
to be different than conventional agriculture. All of my respondents acknowledged formal 
organic certification as a distinct legal marker that separates organic agriculture from 
conventional agriculture. 
Similar to Islamic banking, I interpret the legal codification of production process as 
establishing the technical boundaries between organic agriculture and conventional 
agriculture. Unlike Islamic banking, technical boundaries based on legal definition of 
organic agriculture is not contested. 
Uncontested nature of technical boundaries of organic agriculture may be related to 
two factors. First, clear and objective definition of ‘chemicals’ in organic agriculture may 
account for the clarity regarding the distinctness of organic agriculture. The concrete and 
consensual definition of chemicals obviates the discussions of ‘what is chemical and how to 
avoid it?’ as opposed to un-consensual definition on ‘interest’ in Islamic banking that stirs 
the discussions of ‘what is interest and how to avoid it?’ 
Second, it may be linked to differences in the trajectory of legal frameworks of 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture. From the very beginning, organic agriculture has a 
legal framework separate from conventional agriculture. From its initiation in 1984 by 
European exporters, organic production was done according to the rules and regulations of 
importing European countries. In 1994, Turkey had to devise her first regulation for organic 
agriculture to conform to the EU requirement for the third countries to formulate their own 
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legal framework to continue to export organic goods to EU. From then on, Turkey has 
followed the European Union’s rules and regulations for the basis of her legal framework. 
Changes in regulations and law in organic agriculture were almost always to adapt to the 
changes in European Union’s regulations. These changes were usually related to 
elaboration of production method such as specifying permitted agricultural inputs and 
establishing institutional structure such as detailing control and certification processes and 
organization in the Ministry. As such legal framework of organic agriculture was imported 
from the EU as the idea of industry itself. 
To be sure, the lack of debates regarding the similarities and differences between 
conventional agriculture and organic agriculture as defined in formal law does not mean 
that organic agriculture is not criticized for becoming similar to conventional agriculture. 
On the contrary, it is fiercely criticized for practicing monoculture production in massive 
fields that is condemned and associated with industrial agriculture. Unseasonal production 
in greenhouses and using hybrid seeds are other practices that are commonly criticized in 
organic agriculture in the discussions of similarities with conventional agriculture. But, 
monoculture production and production in greenhouses with hybrid seeds are not explicitly 
mandated by law and regulations. Formal law codifies only the ‘chemical aspect’ of organic 
agriculture and similarity criticisms are never about ‘chemicals’ as defined in law. This is 
different then the similarity criticisms in Islamic banking that is almost always about 
‘interest’ and carried out in respect to both formal law and Islamic law. I will discuss the 
debates around contested practices such as monoculture production and hybrid seeds in the 
next chapter within the scope of moral authenticity. 
What I tried to establish up to now is that the formal definition of organic agriculture 
as excluding chemicals is rarely contested in terms of separating organic agriculture from 
conventional agriculture in its production process. I related this to the understanding of 
‘chemical-free’ as a clear and objective criterion as opposed to contested and dynamic 
definition of ‘interest-free’ in Islamic banking. As such, I claimed that technical boundaries 
of organic agriculture is much less contested and durable compared to Islamic banking. 
However, in a few instances, certified producers were able to modify the ‘content of 
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organic’ as in the case of the changes in the ratio of organic animal feed in order to be 
certified organic meat. I also pointed to the similar use of formal law as in Islamic banking 
as a proof that separates organic products from conventional and informal products. 
!!!
4.1.2. Formal Codification as Alignment to Ideal Form !!
Different priorities with respect to formal codification among industry insiders are 
especially salient in the accounts around the legal codification of contested practices. 
Contested practices in both industries are the practices that are questioned either in terms of 
their appropriateness with respect to industry claims (such as connected to real economy, or 
environmentally friendly) or in terms of its specific implementation. In both cases, the 
debates around the contested practices are informative to have a sense of the ‘imagined 
ideal’ as reflected on technical operation and formal codification. 
Accounts of contested practices as defined in formal law in both Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture involve references to ‘the other law’, Islamic Law and Nature’s rules 
and models respectively. In these accounts, Islamic scholars and organic farming activists 
question the formal definition of specific practices on the basis that legal codification do 
not ensure that the implementation would conform to Islamic law or Nature’s rules and 
models. The aim here is to establish a legal codification that would ensure the 
implementation would conform to an ideal form and serve to its purposes informed by 
Islamic Law or Nature’s rules and models. These conversations are about translation or 
mapping of other law into the realm of formal law; legal codification serves as an 
alignment of implementation to an ideal form informed by Islamic law or Nature’s rules 
and models. 
Producers usually involve in these conversations by explaining why the legal 
codification is the way it is by referring to the obstacles in the previous implementations. 
Producers also assert that the legal codification and the implementation is still appropriate 
according to the other law, Islamic law or Nature’s rules and models. 
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The conversations around contested practices also provide further evidence regarding 
the distinct roles, priorities and positions of people who I refer to as moral certifiers and 
idealists. While idealists fiercely criticize the legal codifications of specific practices on the 
grounds that they are not aligned with their true form, moral certifiers are more lenient in 
their views. Unlike idealists, moral certifiers do not relate the problems regarding the 
technical operation of contested practices to flaws in Islamic banking or organic 
agriculture. Moral certifiers usually tend to attribute these problematic implementations to 
the factors outside the industry and emphasize the transitory phase of the focal industry. 
The conversations around contested practices are different than those related to 
separation that I discussed above in Section 4.1.1. in that the contestation is about the 
conformity to other law rather than similarities to conventional counterpart. These 
conversations are similar to those related to separation that I discussed above in that the 
conversations focus on properties, implementation and executions. 
!!!
4.1.2.1. Formal codification as alignment to contractual forms in Islamic law !!
In Islamic banking, the conversations among Islamic bankers, moral certifiers and 
idealists almost always include debates regarding the compatibility of Islamic banks’ 
products as defined in the formal code and as practiced in the operations of Islamic banks to 
the Islamic law. In this regard, murabaha is one of the most contested practices in Islamic 
banking from the very beginning both because it is not based on the key tenet of Islamic 
banking, participation, and of its technical implementation. It is usually called a weak 
instrument because it is not based on the participation to losses and profit contract but a 
trade contract. 
Murabaha is basically a sale with a mark-up price. Customer who wants to buy goods 
such as machinery or raw materials finds a seller. When he decides which seller to buy 
from, he applies to an Islamic bank for a murabaha financing. Islamic bank buys the desired 
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good from the seller whom the customer have chosen, and sells to customer by adding a 
profit margin. Customer pays back to the bank in arranged installments. 
In the initial implementation of murabaha, Islamic banks were legally obliged to 
invoice for murabaha financing which made them the legal owner of the good. The seller 
was arranging an invoice in the name of Islamic bank while selling to Islamic bank, and 
Islamic bank was arranging an invoice in the name of the buyer while selling to the 
customer. Islamic banks were also doing the physical delivery of the goods they were 
selling. Since 2001, the invoice obligation for Islamic banks is revoked; seller arranges the 
invoice directly in the name of buyer. Moreover, in current implementation, the good is 
transferred from the seller to buyer directly without the Islamic bank physically involved in 
its delivery. 
The crux of the criticism of murabaha contract comes down to the question of 
whether the murabaha as implemented currently can be called a real trade. The problem in 
execution of murabaha, according to some scholars, originated with the revocation of 
invoice obligation in 2001 by formal law. Without invoice, Islamic banks do not assume 
legal ownership of the goods they are financing. This was seen as converting murabaha 
conceived as trading relation into a credit relation. 
Islamic bankers deemed the legal change revoking invoice obligation as necessary 
because of two main reasons: First, invoice system was open to abuse. Second, invoice 
system was bringing additional tax obligations for Islamic banks that created vulnerability 
and unfair competition with respect to conventional banks. Islamic bankers usually point to 
how the invoice obligation was creating extreme financial burdens because of incumbent 
accounting and tax regulations. They sometimes implicitly refer to how this could be used 
politically by opposing incumbent powers to intimidate Islamic bankers. 
The argument regarding the invoice systems was open to abuse refers to the events of 
‘fictitious exports’ that Islamic banks were allegedly involved through murabaha financing 
to a firm, ASCOR, between 1995 and 1998. Muhammet Ciğer, the owner of ASCOR 
claimed that he performed some of the fictitious exports through Islamic banks. Two 
Islamic banks, Albaraka Türk and Faisal Finans made public announcements both in 
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Milliyet and Zaman, stating that the business with ASCOR was completely within the 
boundaries of Islamic banks’ legal framework. (Albaraka Türk, 2000; KuveytTürk, 2000). 
At the ‘Consultation Meeting on Contemporary Religious Issues’ held by Presidency 
of Religious Affairs of Turkey (PoRA) in 2007, Fahrettin Yahşi, then the Assistant General 
Manager of Albaraka Türk, explains that invoice requirement for Islamic banks needed to 
be revoked to prevent these kinds of abuses as in the case of fictitious exports. He explains 
that Islamic banks cannot see each good they trade because they are involved in hundreds 
of thousands of murabaha financing. Since Islamic banks are not involved in physical 
delivery, they could not make sure whether the traded good was indeed existed. This 
operational limit was open to abuse as in the case of ‘fictitious exports’. Yahşi also adds 
that “invoice is not an obligatory document in murabaha contract in terms of Islamic 
law” (Yahşi, 2007: 270). 
However, Islamic scholars refute these claims on the grounds that both arguments, 
abuse and additional tax obligations, could be resolved with legal changes. According to 
Islamic scholars, the real reason Islamic bankers oppose invoice system is that they do not 
want to bear the risks associated with murabaha contract. 
Islamic scholars posit that invoice obligation in the law makes the murabaha contract 
a real trade. When Islamic bank invoices in murabaha financing, the bank is legally 
regarded as the owner of the good and the transaction is treated within the scope of 
commercial code instead of credits code. Without invoicing, Islamic bank is not regarded as 
the legal owner of the traded good. Therefore, if the Islamic bank is not obliged to invoice, 
it could not be held responsible legally in cases where the good is damaged while being 
delivered from the seller to buyer. This is deemed problematic in terms of Islamic law. 
Because according to Sharia, if the Islamic bank is an acting as a trader in murabaha 
contract, then it should be exposed to such risks associated with trade. According to these 
arguments, Islamic banks’ earnings based on murabaha financing without invoicing are 
illegitimate because the profit cannot be substantiated based on true commerce. 
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In response to Yahşi’s statement about invoice not being obligatory according to 
Islamic law, Pof. Dr. Abdülaziz Bayındır points to the function of invoice in murabaha 
contracts. He states:  
!
   “Fahrettin Yahşi Bey dedi ki, “bizde fatura kaldırıldı; faturaya aslında alım 
satımda gerek de yok.” Doğru da, faturanın bir işlevi var; o, yapılan alım 
satımın belgesidir ve tarafların ilişkisinde ticaret hukukunu geçerli kılar. 
Birinde işlem, kredi alacaklarının takibi esasına göre, diğerinde ise ticari 
alacakların takibi esasına göre yürütülür. Arada ciddi fark vardır. Bu yeni 
uygulamayla ticaret kalktı, yerine, gerçekte olmayan ama hayallerde var 
sayılan bir ticaret ikame edildi.” (Bayındır, 2007b: 287) !
   “Mr. Fahrettin Yahşi said, “ invoices have been annulled for us; actually 
there is no need for invoices in buying and selling either.” Okay, but invoices 
have a function; it is the certificate of what is bought and sold and validates the 
laws of trade between the relations of the two sides. In one, the transaction will 
be carried out based on to the follow-up of the credit receivables by the 
creditor, in the other by the follow-up of commercial receivables. There is great 
difference between these two. With this new implementation, commerce has 
been annulled and it has been substituted by a commerce that is really not there 
but is perceived in imagination.” (Bayındır, 2007b: 287) !
Bayındır’s statement is revealing in that he raises the issue of formal status of Islamic 
contracts. Invoice obligation is directly linked to murabaha to be treated as a real purchase 
and a sale transaction according to formal law and, through it, Islamic law. This is where 
secular state law meets and interacts with Islamic law in practice. Legal obligation to 
invoice, in murabaha case, makes the contract to be treated as commerce rather than credit 
according to formal law thus aligns the implementation with its true intention (trading 
rather than financing) in Islamic law. 
There are other Islamic Law scholars who point to this function of formal codification 
of Islamic contracts. According to these arguments, formal codification makes Islamic 
contracts legally binding and through that, the implementation is aligned with Islamic law, 
both in terms of form and intention. Islamic scholars usually acknowledge such legal 
obstacles raised by Islamic bankers, but question the lack of enthusiasm to make legal 
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adjustments to overcome those obstacles. They usually assert that the real reason behind 
such problematic implementations is Islamic banks’ risk aversion. One respondent states: 
!
   “Aslında kanuni mevzuat engeli de var. Yani mudarebeyi, müşarekeyi 
doğrudan bir engel, yasaklayıcı bir şey yok, ama çok zorlaştırıcı… Dolayısıyla, 
bu tür yani bankaların elini bağlayan durumlar var. Mesela, en fazla gündeme 
getirdikleri şey, en fazla malı kendileri satın alıp, başka tarafa satmıyorlar…
Burada yani mülkiyetin nakli meselesi; temel mülk meselesi, mesela şu anda bu 
yok. Bunu niye yapmıyorsunuz denildiğinde, efendim kanun engel. Düne kadar 
doğru kanun engeldi, bugün düzeltin. Bütün bakanlar arkadaşlarınız. Birçoğu 
sizin (eski) elemanınız. Bir saatlik iş, yok o eski yapmıyorlar, etmiyorlar, bizim 
İslam’a uygun çalışmamıza köstek oluyorlar gibi o suçlamalar; eski döneme ait 
suçlamalar o da ne derece doğruydu ayrı bir konu da onu bahane ediyorlardı 
yani.” !
   “Actually there is also an obstruction in the body of the law. That is to say, 
not directly stopping mudarabah (partnership among labor and capital) or 
musharakah (partnership in capital) but making it very hard… Therefore, there 
are things like this that tie banks’ hands. For instance, the thing they bring up 
most is that they do not buy the good and sell to any other party… Here, the 
thing is the transfer of property; the property right issue, currently they (Islamic 
banks) do not own the property (they sell). When asked why they don’t do it, 
they say the laws forbid us. That’s right, the laws did forbid it in the past, today 
you can resolve this. All cabinet ministers are your friends. A lot of them are 
your (former) employees. It will take only an hour, but no, the accusations of 
they won’t, they don’t, they are hindering us from working according to Islam, 
these are all accusations of the old era, which I might say I don’t know to what 
extent they were true, I mean they were using it as an excuse.” !
The account of an Islamic banker, Mustafa Esfa Emek of Albaraka Türk on why the 
invoice system in murabaha contract had to be revoked, confirms the claims on Islamic 
banks’ lack of enthusiasm on taking the risks associated with trading. At the ‘Consultation 
Meeting on Contemporary Religious Issues’ held by PoRA in 2010, Emek states: 
!
   “Üçüncüsü bizim taşıdığımız riskler, siz gerçekten mal alıp satıyor musunuz? 
İlk bu özel finans kurumları faaliyetini icra etmeye başladığımda fiili olarak 
malı gidip biz satın alıyorduk. Tabi takdir edersiniz ki Türkiye’de bankalar işte 
bir yıl vadeyle %50 faiz oranıyla kredi kullandırdığı zaman sadece %50 kredi 
kullandırmadan dolayı kredi riskini üstlenir. Biz de yaklaşık %50 kar elde 
ediyoruz, normal bir mevduat bankası da aynı oranda kar elde ediyor fakat biz 
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aynı zamanda mala ilişkin riskleri de üstleniyoruz. 38’lik bobini satıcı firmadan 
teslim alıp götürüp müşteriye teslim ediyoruz, müşteri diyor ki, ‘bu 38’lik değil, 
38,2’lik’. Tekrar o bobini alıp götürüp satıcı firmaya iade ediyoruz, satıcı firma 
‘hayır yalan söylüyor bu 38’lik’ diyor, bilirkişiyi çağırıyoruz gidip depoya 
stokluyoruz, depoya gidiyoruz ki oksitlenmiş. Dolayısıyla mala ilişkin 
bankacılık sektöründen farklı olarak mala ilişkin riskleri de üstlenmek de kabul 
edilebilir birşey değil. İkincisi, önceki süreçte satıcı firma faturayı bizim 
adımıza keserdi, biz üzerine karımızı koyup müşteriye keserdik. Fakat sade bir 
fatura kesmiş olmakla vergi mevzuatındaki ilk imalatçıdan, nihai tüketiciye 
kadar bütün vergisel sorumluluğu da üstlenmiş oluyorduk. Albaraka Türk’ün 
ödenmiş sermayesi 20 milyon dolarken, sırf bu gerekçeden dolayı 22 milyon 
dolarlık fatura çıkarıldı. Kötü niyetli bir iktidar sırf bu gerekçeden dolayı, eğer 
istese bir katılım bankasını 15 günde batırabilir. O zaman bizim bu riski taşıyor 
olmamız düşünülemez.” (Emek, 2010: 341-342) !
   “The third is the risks we take, do you actually buy and sell the goods? When 
first these special finance houses started to operate, we actually went and 
bought the goods ourselves. Of course, as you would appreciate, in Turkey 
when banks give out credit for one year with 50% interest rate, they only 
undertake the credit risk that comes with applying 50% interest rate for one 
year. We too make a profit of around 50% and so does a deposit bank, I mean 
we both have the same profit rate, however, we also undertake the risks 
associated with the goods. We go and take the 38cm coil from the selling 
company and deliver it to the customer. The customer says, ‘this is not 38cm, its 
38.2’. So we take it back to the selling company, they say, ‘No they are lying. 
This is 38’. So we go and stock it at the warehouse and call a legal expert but 
by the time he comes the goods are corroded. Therefore, it is not acceptable to 
also take the risks associated with the goods separate from banking sector. 
Secondly, in the previous process, the seller would invoice to us and we would 
invoice it to the customer by adding our profit. But just by making out that 
single invoice, we assumed all the tax responsibilities from first manufacturer to 
final consumer. While Albaraka Türk’s paid capital was 20 million dollars, a 22 
million dollars receipt was made out just because of this fact. A government 
with bad intensions could bankrupt a participation bank over a fortnight just 
based on this fact. You can see then, that we cannot assume this risk.” (Emek,
2010: 341-342) !
Emek clearly thinks Islamic banks should not take any risks that are associated with 
the traded goods which he sees as outside of the banking risks. This is exactly the point of 
the critical accounts provided above. In those accounts, what Islamic bank should be doing 
through murabaha is trading not financing so it should take the legal ownership and risks 
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related to the traded good. But according to Emek, taking the trade risk is not workable/
feasible where the profit margins are the same with conventional banks. His account is also 
an example of the arguments that refer to vulnerability of Islamic banks due to invoice 
requirement. He states  malicious incumbent powers could use the system to burden Islamic 
banks with excessive tax bills. 
Although he does not refer explicitly to secularism, given the experience of Islamic 
bankers during the law process of 1999, he may be referring to ideological struggles that 
Islamic bankers had to go through. I will explain the process of 1999 law in Section 4.3. 
below where I examine the influence of context in the legal definition of Islamic banking. 
But to make it clear, such references regarding the perception of secular ideology as a threat 
to the existence of Islamic banking are not very common in the accounts of Islamic bankers 
after early 2000s. 
The accounts of murabaha also reveal different positions, priorities and roles of 
people I refer to as moral certifiers and idealists. Although moral certifies (Islamic scholars 
who are in the Advisory Boards of Islamic banks) acknowledge the less then perfect 
execution of murabaha, they deem it still permissible. According to moral certifiers, Islamic 
banks have to rely on murabaha to ensure long-term survival because more preferred 
Islamic financial instruments like mudarabah (labor-capital partnership similar to venture 
capital) and musharakah (similar to joint venture) are not viable due to unstable macro-
economic conditions and ‘unsuitable human model’ that refers to lack of trustable, capable 
entrepreneurs. The answer of Karaman to a reader, challenging the murabaha contract by 
suggesting that it can be considered Hile-i şeriyye (hiyal), a legalistic trickery to evade the 
prohibition of interest in Islamic law, is an example of these accounts. He answers: 
!
   “Kurum, kendisine para yatıran ortakların (kâra ve zarara katılım hesabı 
sahiplerinin) beklentilerini karşılamak mecburiyetindedir. Kâr beklentisi ile 
para yatıran bir ortak (hesap sahibi) parasının enflasyon farkını; yani 
enflasyonun sebep olduğu değer kaybını bile telafi edemezse buradan parasını 
çeker ve kurum işleyemez hale gelir. Değer kaybını karşılamak da yetmez, 
bunun üzerine bir miktar da reel kâr vermek gerekir. İşte vade farkı bu 
gereklere göre ayarlandığı için bir yandan banka faizlerine yakın olmakta, 
diğer yandan -bazı durumlarda- banka faizi nisbetini de aşmaktadır. Ama 
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yalnızca bu duruma (yani kâr ile faizin miktar olarak birbirine yakın veya farklı 
olmasına) bakarak işlemin meşru olmadığını söylemek mümkün değildir. Genel 
olarak meşru ticarette ve sanayi kesiminde kâr böyledir; kimi zaman faize eşit 
olur, kimi zaman da farklı. Ticaret malı bedel karşılığında alıp satmak suretiyle 
yapılır. Finans kurumları da -murâbaha işleminde- bunu yapıyorlar. Alıp satma 
iki şekilde oluyor:…Bu iki işlem şekil yönünden fıkha (İslâm'a) uygundur. Buna 
hile diyebilmek için tarafların maksadına bakmak gerekir; maksat araya bir 
işlem sokarak faizli kredi vermek/almak ise bu hile olur, maksat gerçekten bir 
malı alıp vade farkı koyarak satmak ise (mal gerçekten alınıyor ve satılıyorsa) 
buna hile denemez. Özel finans kurumlarının faizsiz sisteme -ekonomik ve 
sosyal etkisi bakımından- daha yakın, daha uygun bulunan iki işlemi daha 
vardır: Mudârabe ve müşâreke…Mudârabe ve müşâreke, özel finans kurumu 
uygulamalarında, murâbahaya göre daha küçük oranlarda gerçekleşmektedir. 
Bunun sebepleri arasında hesap sahiplerinin sabırsızlığı, riske düşmeden kâr 
beklentisi, müteşebbis firmaların hesaplarının kısmen kayıt dışı olması, iş 
dünyasında emanet, ahde vefâ, sadâkat, haram-helâl şuur ve duygularının 
zayıflamış olması sebebiyle hâsıl olan güven bunalımı... vardır. 
Biz kemiyet ve keyfiyet yönünden ne kadar iyi Müslümanlar olursak, 
kurumlarımız da o kadar iyi (Müslümanca) olacaktır.” (Karaman, 2001; 
Karaman 2003) !
   “The establishment is obliged to meet the expectations of the partners who 
deposit their money to its accounts (the holders of the participation to profit 
and loss accounts). A partner (account holder) who deposits money with the 
expectation of gaining profit will withdraw his money if he does not even get the 
inflation difference, that is the devaluation caused by inflation, and the 
establishment will not be able to operate. Compensating for the devaluation is 
not enough in itself, a certain amount of real profit is also required. It is 
because the maturity rate is calculated according to these factors that it is close 
to bank interest rates and sometimes –in certain instances- surpasses them. 
However it is not possible to rule this transaction out as illicit by just this (i.e. 
the fact that profit and interest rates are close to or different from each other). 
This is how profit rate generally is in legal trade and industry sectors; 
sometimes equal and sometimes different from interest rate. Trade is done by 
buying and selling a product for a price. This is what special finance houses do 
–in murabaha operations-. Buying and selling takes place in two ways: … 
These two operations are fitting to fiqh in form. In order to call this deceit you 
need to look at the intentions of the two sides; if the goal is to give/take credit 
with interest by putting a transaction in between, this would be deceit, but if the 
goal is to actually buy a product and sell it by adding maturity rate (if the 
product is actually being bought and sold) this cannot be labeled as deceit. 
Special finance houses have two more operations that are more closer, more 
fitting the interest-free system –in terms of its economic and social impact-: 
"169
mudarabah and musharakah. … mudarabah and musharakah find less place 
among special finance house applications compared to murabaha. Among the 
reasons for this are the impatience of account holders, the expectation of profit 
without risk, the fact that companies’ accounts are partly off the books, the 
confidence crisis surrounding the business world because of the diminishing 
sense and feelings of entrustment, abiding the promises (ahde vefa), loyalty, 
haram-halal…The better Muslims we are in quality and quantity, the better our 
establishments will be (in terms of Islam).” (Karaman, 2001; Karaman 2003) !
Karaman’s account above reveals one of the distinctions between the people I refer to as 
moral certifiers and idealists that I explained in previous chapter. According to moral 
certifiers the flaws in implementation are due to objective and subjective constrains within 
the environment, so Islamic banking cannot be the only one to blame. Idealists see the 
flaws in implementation as mainly the function of the intentions and true motives of 
certified producers. Environmental constraints are acknowledged but, Islamic banking is 
understood to be existing to challenge and correct those constraints not to go along with 
them. 
!!!
4.1.2.2. Formal codification as alignment to Nature’s rules and models !!
Similar to Islamic scholars’ accounts in Islamic banking above, moral certifiers and 
idealists in organic agriculture perceive the formal law as not fully accommodating the 
principals of organic agriculture. These arguments are similar to those in Islamic banking 
that they usually refer to both formal law and ‘the other law’ i.e, Nature’s rules and models 
and assert that the latter should be taken into account or codified by the former. 
Similar to the criticisms that the invoice obligation is avoided because of economic 
motives in murabaha in Islamic banking, there are criticism in organic agriculture that the 
natural ways of animal husbandry, seed pollination, or the general natural cycles are 
ignored because of profit maximization. In the following quote, my respondent claims that 
the conditions for chickens’ natural way of being is ignored in certified organic agriculture 
because of economic reasons. 
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   “Şimdi organik dediğin zaman bir standart koyuyorsun. İşte bir tavuk şu 
kadar m2 alanda, hani bunun yapılmasında bir kötülük yok, ama iş görüntüye 
geliyor. Hani böyle organik sertifika olunca çiftliklere bakıyorsun, binlerce 
tavuk falan…Hangi doğal davranışlardan bahsediyorsun? Yumurta organik, 
ama tavukların içinde bir tane bile horoz yok…Onlara doğal davranım 
koşullarını sunabilmen lazım. Doğada nasıl yaşıyor bu hayvan, ona uygun 
şartlar hazırlayacaksın. Her canlının erkeği ve dişisi var. Tabii horoz 
yumurtlamadığı için o kadar horoza para harcamak istemiyor, bu kadar basit 
aslında… Organik yem alıyor, evet hani teknik anlamda organik sonuçta. Tahlil 
ettiğinde bir zehir çıkmaz, ama ekolojinin felsefesi bakımından baktığın zaman 
bana göre değil… çünkü doğal koşullarda yaşatmıyor hayvanı, istediği kadar 
sağlıklı yem yesin. Yani bu bütünden koparılmış artık yani. Bu iş böyle teknik 
düzeylere indirgenmiş.” !
   “Now, when you say organic, you put in a standard. Like, a chicken has this 
m2 space, I mean there is nothing bad in this, but it comes down to show. When 
there is an organic certificate, you look at the farms, thousands of chickens and 
what not… What natural behavior are you talking about? The egg is organic, 
but there isn’t a single rooster among the chicken… You need to give them the 
means to act naturally. How does this animal live under natural conditions, that 
is what you have to provide means to conform that. Every creature has a male 
and a female. Sure, because the rooster does not lay eggs, they don’t want to 
invest in that many roosters, it’s actually that simple… They buy organic fodder, 
yes; it’s organic in the end in technical terms. When you have it tested, no 
poison will come up, but when you look at the philosophy of ecology, that does 
not suit me… because the animal is not living under natural conditions, feed it 
all the organic fodder you want. I mean, it is severed away from the whole. It’s 
all degraded to technicality.” !
Another respondent points how the legal enforcement of using organic certified 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizers to be eligible for organic certification violates the 
interdependency relations in nature. He states: 
!
   “Organik gübreler var, organik üretim yaptığın tarlada organik gübreni 
kullanabiliyorsun. Ama yaylada otlamış ineğin gübresini kullanamıyorsun…
Karadeniz’de bir sürü mesela çay üreticisi diyelim ki gübre olarak, Kars’taki, 
Erzurum’daki yaylalarda otlayan ineklerin gübresini taşıyor, onu kullanıyor. 
Onu kullandığı anda sertifikasını alamıyor. Al bakalım, şimdi hangisi daha 
ekolojik, onun yerine atıyorum, Amerika'da üretilen organik gübreyi 20 bin 
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kilometre gemide taşıtıp, bir sürü karbon analizini yaptırıp, onu kullanıyorlar. 
Bitkiyle hayvanın iç içeliği döngüsünü de kırmış oluyorsunuz.” !
   “There is organic fertilizer, you can use organic fertilizer in the field you 
produce organically. However, you cannot use the fertilizer from the cow that 
grazes on the highlands… In the Black Sea Region, let’s say tea growers carry 
the fertilizer of the cows that graze the highlands of Kars and Erzurum and use 
that. When they use it, they cannot get certification for it. There you go, I mean, 
which one is ecologic? Instead, you go and buy the fertilizer produced let’s say 
in America, carry it for 20 thousand kilometers on ships, do loads of carbon 
analysis tests on it and use that. By this, you break the interconnected cycle of 
plant and animal.” !
Parallel examples are most salient around the organic food production in 
greenhouses, monoculture practices and hybrid seeds and GMO debates. The common 
theme in these accounts is reference to Nature’s rules and models and how organic 
agriculture as codified in formal law violates it. 
Similar to differences among idealists and moral certifiers around contested practices 
in Islamic banking, idealists and moral certifiers in organic agriculture differ in their views 
on contested practices. Similar to idealists’ accounts in Islamic banking, idealists accounts 
in organic agriculture put the blame to the industry for not adequately reflecting the models 
in Nature. Idealists accounts around legal codification similar to two quotes above refer to 
inadequacy of legal codification for enforcing practices that are deemed natural. 
Moral certifies in organic agriculture posit that contested practices such as 
monoculture production, production in green houses, and hybrid seeds cannot be banned in 
the formal law. Similar to moral certifiers in Islamic banking, moral certifiers in these 
accounts refer to external factors that deem contested practices necessary for the long-term 
survival and growth of industry. One respondent explains why formal law cannot prohibit 
practices such as monoculture and hybrid seed as follows: 
!
   “Bütün dünyada aslında sertifikasyon olunca, büyük bir ölçekten 
bahsediyoruz ve o büyük ölçek içerisinde olabilecek şeyler var, olamayacak 
şeyler var…Mono kültürü yasaklayamaz mesela… Neden, çünkü diyelim ki 
üründen ürüne de değişir bu. Örneğin, sultani üzüm, yani hektarlarca bağ var 
ya da işte buğday, hektarlarca ekmek zorundasın ya da işte kayısı tarlaları, 
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kapalı kayısı bahçeleri. Yani şimdi bu ürünler mono kültür sınırında dolaşan 
ürünler zaten. Dolayısıyla, bunu yönetmelik kapsamından çıkaramayız ya da 
işte yerel olması ya da tohumun yerli tohum olması. Yerli tohuma o yönetmeliğe 
koyup, zorunlu kıldığın zaman, birçok üretim yaptıramayabilirsin. Yani hem 
yerli tohum bulamayabilirsin, hem ticari anlamda değeri olan ürünün içinde 
yerli tohum bulamayabilirsin…Mono kültür bir konuysa, sera başka bir konu 
olabilir. Serada organik domates yetiştirebilirsin. Ama onun için hibrit standart 
tohum kullanman gerekir. Bunları yönetmelik yasaklamaz, fakat felsefe 
kuruluşları ve yönetmelikte önerir, yerli tohum kullanmasını önerir. Yerli tohum 
kullanmasını yasaklamaz. Yani bir hayli üreticinin işini de kolaylaştırmak 
zorunda. Hani bu işin önünün açılması için ve belli bir noktadan daha ekolojik 
bir noktaya gelebilmesi için, mevcut durumdaki bütün araçlarını elinden 
almaması lazım. O nedenle, o anlamda gevşek koşulları olabilir, ama bunların 
hep sebepleri var.” !
   “Actually when there is certification all over the world, we are talking about 
a great scale here, within that great scale there are things that can be done and 
that cannot be done… For instance you cannot forbid monoculture… Why, 
because let’s say this can vary from product to product also. For example, 
sultana, there are hectares of vineyards, or wheat, you have to plant hectares 
and hectares, or apricot fields, closed apricot gardens. I mean these are 
products bordering monoculture. Therefore, we cannot take it out of the scope 
of the regulation, or it being local, the seed being local seed. When you put 
local seed into that regulation and make it mandatory, you may not be able to 
grow many things. I mean, you might both not be able to find local seeds and 
you may not be able to find local seeds within products that have trade value… 
If monoculture is one topic, greenhouse might be another. You may grow 
organic tomatoes in a greenhouse. But for that you need to use hybrid standard 
seeds. The regulations do not forbid this, but recommend the use of local seeds. 
It will not forbid the use of local seeds. I mean, you also have to make it easy on 
the producers. Like, for this business to take flight and after a certain point 
come to a more ecological standpoint, you must not take away all the 
instruments in the farmers’ hands. That’s why there can be flexible conditions in 
that sense but all these have their reasons.” !!!
4.1.3. Formal Codification for a Viable Industry !!
People I refer to as certified producers and moral certifiers are more interested in the 
viable operation of the focal industry compared to people I refer to as idealists. The 
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accounts of certified producers and moral certifiers in reply to idealists’ criticisms around 
legal definition of Islamic banking and organic culture above reveal that these people try to 
ensure a safe and viable operation through legal regulation albeit in different ways.  
!!
4.1.3.1. Moral certifiers: leniency and legal spaces !!
Moral certifiers in Islamic banking and organic agriculture try to ensure a safe and 
viable operation of the focal industry by being more lenient with ‘loose’ definitions in 
formal codification. They acknowledge the less then perfect status of formal codification 
and implementation of certain practices. However they tend to interpret this as reflecting 
the defects of external factors such as a strong incumbent system that obstructs certain 
practices, unstable macro conditions, moral defects of people in economic life, consumer 
demand, the characteristic of the product that necessities a certain implementation etc. 
According to these arguments, Islamic banking and organic agriculture in their current 
status are ‘trial’ or ‘transition phase’ models and they will evolve to more ideal form once 
the external environment is more suitable. Moral certifiers believe that these industries 
fulfill an important function, providing better alternatives with respect to their conventional 
counterparts, thus they must be supported to survive. Thus, formal codification should 
provide that flexibility in implementation for these industries to survive and grow. 
In organic agriculture moral certifiers explicitly refer to opening up legal spaces for 
organic agriculture to develop and address the concerns around contested practices. Usually 
the specific articles added to laws and regulations are elaborated as providing such legal 
spaces that allowed for practices that is favorable for the development of organic 
agriculture. For example the establishment of organic farmers’ markets was possible 
because of the amendments to laws on municipalities and trading of fruit and vegetables. 
Seedling law prohibits the farmers to sell seeds but a provision makes the seed-exchange 
among farmers possible. There has been even a modification in the organic agriculture 
regulation about the ratio of organic animal feed in order to be certified organic meat so 
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that the large organic husbandry producers could survive until enough supplies of organic 
animal feed were secured. 
!!!!
4.1.3.2. Certified producers: law as a shield !!
Islamic bankers try to ensure a safe and viable operation by using the law and 
regulations as a shield against criticisms from moral certifies, idealists and the state. Islamic 
bankers referred to law and regulations as constraining while interacting with moral 
certifies and idealists and highlighted their formal status within the legal system while 
interacting with the state. 
Islamic bankers’ accounts around their legal bases and regulations while interacting 
with the moral certifiers and idealists are tied to the claims about being constrained by the 
law. Islamic banks try to reconcile the differences between the implementation and the 
definition of moral certifiers and idealists by referring to practical obstacles they encounter 
and usually with its link to the larger legal system. For example, as I explained in the case 
of murabaha contract above, Islamic bankers reply to the criticism regarding invoice 
obligation by referring to incumbent accounting and tax regulations. Larger legal 
regulations in tax and accounting laws coupled with bad intentions would make invoice 
system open to individual abuses and ideological or political hostility. 
When questioned about the handling of deposits that are retrieved before their 
maturity date, Islamic bankers claim that they can not pay the profits those funds earned 
during the time they stayed in the bank because of legal regulations, even though they 
acknowledge that they should be paid according to Islamic law. When questioned about the 
similarities in calculations of and references to monthly profit rates on the grounds that it 
implies association between interest and profit, Islamic bankers point to formal financial 
accounting practices that require monthly calculations of ‘internal rate of return’. 
In all these accounts, Islamic bankers refer to formal legal framework as inhibiting 
Islamic banks in their reply to criticism by moral certifiers or idealists. By deferring to the 
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constraints of the legal system that is claimed to be designed for conventional interest-
based financing, Islamic bankers transfer the responsibility for being less than ‘Islamic’ to 
the system. Here, in Islamic bankers’s accounts in reply to moral certifiers and idealists, 
being within the system is regarded as a handicap that incapacitates these banks to be truly 
Islamic. 
Islamic bankers’ accounts around these banks’ legal bases and regulations while 
interacting with the state are usually tied to being formal and regulated organizations rather 
than being constrained by formal law. In these accounts, the formal status and being within 
the system is articulated as a positive feature that proves these banks to be legally proper 
financial institutions. These accounts almost always include references to Islamic banks’ 
role as supporting real economy and attracting unbanked funds. 
Accounts of this type are especially salient before the early 2000s and usually are in 
response to the secular criticism. In these accounts, Islamic bankers emphasized their 
formal status as an evidence that they are completely legal, transparent and regulated and as 
such cannot be a threat to secular system. These accounts are geared towards depicting 
Islamic banks as financial institutions and almost never explicitly challenge secularism as 
an ideology. 
Unlike Islamic bankers, certified organic producers rarely refer to organic law and 
regulations as obstacles to do ‘proper’ organic farming when interacting with moral 
certifiers and idealists.This may be due to the content of organic agriculture law.  The law 
prohibits harmful chemicals and encourage biodiversity. It does not contain any provisions 
regarding the use of local seeds or hybrid seeds. 
And unlike Islamic bankers, certified organic producers rarely needed to emphasize 
their formal status while interacting with the state. Large certified producers and moral 
certifiers refer to cooperative relations with the state regarding the legal regulations and 
organic agriculture. In these accounts, the state is usually understood to be genuinely 
interested in developing the scale of organic agriculture. 
However, certified organic producers and moral certifiers do emphasize their 
products’ formal and regulated character in their public statements in relation to 
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unregulated ‘natural’, ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ labels (NLT labels) that are ubiquitous. I 
explain how formal codification was used as separation from similar ventures below. 
!
4.1.4. Formal Codification as Separation from Similar Ventures !!
Different priorities of industry insiders with respect to legal codification are also 
revealed in the issue of separation from similar ventures. Islamic banks were established at 
a time with Islamic holdings -businesses that acted as unregulated financial institutions, 
collecting funds primarily from Turkish workers in Germany and investing them with the 
promise of some return- were prominent in the news media. Organic agriculture, has co-
existed with agricultural production that claims to be natural, local, and/or traditional but 
outside of regulation. These unregulated similar ventures have revealed conflicts among 
actors in both industries. Idealists have been supportive of some unregulated producers that 
they saw as conforming to moral ideals. Moral certifiers have seen them as threats to the 
spread and acceptance of the legal forms. Producers have seen them as rivals. Even moral 
certifiers and producers, however, have often been unable to speak against them when they 
saw them as actors with the same mission or in order not to compromise their relationships 
with them. 
Unlike current literature on market categories, respondents’ accounts on the similar 
ventures in Islamic banking and organic agriculture suggest that industry insiders do not 
readily demarcate their industry from similar ventures even if those ventures are perceived 
to be causing a conceptual confusion or harming the industry. Some organic producers did 
not choose to opt for legal codification for NLT labels while some Islamic bankers could 
not choose to clearly differentiate Islamic banking from Islamic holdings in their public 
statements. Producers’ multi-layered relations with similar ventures in Islamic banking and 
the perceptions of those ventures as being within the same camp in organic agriculture 
influenced their ability and motivation to demarcate their industry from those ventures. 
!!!
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4.1.4.1. Separation of Islamic banking from Islamic holdings !!
All respondents acknowledged that Islamic holdings harmed Islamic banking and also 
acknowledged the silence of industry insiders around these ventures. Given the Islamic 
bankers’ perceptions regarding the adverse effects of Islamic holdings on Islamic banking, 
why Islamic bankers did not activate sharp boundaries between themselves and Islamic 
holdings? 
Participants’ accounts point to two adverse effects of Islamic holdings that was 
particularly harmful for Islamic banking: First Islamic banking was generally lumped with 
Islamic holdings and bore the distrust held to these ventures. Second, Islamic holdings were 
also posing unfair competition by distributing profits at rates 25-30% while Islamic banks 
could only provide 7%. 
Distrust spillover was most harmful in two instances; during the drafting of the 1999 
law and opening branches in Germany. Military elites, in a memorandum in 28 February 
1997, regarded Islamic holdings as involving pro-sharia activities and demanded that they 
should be controlled. In the process, Islamic banking was lumped with Islamic holdings 
and, in response to military elites’ request, tried to be disestablished through the draft of 
1999 banking law. 
In the second instance, Islamic banks could not open branches in Germany where a 
substantial Turkish community exists and had an experience with Islamic holdings. One 
respondent referred to a feasibility study conducted in Germany to open a branch of an 
Islamic bank in 2001 and concluded that it was not feasible to open a branch due to high 
distrust to Islamic holdings. The first branch of a Turkish Islamic bank could be opened in 
Germany 14 years later in 2015. 
However archival data do not include explicit criticisms or concerns of Islamic 
bankers regarding Islamic holdings. Islamic holdings were referred in a few instances as 
‘unregulated practices’ or ‘wrong examples’ and usually only after 2000 when Islamic 
holdings started to bankrupt. Ahmet Ertürk, assistant general manager of Albaraka Türk, in 
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his speech in a symposium on the occasion of 15th year of the establishment of Islamic 
banking on May 31st, 2000 states that: 
!
   “Bugün artık Bankalar Kanunu bünyesinde faaliyetlerine devam eden özel 
finans kurumlarının geçtiğimiz 15 yıllık süre zarfında zaman zaman yanlış 
bilgilenmekten kaynaklanan bazı tereddütlere ve sorunlara muhatap olduklarını 
biliyoruz. Daha çok piyasada özel finans kurumları dışındaki bazı yanlış 
örneklerden ve bazı ön yargılardan destek alan bu ithamların haksızlığını 
burada vurgulamak isteriz.” (Ertürk, 2000: 13) !
   “We are aware that during the last 15 years, special finance houses, which 
today are continuing their operations under the Banking Law, have from time to 
time experienced some uncertainties and problems rising from misinformation. 
We would like to stress here the unfairness of these accusations that stem from 
certain prejudices and wrong examples outside of special finance 
houses.” (Ertürk, 2000: 13) !
This is an example of how implicit references to secular ideology (certain prejudices) 
and Islamic holdings (wrong examples outside of SFHs) usually look like in Islamic 
bankers’ accounts in archival data. 
Given Islamic holdings’ apparent harms, why Islamic bankers did not activate sharp 
boundaries between themselves and Islamic holdings? Respondents’ accounts point to 
multilayered relationships between Islamic banking and Islamic holdings as an explanation. 
First they were business partners, Islamic holdings were the customers of Islamic banks. 
Second, Islamic holdings were perceived as within the same camp, targeted by the same 
incumbent secular ideology, and a stance against Islamic holdings could harm them even 
more, given the ideological hostility of the period. And third, Islamic banks and Islamic 
holdings shared a similar and even overlapped customer base; an explicit stance against 
Islamic holdings could have eventually harmed Islamic holdings’ customers and alienated 
the customers of Islamic banks. 
Similar to Islamic bankers, Islamic scholars I refer to as idealists and moral certifiers 
did not publicly talk about Islamic holdings. In the interviews, there were ambivalent 
attitudes to Islamic holdings. They were usually acknowledged for their success to mobilize 
huge amount of capital but criticized for being not professionals regarding how to use that 
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money. Some expressed sympathy and blamed the state’s hostile attitude for bankruptcy of 
most Islamic holdings in early 2000s. 
!!!
4.1.4.2. Separation of organic agriculture from natural, local and traditional labels 
and good agricultural practices !!
Labels such as ‘natural’, ‘local’ and ‘traditional’ (NLT labels) figure prominently in 
both archival and interview data as creating conceptual confusion. My respondents pointed 
that these labels created much more confusion in the early 2000s but now, they claim, there 
is a growing group of knowledgable consumers who wouldn’t be deceived so easily. 
There are different views among certified producers, moral certifiers and idealists 
about what to do with these labels. My respondent from ORGÜDER saw NLT labels as a 
bigger problem for conventional rather than organic producers, as organic producers could 
differentiate themselves with formal certification. On the same vein, he did not view Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP) as creating confusion for organic agriculture because they 
both were defined in the law. However he also mentioned NLT labels should be regulated 
by the law. 
Moral certifiers have more complicated view of NLT labels and GAP. Some 
acknowledged the conceptual problem NLT labels created for organic farming but were 
reluctant to advocate legal regulation around these labels. They were very well aware of the 
genuine producers I explained in previous chapter in Section 3.3. who follow non-chemical 
farming practices but do not have organic label. They believed that any formal regulation of 
NLT labels would affect those genuine small farmers negatively whom they saw within the 
constituency of ecological agriculture. They believed small farmers are best left outside of 
legal regulation as much as possible so that they would have a little more freedom to 
operate and survive and that they are not burdened by the bureaucratic requirements of 
certification. 
However some saw counterfeit NLT producers as creating unfair competition for 
those small genuine NLT producers and would prefer a legal regulation on those labels. 
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Moral certifiers usually have ambivalent attitudes to the certified Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP) that I explained in previous chapter Section 3.3. They acknowledged that 
GAP is creating a conceptual confusion in relation to organic agriculture and highlighted its 
odd and unique character by stating that GAP was initiated by large supermarkets and 
existed only in a few countries. However, they also saw GAP as a ‘buffer zone’ between 
organic and conventional agriculture and potentially as an opportunity to reach out more 
producers and consumers for the two reasons. First, it could help raising consciousness 
about the abuse of conventional inputs among producers and consumers and second, 
providing more affordable choice compared to organic products. 
!!!
4.2. Alignment in the Legal Space !!!
I explained how different priorities and positions of industry insiders played out in the 
formal definition of Islamic banking and organic agriculture above. Beyond just creating 
the legal definition, data suggests a separate challenge in the legal creation of 
organizational forms: How to make the legal definition of organizational form compatible 
with other legal definitions and regulations so that the new form becomes operational? How 
to align the new terms and definitions introduced with the new form with related laws and 
regulations? And how this alignment process figure in the debates regarding the focal 
industry? 
This challenge was especially true for Islamic banking because of two reasons. First, 
the operation of Islamic banking was directly or indirectly related to several other laws and 
regulations, such as income tax law, corporation tax law, procurement law, internal 
documents of state-owned economic enterprises, Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) 
regulation, the regulation of Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT), and later to 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) regulation and capital markets law. 
Second, the new terms and definitions such as ‘Special Finance Houses’ (vs ‘banks’), 
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‘profit and loss accounts’ (vs ‘deposit accounts’) and ‘(expected) profit’ (vs ‘interest’) were 
introduced for the first time with Islamic banking and did not exist in the contents of these 
laws and regulations. 
For example income tax law was including provisions for interest incomes from 
conventional banks but not the profit incomes from Islamic banks. What was going to be 
the status of profit incomes from Islamic banks and how to decide about tax ratios? 
Borrowers from conventional banks could enter the interest debts as expenses in their tax 
forms, would it be the same for customers of Islamic banks who were not borrowing money 
but participating to loses and profits? When the income tax ratios were lower in favor of 
Islamic banks in early 1990s, this was interpreted as an evidence of the government’s lack 
of commitment to secular principles in newspaper Milliyet. 
Due to provisions in corporation tax law, the invoice obligation in murabaha contract 
created double taxation problem creating excessive tax burdens for Islamic banks. Coupled 
with operational problems I explained in Section 4.1.2.1., Islamic bankers lobbied for the 
invocation of invoice obligation and succeeded in it. This created heated debates among 
Islamic scholars and Islamic bankers about the legal definition and implementation of 
murabaha on the grounds that it violates Islamic law and still continues today. 
Procurement law was referring to banks as the only eligible entities for providing 
letter of guarantees. How could Islamic banks formally named as Special Finance Houses 
and defined as non-bank financial institutions, provide letters of guarantee and raise their 
earnings? Islamic bankers frequently highlighted in their public statements as captured in 
newspaper data, that the fact that their letters of guarantee were not accepted is an example 
of state’s hostile attitude towards these banks. This problem was tried to be solved briefly in 
1996, but continued until 1999 when Islamic banks were included in the banking law. 
Internal regulations of all state-owned economic enterprises were referring to 
conventional banks but not to Special Finance Houses as the entities to be worked in their 
financial dealings. SHFs, defined as non-bank financial institutions could not work with 
state-owned economic enterprises that constituted a fair part of Turkish economy before the 
large scale privatizations started in early 2000s. This issue coupled with letters of guarantee 
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(state-owned economic enterprises were the main customers accepting letters of guarantee) 
reflected in the accounts of Islamic bankers as the hostility of the secular system to Islamic 
banking. 
Another example is the insurance of the funds in Islamic banks. If the contract 
between the customer and the Islamic bank is a participation to loses and profits relation, 
then should the participation accounts in Islamic banks be insured? And if yes, which risks 
the insurance cover? Should the SDIF premium calculations be the same for funds in 
Islamic banks and conventional banks? Could the same entity insure the funds both in 
Islamic banks and conventional banks? As I explained in Section 4.1.2.1., insurance of 
funds in Islamic banks was one of the contested areas among Islamic bankers and Islamic 
scholars in terms of its status in Islamic law. Currently SDIF insures both banks and applies 
the same premium calculation ratios for both types of banking. According to a recent 
Participation Banking Strategic Plan published on May 2015, however, premium 
calculation ratios is going to be changed with an amendment to SDIF regulation (TKBB, 
2015) 
As the new products and definitions are introduced continuously so as the alignment 
to incorporate them within the legal space. The recent Strategic Plan announces around 50 
legal changes to increase the effectiveness of the products currently in use and to diversify 
the product portfolio structure and introduce new products. These legal changes are 
comprehensive and effect several laws and regulations such as regulations of SDIF, BRSA, 
CBRT and capital markets law. 
The alignment process in not unidirectional inflicting changes only in the larger legal 
space to accommodate Islamic banks’ products and definitions. There is also an ongoing 
alignment among the legal definitions within the legal framework of Islamic banking to 
accommodate new products. For example one of the key definitions, the legal definition of 
participation fund will be changed to accommodate a new product called wakala. There are 
legal changes foreseen for the murabaha contract to accommodate wakala. 
There are not explicit events and discussions in organic agriculture arising from the 
new legal definitions as it was the case in the income tax law, and procurement law in 
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Islamic banking above. However, there were a few examples of legal alignment process to 
accommodate organic agriculture within the conventional system. Respondents’ accounts 
on how organic farmers’ markets could be opened, and how seed-exchange festivals are 
possible provide evidence that there were legal adjustments in larger legal framework to 
develop organic agriculture and accommodate the concerns around local seed among 
industry insiders. 
As I explained in Section 4.1.3.1. the establishment of organic farmers’ markets was 
possible because of the amendments to laws on municipalities and trading of fruit and 
vegetables. Seedling law prohibits the farmers to sell seeds but a provision makes seed-
exchange among farmers possible. These examples are usually provided by moral certifiers 
in the context of state-organic agriculture relations to elaborate state’s interest in developing 
organic agriculture. Idealists usually do not refer to the exceptions made in the laws that are 
perceived to be helping organic agriculture by moral certifiers. The people I call idealists 
usually referred the laws and regulations in the larger legal framework to elaborate how the 
system and the state is designed for agribusiness and how specific laws were influencing 
agriculture to become an agribusiness. I will discuss the debates around contested practices 
such as monoculture production and hybrid seeds in the next chapter within the scope of 
moral authenticity. 
!!!
4.3. Influence of Context on Legal Codification !!!
I explained how the industry participants’ different priorities and the larger legal 
space played out in the legal creation of Islamic banking and organic agriculture in the 
previous two sections, Sections 4.1. and 4.2. respectively. In this section I explain how the 
larger socio-political and economic context influenced the legal creation of Islamic 
banking. Data suggest that if the legal change is perceived as a necessity caused by external 
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factors, it stirs less contestation among industry insiders compared to legal changes that 
happened in the absence of external forces. 
The basis of this assertion comes from two instances. First, inclusion within the 
banking law of 1999 and second, the establishment of assurance fund in 2001 created less 
contestation among industry insiders compared to banking law of 2005 that I explained 
above. 
In the draft of 1999 law, one of the proposals was to convert Islamic banking into 
conventional banking. All respondents agreed that the proposal was reflecting the hostility 
of secular ideology of the time fueled by military memorandum in 28 February 1997. With 
a successful lobbying, Islamic bankers were able to influence the process and the Islamic 
banks were included within the banking law for the first time. 
The law of 1999 did not define Islamic banks as a ‘bank’ but put them under the same 
regulation body, BRSA as their conventional counterparts. With an amendment to banking 
law n. 4389 in 2001, Islamic banks were to establish their own Association as well as 
Assurance Fund similar to conventional banks’ Banking Association and SDIF respectively. 
As suggested by my respondents and supported by archival data, the dominant view 
among Islamic bankers and Islamic scholars was to retain Islamic banks outside the 
banking law to keep them distinct from conventional banks. From Islamic bankers’ 
perspectives, this preference also reflected instrumental concerns; being outside of banking 
law provided more flexibility and financial advantages. The inclusion in the banking law 
and assurance funds would bring additional financial obligations. 
Data suggests that, the political context in the events of military memorandum 
starting from mid 1990s raised concerns among Islamic bankers regarding the fragility of 
Islamic banking’s legal framework. Islamic banking was regulated with a government 
decree and left the ultimate power regarding the fate of Islamic banking to the council of 
ministers. Inclusion within the banking law would provide more a secure ground for 
Islamic banking as the law, being difficult to change in a whim, would provide more 
protection against external hostility. A few respondents explained what it meant to be 
included in banking law in 1999 as “being equal to İşbank in terms of legal framework”. 
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İşbank is the first bank established in Turkish Republic in 1924 with the order of Atatürk, 
who also provided one fourth of the bank’s founding capital from his personal account. 
Accounts regarding the establishment of assurance fund in 2001 provides another 
example how the external factors influenced industry insiders’ attitudes towards the legal 
change. Parallel to perceptions regarding the inclusion within 1999 law as a necessity to 
protect Islamic banks from the ideological hostility of incumbent governments, assurance 
fund was deemed as necessary to repair confidence to the Islamic banks after one of them 
was bankrupted because of mismanagement in the midst of severe economic crises in 2001. 
One respondent who had been in favor of this development explains the establishment of 
Assurance Fund as ‘a gift of crises conditions’, and points that discussions around the 
appropriateness of the Fund in terms of Islamic law were resolved quickly by referring to 
the urgency of the situation. 
!
“Güvence fonu o kriz şartlarının bize hediyesidir. Kriz şartlarında 
oluşturduğumuz bir mekanizmadır o. Özel finans kurumlarında esas kâr ve 
zarar hesabı olduğu için, bunun güvencesi olur mu tartışmaları da oldu. Ama 
bu birkaç ay sürdü, en az iki üç ay sürdü. Fakat kriz şartlarını başka türlü de 
aşma imkânımız yoktu… Bizim kendi aramızda oldu, danışmanlar, yani bu işe 
olur veren hocalar arasında, fetva heyetleri arasında tartışmalar da oldu. 
Güvence fonu olabilir mi, bu bankalara emanet edilen fonlar garanti edilebilir 
mi tartışması oldu ve süratli bir şekilde bunun olabileceği neticesine gittik… 
Arkadaşlardan da uygunluk aldık. Onlar dediler ki, bu güvence fonu olağanüstü 
şartlarda fonksiyonel olacak bir mekanizma. Bu neyi garanti ediyor? Allah 
göstermesin, bina yıkılırsa, banka batarsa, devreye girecek, tasarrufçuyu 
koruyacak bir mekanizma. Tasarrufçu tasfiyeyi bekleyecek, işte bana bir şey 
düşecek, düşmeyecek. O sıkıntıdan kurtulsun, bir an önce parasına ulaşsın, 
küçük tasarrufçunun tasarrufu korunsun, onun için bir güvence olsun.” !
“The assurance fund is a gift left to us from the time of the crisis. It is a 
mechanism that we formed under crisis conditions. Since the basis of special 
finance houses is profit and loss calculations, there was debate about whether 
there could be a warranty for this. It lasted for a few months, two or three at 
least. However, we had no other choice to overcome crisis conditions… We 
debated it among ourselves, with our advisors, I mean among the fatwa 
committees. It was debated whether or not a warranty fund could be established 
and if the funds deposited to these banks could be guaranteed and we quickly 
came to the conclusion that this was possible… We got approval from our 
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friends (fatwa committees) too. They said this assurance fund was a mechanism 
that will be functional only under extreme circumstances. What does this 
guarantee? God forbid, if the building collapses, if the bank bankrupts, it will 
be activated to protect the account holders. Normally, the account holder will 
have to wait for the liquidation; wonder if something will fall to his share. Let’s 
save them from this trouble, get them the money as soon as possible, protect the 
savings of the small account holder, be a guarantee for them.” !
The accounts around Islamic banks’ inclusion in Banking Law in 1999 and the 
establishment of assurance fund in 2001 suggest that it was not always possible for industry 
insiders to establish clear boundaries between Islamic banking and its conventional 
counterpart. Although some Islamic bankers may have preferred to be included in the 
banking law anyway, the dominant view was to stay out of it. Similarly, some Islamic 
bankers and almost all Islamic scholars were against insuring the funds in Islamic banks on 
the grounds that it was contradictory to the participation principle that do not guarantee 
even the principal sum. Yet in both cases, the external contexts, political tension and 
economic crisis, left no choice for Islamic bankers and Islamic scholars who could have 
preferred the status quo. 
The legal creation of organic agriculture was less prone to the influence of larger 
context compared to Islamic banking. Two explanations seem plausible for this. First, 
organic agriculture was much less politicized compared to Islamic banking. There was no 
ideological contestation around organic agriculture as it was the case of secularism 
criticism around Islamic banking. Second, Turkey from the very beginning exports most of 
her organic produces to EU which necessitated to follow EU legislation as a base for 
organic agriculture’s legal framework. On the same vein, EU accession process requires 
Turkey to comply with EU’s Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) within EU’s acquis 
(Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatı) that ties Turkey’s legal framework for organic agriculture 
closely to EU’s law and regulations. 
!!!!
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4.4. Discussion and Contributions !!!
In this chapter, I examined the process of creation, definition and incorporation of 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture within the legal system. Based on the data, I 
showed how industry participants’ different priorities (separation from conventional 
counterparts; alignment with the ideal form; ensuring a viable operation; and separation 
from similar ventures), the larger legal space and socio-political and economic context 
played out in the legal creation and evolution of Islamic banking and organic agriculture. 
My findings in this chapter combined with the arguments in the previous chapter 
where I explained different sets of actors in each industry address the several limitations in 
research on new organizational forms that I identified in Section 1.1. 
First, in terms of the actors that influence the formation of new organization forms 
and practices, researchers generally examine a few predetermined sets of actors: producers, 
state, rivals (generally dominant incumbent producers) and vanguards (generally critics, 
activists, enthusiasts and analysts). The inductive examination of influential people and key 
events in this study revealed five types of actors that I referred to as state, certified 
producers, non-certified producers, moral certifiers and idealists and explicated in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
What is especially important in terms of theoretical contribution to the literature on 
industry formation and evolution is the existence and roles of two groups of actors; moral 
certifiers and idealists. Moral certifiers and idealists have no formal roles as defined in laws 
or regulations or any formal appointments within any of the producer organizations, but 
play a key part in shaping organizational practices and legal frameworks. Both groups 
advocate a banking system based on Islamic law or agricultural system based on rules and 
models in Nature. In the schema of the previous literature drawing from institutional logics, 
social movements or market categories perspectives these actors would be lumped together 
as vanguards, critics or gatekeepers (e.g. Koçak et al., 2013; Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; 
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Hirsch, 1972). However, I find that moral certifiers and idealists differ strikingly in their 
understanding, evaluation of and effect on the development of the emerging industry. 
Specifically, my findings in terms of vanguards highlight a particular role that I 
referred to as moral certifiers: Moral certifiers influence the focal industry through two 
mechanisms: their informal regulative role (they control whether industry practices are 
legitimately ‘Islamic’ or ‘organic’) and moral certification role (they endorse the industry as 
a moral enterprise). They are alliances of industry and they want the industry to survive and 
grow. Moral certifiers, not only help to common understanding to emerge as commonly 
described in relevant literature, but also control and endorse that the common 
understanding and practices conform to moral grounds. 
What I want to highlight as the most important in terms of theoretical contribution to 
literature on new organizational forms is the actors that I referred to as idealists and has not 
been explicitly discussed in the previous literature on industry formation and evolution. 
Idealists are similar to the moral certifiers in that they are in search for morally informed 
alternatives. They have some sympathy for Islamic banking or organic agriculture but they 
want these industries to conform to the ideals. They are alliances of ideals. They work to 
materialize their ideals either through state by forcing for legal codifications, and standards 
on the industry and/or by creating alternative models. 
Second, in terms of state and its role in relation to Islamic banking and organic 
agriculture, my findings highlight the political and societal factors that influence the state’s 
treatment of these industries. Although state is generally conceived as a source of 
endorsement or material rewards in the studies of market creation (e.g. Schneiberg and 
Bartley, 2001; Wholey et al., 1992 ; Sine et al., 2005), Islamic banking case reveals the 
ideological hostility of the state towards these banks. This was also the case in organic 
agriculture, albeit to a much lesser extent. Specifically, I provided illustrative examples of 
ideological and political contestation around Islamic banking and how it was associated 
with political Islam and tired to be disestablished. In the similar vein, respondents in 
Islamic banking referred to more favorable treatment of the state after the government was 
transferred to the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. These findings 
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are in line with those few researchers that argue and show that societal level factors and 
ideological and political context are influential in state-organizational population or 
business relations (e.g. Simons and Ingram, 2003; Özen and Akkemik, 2012; Buğra and 
Savaşkan, 2014). 
Third, in relation to conventional counterparts, similar ventures and legal separation 
from those, my findings highlight the industry specific and societal level conditions that 
limited the capacity and motivation of certified producers to invoke sharp distinctions from 
other producers. Specifically, in terms of conventional counterparts, unlike current research 
claims, certified producers did not automatically engage in activating sharp identities and 
devalue conventional counterparts. In terms of similar ventures, multi layered social and 
economic relations with and ideological affinity to similar ventures in Islamic banking and 
the perceptions of similar ventures as being within the same camp in organic agriculture 
limit producers’ ability and motivation to separate their industry from similar ventures. This 
is different than the extant research on new organizational forms that implicitly or explicitly 
assume producers are capable and motivated to differentiate themselves from the 
incumbent or oppositional producers (e.g. Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Weber et al., 
2008). My findings suggest that producers in new organizational forms have societal and 
relational concerns other than differentiation with respect to incumbent or similar 
producers.	

Figure 4.1 depicts the main actors and themes as studied in literature on new 
organizational form creation from the institutional logics, social movements or market 
categories perspectives. Figure 4.2 depicts the main actors and themes as observed in this 
dissertation. 
!!!!!!!!!!
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Figure 4.1	

Main actors and themes in literature on organizational forms	

!
Figure 4.2	

Main actors and themes observed in this dissertation	
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In the next chapter, I present the accounts where the idea of Islamic banking and 
organic agriculture is debated mainly, but not exclusively among the people I refer to as 
idealists and moral certifiers.  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5.!!!
5. CREATION OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AS A MORAL ENTERPRISE !!!!
The story of Islamic banking and organic agriculture, and of any new venture for that 
matter, could be said to be about aligning the ideal, the theory, with the practice. I discussed 
one aspect of that story, the formal codification of the idea of Islamic banking and the idea 
of organic agriculture in the previous chapter. I claimed and showed that divergent 
positions of the different sets of people I refer to as idealists, moral certifiers and certified 
producers regarding legal codification and implementation were the main sources of 
contestation about aligning the idea to the formal codification and the practice. I also 
highlighted the influence of larger legal space and the socio-economic context on the 
debates about idea-practice alignment as reflected in the legal codification of both 
industries. 
In this chapter, I look at the alignment problem more closely by focusing on 
conversations mainly between idealists and moral certifiers with the aim of understanding 
the nature of that idea. Unlike previous chapter that focused on the alignment between the 
idea of the industry and its legal codification, alignment problem that I focus in this chapter 
is about alignment to the ideal, the ideal being informed by the alternative codes of, Islamic 
law in the case of Islamic banking, and Nature’s rules and models in the case of organic 
agriculture. 
A big part of my archival data consists of conversations around whether Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture are really what they are purported to be. This debate is 
fundamentally linked to an ontological question of ‘how real is this thing’ and as such 
hinges on the concept of authenticity that is very much concerned with what is genuine and 
real. The criterion for assessing the realness of both industries is grounded on the other law, 
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Islamic law or Nature’s rules and models as the sources of the moral foundations of these 
industries. 
The concept of authenticity is generally attributed to Existentialist philosophers of 
19th century such as Kierkegaard and Heidegger (Carroll and Wheaton, 2009; Gill, 2007; 
Milnes, 2011; Varga and Guignon, 2014; Warnock, 1970) and as such is part of a larger 
Existentialist arguments regarding man and his connection with the world. Authenticity in 
existentialist philosophy refers to “the necessity for each of us to realize his own 
uniqueness” (Warnock, 1970: 55-56) by separating ourselves from all the standards, the 
beliefs and prejudices of the society. In this conception, man has possibilities that he is free 
to choose and responsible to fulfill. In existentialist conception of authenticity, there is a 
strong criticism of rational, impersonal, and objective which is associated with industrial 
and modern society as it is understand to be as compromising authentic existence by 
promoting competitive relations and role playing (Grazian, 2010; Warnock, 1970). This 
conception of authenticity is strongly linked with other common themes in Existentialist 
philosophy such as individuality, freedom, subjectivity, autonomy, domination and the 
critique of modern with hostility to science, rational and objective and as such it is 
essentially political. 
Existentialist conceptualization of authenticity has two main aspects that are also 
somewhat related: a revolt against industrial/commercial culture and the rise of 
individuality (Gill, 2007; Warnock, 1970). The former provides a full account of the 
destruction of modern and industrial on individual and local communities and celebrates 
features such as origin, essence and purity. The latter highlights features such as connection 
to self, intrinsic creativity and self expression and emphasizes individual freedom against 
social institutions such as religion. 
Authenticity in organizational research is generally linked to the latter aspect. 
Organizational scholars usually studied the authenticity within the cultural production and 
consumption fields such as country music (Peterson, 1997), blues (Grazian, 2003), self-
taught art (Fine, 2004) and food and restaurants (Carroll and Wheaton, 2009; Johnson and 
Baumann, 2007). These studies examine topics such as how authenticity claims are made, 
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and how it is linked to status distinctions among consumers. In these studies, it is generally 
assumed that authenticity provides some sort of benefit to either producer, consumer or 
both, such as recognition, social status and distinction. 
The social benefit of authenticity is not something that is salient in its initial 
conception by Existentialists philosophers. Authenticity in existentialism is like a personal 
moral duty that a man needs to fulfill to truly exist and as such something that needs to be 
attained for its own sake (Warnock, 1970). The accounts regarding what I interpret as 
related to moral authenticity in Islamic banking and organic agriculture are more aligned 
with its existentialist formulation as a moral duty rather than attaining social status and 
stratification. 
Carroll and Wheaton (2009) distinguishes between two general meanings of 
authenticity; type authenticity and moral authenticity. Type authenticity signifies that the 
object such as a piece of art or an organization is a genuine member of a category. The 
focus in evaluations of type authenticity of a particular object is on whether the object 
meets the criteria for inclusion in the type or category. There is an assumption of the 
existence of classification criteria that might be more or less consensual. 
In the second meaning which is more aligned with the existentialist origins of the 
concept, moral authenticity conveys that the producer involved in the establishment of an 
object was driven by his own morals and values. In this conceptualization, to be perceived 
as morally authentic, values behind the choices should be understood as having primacy 
over material rewards in guiding the action. 
Carroll and Wheaton (2009) regard these two basic types of authenticity as ideal 
types and note that an entity might hold the features of each ideal type. However they also 
state “simply conforming to an established type, however morally laden it might be, will 
probably eventually become suspect with respect to moral authenticity” (Carroll and 
Wheaton, 2009: 271), suggesting that type authenticity may inhibit the perception of moral 
authenticity. It is because an established type may attract pure profit-seekers and becomes 
questionable regarding the sincerity of morals. 
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According to Carroll and Wheaton’s framework, a financial instrument in Islamic 
banking is considered to be assigned type authenticity, if the implementation of that 
financial instrument complies with Islamic contractual forms that the jurists throughout the 
centuries commonly regarded as valid according to Islamic law. In this sense, the criteria 
for inclusion in the type of ‘Islamic financial instrument’ stems from Islamic law. Moral 
authenticity of a financial instrument created by an Islamic bank, is evaluated on various 
grounds, but usually hinges on the contract’s maksat, i.e. purposes, aims, intentions, and 
morals of the form and fıtrat i.e. its true nature, and doing what it is supposed to do 
according to Islamic law. 
I show below in Section 5.1.1. that type authenticity and moral authenticity 
evaluations in Islamic banking almost always figure together in data. Contrary to Carroll 
and Wheaton’s (2009) suggestion, type authenticity is generally understood as implicitly 
ascribing moral authenticity among Islamic scholars. Evaluations of type authenticity of 
financial instruments in Islamic banking is highly contested among the Islamic law scholars 
and involve discussions of morals and the purposes beyond the features of the form. I 
explain below that this is mainly due to different views among Islamic law scholars on 
sources and styles of reasoning in Islamic law. 
I explain how authenticity discussions figure in the accounts of the people I refer to as 
idealists, moral certifiers and Islamic bankers in Section 5.1.2. below. Based on the data I 
claim, in Islamic banking two parallel questions regarding authenticity go hand in hand: 
what is considered authentic? (i.e. authenticity evaluations of specific financial instruments) 
and what is authentic? (i.e. the establishment of authenticity criterion). 
In organic agriculture these two questions have more clear answers. Type authenticity 
is ascribed by formal organic label. If a product is produced according to organic 
production methods defined by law and labeled as organic, then it is considered to be a 
member of a category of products called ‘certified organic products’. Thus, in organic 
agriculture, the formal law provides the criteria for inclusion in the type of certified organic 
products. Since the formal law provides clear criterion to be assigned as organic, type 
authenticity evaluations in organic agriculture are much more straightforward compared to 
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Islamic banking. And, unlike Islamic banking type authenticity conversations are usually 
detached from moral authenticity conversations in organic agriculture. 
In contrast to Islamic banking, organic agriculture provides a case where type 
authenticity does not necessarily suggest moral authenticity. There are idealists who create 
alternative networks of trade outside of the certified organic production and exchange 
system supported by moral certifiers. These idealists’ challenges to moral authenticity of 
organic agriculture focus on standardization, intermediaries, the infrastructure of 
distributional channels and the role of firms in agriculture that are usually discussed in 
relation to agribusiness model relying on standardized hybrid seeds and monoculture 
production. 
Conversations around the morals, values and the principals of organic agriculture is 
about alignment to the Nature’s rules and models and being in accord with Nature. This is 
similar to Islamic banking, where moral authenticity is generally understood to be as being 
accord with fıtrat, i.e. conveying ones true nature, and doing what it is supposed to do 
according to Islamic law.  Thus, I claim, in both industries, the moral evaluations are 
grounded on the values and beliefs that stem from the other law, i.e Islamic law, and 
Nature’s rules and models that is generally summed up when the phrases ‘being accord 
with fıtrat’ and ‘being accord with Nature’ that I introduced in Chapter 3, are invoked 
respectively. 
Below I explicate these ideas further by mainly focusing on the accounts of the 
people I refer to as idealists and moral certifiers on Islamic banking and organic agriculture.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!
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5.1. Islamic Banking as a Moral Enterprise !!!
5.1.1. The Sources of Contestation among Islamic Scholars regarding Islamic Law !!
As I explained in the previous chapter, techniques and properties of Islamic banking 
instruments feature prominently in the data. Debates around legal codification and 
implementation of contractual forms, whether they exclude interest or not and how they 
differ from conventional instruments are persistent in Islamic bankers’, moral certifiers’ and 
idealists’ accounts. These discussions are usually carried out in a rather technical manner, 
comparing the current application with both its conventional counterpart and its status in 
Islamic law and reflect different positions of different sets of actors. 
In relation to but separate from the debates regarding formal codification, 
conversations of the people I refer to as moral certifiers and idealists include debates 
around how to decide a contractual form’s status in Islamic law. Deciding on whether 
specific products and services are permissible according to Islamic law is a very 
complicated matter. The difficulty arises because of two reasons. First, some concepts such 
as interest/usury are highly contested in Islamic law. Although everyone accepts its 
illegitimacy according to Islam, there is no consensus on the content and the boundaries of 
interest. For example, do returns from state bonds count as interest even though the state is 
not an institution established for lending or borrowing money? Or could an interest gain at 
the rate of inflation be considered as real interest as it protects the value of money? And 
second, most of the modern financial instruments are difficult to be understood from the 
perspective of Islamic law, such as credit default swaps, commodity future markets and 
foreign exchange options. This complication partly arises due to changing concept of 
money; when the core of Islamic law was formed around 8th and 9th centuries, gold or 
silver was the unit of value and physically used as money instead of current fiduciary 
monetary system where paper currency has no intrinsic value. 
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In relation to the sources of the first difficulty, the contestation among Islamic 
scholars on concepts such as interest/usury, a brief explanation is necessary regarding 
Islamic law. The explanation will also provide a basis to understand the divergent views on 
several Islamic banking related topics. 
The sources of contestation are grounded in differences among Islamic law scholars 
on matters of sources and styles of reasoning in Islamic law. In terms of sources of Islamic 
law, some sharia experts insist Quran should be the main source, while others assign similar 
weight to sunna (prophet’s words and deeds) and hadith (prophet’s sayings). Moreover 
those who accept the sunna and hadith as authoritative sources have to deal with 
discrepancies among and within the different collections of hadiths. 
Collection of hadiths started in the 8th century, long after Prophet Muhammed died. 
Each hadith refers to verbatim quote of the prophet with its isnad, the chain of narrators 
which documents the route the narrative has ben transmitted. Hadiths are categorized 
depending on their authenticity as sahih (sound), hasan (good), daif (weak) as well as their 
discontinuity, however there is no general agreement on these categorizations among sharia 
scholars. More complication arises from the four main branches of Islam relying on 
different hadith collections as references. Moreover, even commentaries (tesfir) on the 
Quran sometimes include references to hadiths. 
Some Islamic scholars see the high reliance on hadith in Islamic law problematic, as 
one can never be sure of its authenticity. I attended an Islamic law seminar examining the 
status of war captives in Islam, and the Islamic Law professor referred to eight main hadith 
collections of four branches of Islam during two-hour long seminar and concluded that they 
were all wrong according to the Quran. He emphasized the need for ‘explaining Quran with 
Quran’ frequently and warned also against the contradictory explanations in some 
commentaries of Quran. For him, the authenticity of hadith collections, thus the sunna, was 
not to be taken for granted as he thought some of them were clearly against the Quran. 
In addition to the different sources, different methods of reasoning are available in 
Islamic law to decide on matters where fundamental sources did not provide clear direction. 
Ijtihad and Qiyas are just two examples of such methods and sharia experts tend to differ 
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on the weight they give to those methods. Ijtihad refers to individual interpretation based 
on acceptable hermeneutic techniques and Qiyas refers to reasoning by analogy where a 
new injunction is created based on a known injunction about a case similar to the new 
problem at hand. The choice between different reasoning methods comes down to the issue 
of limits of interpretation: How much freedom does an Islamic scholar have while 
interpreting a new case to reach a decision? ; What is the legitimate balance between 
relying on previous rulings and relying on individual reasoning? and How to use classical 
fiqh knowledge that emerged within a specific historical context in relation to current 
problems? 
The debates around reasoning methods reveal themselves in data around the 
discussions of Akıl/Nakil (Reason/Transfer) dichotomy, and almost always extends to Şekil/
Maksat (Form/Spirit) dichotomy. Sharia scholars who refer to contextual differences 
between the present times and the times of Prophet usually invoke these dichotomies 
simultaneously as a criticism for applying a previous ruling as a stencil/template to current 
issue at hand without examining the reasoning behind that ruling. Those Sharia scholars 
posit that the individual reasoning and interpretation is essential when assessing the status 
of current needs and problems according to Islamic law as well as relying on previous 
rulings. They criticize the strict application of rulings to current issues as they hold that not 
only the form of contracts but maksat, the underlying purposes and realities they serve are 
legislated in Islamic law, and as such ‘the spirit’ as well as the form needs to be taken into 
account in the decision making process. 
Identifying the underlying purposes and realities of an original ruling, maksat, is 
usually linked to the concept of maslaha, that refers to doing justice and preserving public 
interest. However, for some scholars, the principle of maslaha is too worldly, based on the 
assumption that benefits and harms in society can be determined objectively and rationally. 
Besides, Divine is not necessarily about public interest. Moreover, preserving public 
interest is prone to the political influences and as such it is arbitrary and should be invoked 
cautiously. 
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To be sure, discussions of Akıl/Nakil (Reason/Transfer) and Şekil/Maksat (Form/
Spirit) dichotomies are not specific to Islamic banking in Sharia (Islamic law). The concern 
with form is persistent in Sharia and there is even a concept called hile-i şeriyye (hiyal) that 
refers to making deeds conform to Sharia in form. Hile-i şeriyye as a term means 
‘legitimate solution’ but usually refers to legalistic stratagems and is highly controversial in 
Islam. Traditionally it is used on the realms of alms, preemption, gifts and marriage to reach 
an unapproved aim without violating sharia. While some scholars refute the concept as 
outright deception, others refer to its role as providing flexibility and helping Muslims deal 
with daily problems without outright violation of Sharia. These latter scholars differentiate 
among hile-i şeriyye depending on its violation of maksat. However, the question of at what 
point do legal stratagems become illegitimate remains. Concepts of şekil (form), maksat 
(spirit), hile-i şeriyye (legalistic stratagems) and maslaha (public interest) usually figure 
simultaneously in the debates regarding the contested practices in Islamic law. 
This brief information on sources and forms of reasoning in Islamic law is to provide 
an insight about the divergent views on the several Islamic banking related topics. There are 
different sources and methods to assess Islamic banks’ contracts in terms of their 
conformity to Sharia and this leads to differing opinions. In fact, the controversy around 
‘interest’ itself is closely linked to Akıl/Nakil and Şekil/Maksat dichotomies explained 
above. The questions of ‘what constitutes interest’ and ‘how is interest to be avoided’ figure 
persistently in archival data from the very beginning of Islamic banks’ establishment to the 
present. Prof. Mehmet Görmez, President of Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey 
(PoRA), in his opening speech in consultation meeting in 2010, explicitly refers to Akıl/
Nakil and Şekil/Maksat dichotomies and calls for a need to redefine riba (interest). He 
states: 
!
   “Burada, toplantımızın adında da geçen “güncel” ifadesine özellikle dikkat 
çekmek istiyorum. Aslında riba bildiğimiz ribayken, alışveriş bildiğimiz 
alışveriş iken, üzerinde tartıştığımız bütün bu konuları güncel yapan şey nedir? 
Bu konu üzerinde biraz durmalıyız. Güncellik kavramı değişimle ilişkilidir. 
Yani, problemler eski problemler olmakla birlikte yeni mahiyetler yeni formlar 
yeni yönler kazanmaktadır. Bugün yapmamız gereken şey işte bu değişimi iyi 
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takip etmek ve bu değişme “yokmuş gibi” yaklaşmamaktır. Hükümlerin belirli 
bir formu ve ruhu olduğunu nazarı itibara alarak, formu taşıdığımız gibi ruhu 
da günümüze taşımalıyız. Hükümlerin ruhu ise hikmet-i teşriin anlaşılmasıyla 
mümkündür. Başka bir deyişle hüküm vermek, hükümlerin birer şablon gibi ele 
alınıp bir furû-ı müteferrika’ya mekanik bir tarzda tatbikinden ibaret değildir. 
Hikmete istinat etmeyen bir şekli bir hüküm, ruhsuz bir bedene benzer. Aynı 
ruhu taşıyan bir insanın, zaman içerisinde fiziki açıdan değişmesi ne kadar 
tabii hatta zaruri ise hükümlerin -“kendi” kalabilmek için- değişebilmesi de o 
kadar tabiidir. Sadece şekle itibar edilip maksadın, mananın, gayenin, 
mağzânın ihmal edilmesi şeklinde gerçekleşen bir faaliyet, “fıkh” kelimesinin 
etimolojisi ile de çelişmektedir… Zira hepinizin bildiği gibi fıkh, dikkatü’l-fehm 
olarak ifade edilmiştir. Fıkh, zahir ötesinde, lafızların derununda yatan dakik 
manaya ermektir. Öyleyse, madem ki karşımızda “güncel” konular var; bizim 
de bilgi ve bakışımızı “güncel” hale getirmemiz son derece önemlidir… Sabit 
hüküm ile değişken vakıa ilişkisini dikkate almaktan bahsederken, Riba’nın 
hükmü nedir?” sorusunu yeniden sormayı teklif etmiyorum. Zira bu İslam’ın en 
açık sabitlerinden biridir. Fakat “riba nedir ve hangi muameleler ribevidir?” 
sorusunu, üzerinde durduğumuz zeminin daha da sağlamlaştırılması 
bakımından yanıtlamamız gereken bir soru olarak gürüyorum.” (Görmez, 
2010: 23-24) !
   “Here, I would especially like to stress the expression “contemporary,” which 
is also in the title of our meeting. While interest is the interest we know, while 
commerce is the commerce we know, what is it that makes these topics 
contemporary? We should ponder upon this. The concept of contemporariness 
is about change. That is to say, while the problems are the old problems, they 
take on new qualities, new forms and new trajectories. What we need to do 
today is to follow this change well and not approach this change ‘as if it were 
not there’. Keeping in mind that judgments have a certain form and soul, we 
should carry the soul to the present day just as we carry the form. The soul of 
judgments may only be understood by hikmet-i teşrî (the reasons of the laws 
Allah and the Prophet made). In other words, making a judgment is not solely 
about handling them in templates and applying them to furû-ı müteferrika in a 
mechanical way. A judgment only attesting to form without reason is like a body 
without a soul. Just as it is natural and even mandatory for a human carrying a 
soul to change physically in time, it is also natural for judgments to change – in 
order to stay as “themselves”. An activity that only gives importance to form 
and neglects purpose, meaning, intention, objective is also contradictory to the 
etymology of the word ‘fiqh’… For as we all know, fiqh is stated as dikkatü’l-
fehm (a deep and full understanding). Fiqh is reaching the accurate meaning 
lying beneath what is said, beyond what is apparent. So, since we are dealing 
with ‘contemporary’ topics, it is vital that we make our information and 
perspective ‘contemporary’… As we talk about taking up the relationship 
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between fixed judgment and variable cases, I propose not we ask the question, 
‘What is the judgment on interest?’, for this is one of Islam’s most clear 
constants. But I see the question of ‘what is interest and which transactions 
constitute interest’ as one that should be answered as to further strengthen the 
grounds that we stand on.” (Görmez, 2010: 23-24) !!!
5.1.2. Debates over Authenticity !!
5.1.2.1. Authenticity debates among Islamic law scholars !!
Without a clear criterion to even judge what is ‘interest’, discussions about the 
conformity of Islamic banks’ services and products to Sharia is a persistent theme in the 
conversations among Islamic scholars I refer to as moral certifiers and idealists. The 
debates are mostly carried through ‘form conformity’ but usually extend to involve the 
distinct but related Akıl/Nakil (Reason/Transfer) and Şekil/Maksat (Form/Spirit) 
dichotomies. Almost all of Islamic banks’ services, products, and practices such as product 
promotions, commissions and filing charges, fees for banking services, warranties and 
proxies such as letters of guarantee and letter of credit (akreditif), gold and foreign 
exchange accounts, credit cards, late payment charges, insurance, and stock market 
instruments were all discussed in terms of both their conformity to specific contractual 
forms in Islamic law and also their similarities and differences from their conventional 
counterparts. Moreover, these debates usually extend to issues of maksat, the underlying 
purposes that the products serve. 
I interpret these discussions around the conformity of Islamic banks’ processes, 
products and contracts to specific contractual forms, in Islamic law as discussions of 
assessing type authenticity of the products. These discussions are almost always carried out 
with the discussions regarding not only the contents and the properties of the form but also 
maksat, i.e. purposes, aims, intentions, and morals of the form. I interpret these discussion 
around the morals of the contract in Islamic law as discussions of assessing moral 
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authenticity of the products. The discussions of the form and the moral of the contracts are 
entangled:  Şekil (Form) and Maksat (Spirit) are understood to be distinct but at the same 
serving to the one and the same. 
Conversations among people I refer to as moral certifiers and idealists are 
fundamentally about assessing the type and moral authenticity of products and services of 
Islamic banks. Moreover, data suggests there are no consensual criterions to make those 
evaluations and the discussions about authenticity are simultaneously about establishing the 
authenticity criterions. The following quotes are evidence for tensional entanglements 
among type authenticity, moral authenticity and criteria for assessing these figuring in 
Sharia scholars’ accounts. 
For example, Prof. Ahmet Yaman, the Dean of the Faculty of Theology at Akdeniz 
University, proposes a five-step assessment on deciding the conformity of a product to 
Islamic law and advises an independent interpretation from the decisions of classical jurists 
such as İmam Malik, one of the prominent Sharia scholars of 8th century, as they are 
known to be limited in their economic knowledge. He emphasizes that checking whether 
the issue contradicts a known and clear injunction in Islamic law should be the last step in 
the decision process. 
!
   “Ticari iktisadi konularda hüküm istinbatının beş adımda sonuçlanabileceği 
düşüncesindeyim…Birinci adım, işlemin mahiyetinin belirlenmesidir. İkinci 
adım, maksadın tespitidir. Üçüncü adım, bu işlem ve muamele acaba gerçek bir 
ihtiyaca mı bağlı olarak yapılmaktadır. Dördüncü adım, acaba bu işlemde 
haksız kazanç, sömürü var mıdır, taraflardan birisinin zayıflığından istifade var 
mıdır yok mudur, bunun tespit edilmesi gerekiyor ve en son adım, beşinci adım 
da, bilinçli olarak bu beşinci adımdır, son adımdır, acaba konuyla ilgili sarih, 
kati bir nass var mıdır, bir nasa aykırılık söz konusu mudur? Öncelikle 
mahiyetin tespiti önem arz ediyor, işlemin ne olduğu ve hangi hukuki terimin, 
fıkhi terimin altında ele alınacağı, eğer yeni bir işlemse bu hangi hukuki 
kavramlarla izah edilebileceğinin tespiti önem arzediyor…Adını koyarken 
acaba klasik fukahamızın tespitlerinden mi hareket etmeliyiz, yoksa onlardan da 
istifadeyle bağımsız bir tespitte mi bulunmalıyız sorusuna acizane bendenizin 
cevabı ikincisidir. Yani fukahamızın tespitlerini göz önüne alalım, onlardan 
istifade edelim, varlık sebebimiz onlardır, tamam fakat biz onlardan bağımsız 
olarak bir tasavvur tespitine, bir mahiyet tespitine çalışalım, zira klasik 
fukahamızın içerisinde mezhepleşmiş olanlar da dahil olmak üzere piyasayı ne 
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kadar tanıdıklarından, pazarı ne kadar bildiklerinden emin olmadığımız isimler 
vardır.” (Yaman, 2010: 297) !
   “I believe that reaching a judgment call on commercial and financial subjects 
can be completed in five steps… The first step is the determination of the scope 
of the transaction. The second is designating its purpose. Third, is this 
transaction and treatment based on a real need? Fourth step; is there 
undeserved gain, exploitation, in it? Is one of the sides benefiting from the 
other’s weakness, this needs to be determined, and the last step, the fifth one, 
which is consciously the last step, is there an clear, a fixed judgment concerning 
the subject, is there conflict with such a judgment? First of all, the 
determination of the scope is very important. What is this transaction and under 
which legal term, term of fiqh is it going to be handled, if it is a new type of 
transaction, which legal concepts can it be explained under?… While giving it 
a name, should we move on the evaluations of our classical fiqh scholars or 
should we make an independent one using their guidance? My humble answer 
to this question would be the second way. I mean, we should bear in mind the 
evaluations of our fiqh masters, make use of them for they are the reason of our 
existence, but we should attempt a contemplation, an evaluation independent of 
them, for there are names among the classical fiqh scholars that we are not 
quite sure know the market, the marketplace enough, including the ones who 
have sectarianized.” (Yaman, 2010: 297) !
Prof. Servet Bayındır, and Islamic law professor at İstanbul University and a member 
of Advisory Board of an Islamic bank highlights the role of formal law on deciding the 
appropriateness of product in Islamic law. He states: 
!
   “Finansal ürünlerin hukuki-fıkhi vasfının belirlenmesinde benim teklifim 4 
kriterin esas alınmasıdır. Bir, bu işlem bugünkü hukukta gerçekten nedir? İki, 
fıkhi hükmü nedir, meşru mudur değil midir? Üç, bu muhasebede ne diye 
kaydediliyor? Muhasebe kriteri de dikkate alınmalıdır. Dördüncü olarak da 
makasıt konusudur. Çünkü finansal ürün diye bir paket oluşturuluyor. Bunlar on 
tane yirmi tane ayrı sözleşmeden ibaret olabiliyor. Sözleşmelere teker teker 
baktığınızda her biri meşru görünüyor ama bir bakıyorsunuz sonuç fıkhın hiç 
de arzu etmediği, meşru görmediği bir şey. Bolayısıyla bu kriterlerin dikkate 
alınarak finansal ürünlerin geliştirilmesi gerektiği kanaatindeyim.” (Bayındır, 
2010: 317) !
   “I propose that 4 criteria be taken into consideration in the determination of 
the legal-fiqh functions of financial products. First, what is this transaction in 
terms of today’s law? Secondly, what is its judgment in fiqh, is it licit or not? 
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Third, what is it recorded into accounting as? And fourth, what is the purpose? 
Because they form a package called financial product. These can be made up of 
separate ten, twenty contracts. When you look at each contract separately, they 
seem licit but when you look at the outcome, you see that it is something fiqh 
does not wish, does not find licit. Therefore, my opinion is that financial 
products be developed taking these criteria into consideration.” (Bayındır, 
2010: 317) !
He insists on a proper formal codification for Islamic banking products to be 
authentic. In another context, he states that proper formal codification of Islamic banking 
contracts is prerequisite to prevent the improper implementations that are against the 
Sharia. His concerns with proper formal codification is about aligning the implementation 
with the discourse of the product; since the formal law is legally binding, a proper formal 
codification based on the contractual forms in Islamic law would align the implementation 
with the discourse of the product. In another context he states: 
!
   “Her iktisadi eylemin, üretiminden, pazarlamasına, tüketimine, alım satım, 
riba, selem, icare, müdaraba, müşareke, sözleşmeler, bin bir türlü sözleşme var. 
Bu her birinin de kendince bir fıtratı, bir doğası, bir kanunu var. Yani H2O’su 
var hepsinin. Her biri işte, İslam şu caizdir dediği zaman, onun doğasına 
bakmıştır, … ondan sonra hükmünü vermiştir. Şimdi, alım satım caizdir, niye 
çünkü o işin doğasına bakıyor. Doğa, toplum, insanlık alemi içerisinde oynadığı 
iktisadi role bakıyor, birincisi bu iktisadi rol. ‘İkincisi; fakat iki insan bunu 
yaptığı an bir de hukuki bir eylem gerçekleştirmiş oluyor. Bunun bir doğası var, 
iktisadi doğası var, bir de hukuki tarafı var bunun. Hukuk karşısındaki durumu 
var. Üçüncüsü; sadece iktisadi yapısı, doğası ve hukuku yetmiyor, üçüncü 
olarak bir de bunun artık insanoğlu bunu kaydediyor. Kaydederken, doğasına 
bakarak kaydediyor zaten, muhasebe kaydı. Bu doğasına bakaraktan. Dördüncü 
olarak da; tamam doğası, hukuki yapısı, kaydı ama bir de dışarıdan, biz niçin 
giriştik, amaçları neydi, maksatları neydi, nihai anlamdaki maksatları neydi, 
orada dikkate alınıyor. Şimdi, ben diyorum ki,… İslami veya neyse finansal 
ürün, bir finansal ürün nedir, burası caiz midir, değil midir?, hakkında karar 
verebilmek için bir fıtratına bir bakılım. Fıtratı iktisadi tarafını yansıtır. 
İktisaden bu hangi rolü oynuyor, insanlık aleminde? İkincisi; peki hukuk yarın 
iktisadi eylemi yaptılar, ama sağ olsun ihtilaf çıktı arada, hukukun önüne 
gittiler….Yani fıkıh, dışarıdan baktığınız zaman, fıkıh bir olayın caizdir veya 
değildir derken, genel anlamda baktığınız zaman, dediğim gibi hukukun 
karşısına bu adam gittiği zaman, buna ne der hukuk? Muhasebede ne der, 
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şunda ne der ve en nihayetinde de kalbi olarak ne der, ona bakar, caizdir veya 
değildir der.” !
   “Every economic action, from production to marketing, consumption, interest, 
selem, ijarah, mudarabah, musharakah, contracts, there are thousands of 
contracts. And each of these has a fıtrat, a nature, a law of its own. I mean each 
has a H2O. With each of these, when Islam declared them licit, it looked at their 
nature, … and then gave its judgment. Now, buying and selling is licit. Why? 
Because it looks at its nature. It looks at the economic role it plays within 
nature, community, humanity; the foremost is this economic role. Secondly, 
when two people involve in buying and selling between them, they enact a legal 
action. There is a nature, an economic nature and then there is this legal side; 
its situation in the scope of the law. Thirdly, not only the economic structure, its 
nature, and legality are not enough, humankind also records it. When he does, 
he does it according to its nature, accounting records. Looking at that nature. 
And fourthly; its nature, legal structure, records are all okay but why we got 
into this, what was their intention, what was their final intention, that is also 
considered. Now, I say, … Islamic or whatever the financial product, when we 
decide whether it is licit or not: Let us look at its fıtrat to give judgment on it. 
Its fıtrat reflects the economic side. What role does it play for humanity 
economically? Secondly; okay, they went into economical relations, but they 
had a conflict, they went to the law… I mean fiqh, when you look at it from the 
outside, when fiqh says something is licit or illicit, when you look at it 
generally, like I said, when this man goes in front of the law, what does the law 
say? What does it say in accounting and, what does it say from the hearth, that 
is what it looks at, it says licit or illicit.” !
He invokes, the specific natural character, fıtrat, of economic transactions and states 
that the formal law and the accounting practices should be reflection of that fıtrat. His 
argument is about being true to natural character and that’s why I interpret his discussion on 
formal law and reaching an Islamic ruling as related to type and moral authenticity. 
Prof Dr. Rahmi Yaran, Islamic law professor at Marmara University who is currently 
serving as mufti of İstanbul, posits a two-step process for deciding on a ruling about a 
financial instrument in Islamic law. First step is based on its fıtrat that is derived from 
Quran and sunna. If it is not permissible in Quran and sunna then the action is prohibited. 
But if permissible, then several other contextual and subjective criterions such as macro 
stability and necessity are considered and the final ruling is reached. He separates 
permissibility of an action based on its fıtrat from its context. If an action is prohibited by 
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fıtrat, then it is always prohibited. But if its permissible by its fıtrat, it may still become 
prohibited depending on several contextual conditions such as market stability. In this 
conceptualization, Islamic law and ruling is dynamic, subjective and flexible, as are the 
criteria used to evaluate an action. 
!
   “Önce işlemin mahiyetini tespit ederiz. Bu işleme karşı naslarda aykırı bir 
durum var mı, bunu tespit ederiz. Eğer aykırı bir durum yoksa bu işlemle ilgili 
genel hükmü veririz. Bu işlem mubahtır deriz. Bir nevi liaynihi bir aykırılık yok 
demektir burada. Sonra diğer maddeler tabi ki önemli, onları da bundan sonra 
devreye sokariz. Kredi talebinde bulunanın maksadı nedir, ihtiyaç var mı, 
sömürü var mı, istismar var mı bakarız (buna başka şeyler de ilave edilebilir) 
sorularına bakarız.  Bunlardan dolayı (ligayrihi, yani bir başka harici sebepten 
dolayı) onları uygun görmeyebiliriz veya bu şekilde uygun görmemeler o 
devirde olur, geçici olabilir, daha sonra bunlar geçer. Farz edelim piyasa 
istikrarı açısından, önemli bir dönemden geçiliyordur, bunlar yasaklanabilir 
ama daha sonra da tekrar serbest bırakılabilir.” (Yaran, 2010: 328) !
   “First we identify the scope of the transaction. We specify if there is a conflict 
in the judgments against this transaction. If there is none, we give a general 
judgment for the transaction. We declare the transaction acceptable. In a way it 
means that there is no liaynihi (haram in its nature) conflict. Then the other 
articles are also important, we put them into action after this. What is the 
purpose of the person who is requesting the debt, does he need it, will he exploit 
it, is there abuse and such? Because of these (ligayrihi, i.e. owing to an external 
factor) we might not find it suitable or this kind of an inappropriateness might 
be for that period, it might be temporary, it might pass in time. Let’s say we are 
going through an important period in terms of economic instability, it might be 
forbidden but in time it may be permissible again.” (Yaran, 2010: 328) !
Prof. Beşir Gözübenli, Islamic law professor at Gazi University, highlights the 
necessity of identifying specific criteria for each financial product. He points to 
contradictions that the practice of Nakil (Transfer) creates. For example conventional credit 
is usually mapped to karz relation in Islamic law but the contractual form of karz in Islamic 
law is not appropriate proxy for conventional credit in terms of either form or spirit. First 
there is no possibility to set a certain payment date in karz relation and second originally 
karz refers to providing credit for the purposes of helping someone without expectation that 
the payment will be done eventually. It is basically a grant on goodwill, not a financial 
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instrument. Gözübenli criticizes the prevailing practice of finding Islamic analogies to 
conventional products and presenting those as transfers (such as from karz to credit) rather 
than creating new financial instruments from scratch, basing them entirely and from the 
beginning on Islamic sources. 
!
   Bir kere ilahiyatçıların kendi içinde ya da fıkıhçıların kendi içinde 
çözemedikleri pek çok problem olduğunu ifade etmek istiyorum öncelikle… 
Bunu ifade ederken, katılım bankalarıyla ilgili olsun diğer konularla ilgili olsun 
bizim bazı kriterleri netleştirmemiz gerektiğini belirtmeyi hedefliyorum 
öncelikle … Bunlarla (katılım bankaları) ilgili bir kere, kredi midir, bunların 
verdiği işlemlerde, yaptığı işlemlerde kredi kullanılıyor mu veya biz faizle ilgili 
tahlillerimizde kredi konusunu fıkıhta nereye oturtacağız? Hemen ilk başta tabi 
ki ‘karz var ya’ denilecektir, ama karzın krediyle aynı olup olmadığı ve bugünkü 
anlamda ticari kredileri karşılayıp karşılamadığı hükümleri bakımından ariz-
amik (enine boyuna) konunun uzmanları tarafından tartışılması gerektiğini 
düşünüyorum. Karz bizde tamamiyle teberru (karşılıksız yardım, bağış) 
maksatlı ilk başlangıçta, yani bugünkü hukuk literatürü ifadesiyle adi karzı, 
mücamele duygusu, yani yardım duygusuyla yapılan güzellik, güzel davranma 
duygusuyla yapılan işlemleri kapsıyor. Karzda fıkhen, özellikle Hanefiler 
açısında söylüyorum, bir vade belirleme şansımız var mı? Fıkıh kitaplarında 
birçok fetva kitabında karzda vade belirleseniz fazla ödememiş olsanız bile 
baştan faize girersiniz diye bir kural var… Bir kere bizim faizle ilgili 
tahlillerimizin temellendirilebilmesi için karz başta olmak üzere, birtakım 
akitlerle ilgili temel esasları ortaya koymamız gerekiyor… Peki bu konuda 
hangi yöntem takip edilecektir… Şimdi doğrudan doğruya ayet ve hadislerden 
yeni finansman yöntemleri veya işlemler mi geliştirilecektir, bütünüyle yeni, 
yoksa mevcut yapılabilen işlemlerin şu anda mevcut işlemlerin, bankacılık ve 
finansal işlemlerin fetva kitaplarında veya fıkıh kitaplarında verilen fetvalara 
uyarlanması mı yapılacaktır? Takdir edersiniz ki bu geçiş süreci içerisinde bu 
ağırlıklı olarak uyarlama işi yapılıyor.” (Gözübenli, 2010: 311-312) !
   First of all, I would like to state that there are a lot of problems that 
theologians or fiqh scholars cannot solve among themselves. In saying this, I 
am primarily aiming to state that we need to clarify some criteria concerning 
participation banks as well as other subjects… About these, first of all, are they 
credit loans, is credit being used in the transactions they give, in the 
transactions they make or where are we to put the subject of credit in our 
assessments of interest within fiqh? Without hesitation they will say, ‘Well, there 
is karz’, but I believe that experts of the topic should argue in scientific depth 
whether karz is the same as credit and whether it consolidates commercial 
credit loans of our day. Karz was at first used completely for donation 
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purposes, that is to say in today’s legal terms adi karzı, and encompasses 
feelings of solidarity, a deed done with the feeling of aid, actions done with the 
feeling of good deeds. According to fiqh, and especially from the perspective of 
the Hanafi, do we have the chance to set a due date in karz? In fiqh books and 
in many fatwa books, there is a rule that says that if you set a due date, even if 
you do not pay more, you will have entered into interest from the start… First of 
all, in order for our assessments to be grounded, we need to lay down the basic 
principles of some contracts, mainly that of karz… But which method should we 
follow?… Now, are we to develop new, completely new financing methods or 
transactions directly from Quran verses and hadiths, or are we to adapt 
currently available transactions, banking and financial transactions to the 
fatwas given in the fatwa books or fiqh books? As you might have thought, in 
this period of transition, mainly the adaptation method is adopted.”(Gözübenli, 
2010: 311-312) !
And some scholars highlight the importance of Islamic customs and traditions while 
finding solutions to problems that are not explicitly discussed in Quran and sunna. 
According to Prof. Yunus Apaydın, Islamic law professor at Erciyes University, cultural 
heritage of Islamic civilization should be guiding in dealing with current problems as it is 
this cultural heritage that connects Muslims to their roots. As such his statement represents 
the ideas that put more weight on the role of customs and traditions than independent 
interpretation of current problems and the imagination of solutions. 
!
   “Bir de problemlerin ele alınış tarzıyla ilgili bir -iki şey söylemek istiyorum. 
Şimdi 14 asırlık bir medeniyetin bir halkasıyız. Bunu hiçbir zaman 
unutmamamız gerekiyor. Hatta İslam medeniyetini belki fıkıh medeniyeti olarak 
nitelendirsek çok abartmış olmayız. Dolayısıyla karşılaştığımız meselelere 
çözüm üretirken, bu medeniyetin bir halkası olduğumuzu asla gözden ırak 
tutmamamız gerekiyor. Bunun şöyle bir anlamı var: Sadece üzerinden 14 asırlık 
medeniyeti ve birikimi bir kenara bırakarak herhangi bir sorunu çözdüğümüz 
zaman, bu medeniyet ile olan bağlantılarımızın biraz zayıf kalacağını 
düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla, oradaki birikimden hakikatten gerektigi şekilde 
istifade etmek lazım” (Apaydın, 2010: 698) !
   “I would also like to say a few words on how we handle problems. Now, we 
are a link in a civilization that has been around for 14 centuries. We should 
never forget that. And we would not be exaggerating if we called the Islam 
civilization, the fiqh civilization. Therefore, when we are solving the problems 
before us, we should not lose sight of the fact that we are a link of that 
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civilization. What this means is: when you solve a problem by putting aside 14 
centuries of civilization and accumulation of knowledge, you weaken your 
bonds to that civilization. Therefore, we should truly make use of this 
accumulated knowledge.” (Apaydın, 2010: 698) !
In similar accounts to those above form and spirit of various financial instruments 
figure simultaneously as distinct but entangled issues. In all of these, it is argued that form 
of a contract needs to reflect and enable the true spirit of the contract. Without serving the 
underlying purpose, form conformity is deemed useless, yet it is also implicitly assumed 
that through correct form, the underlying purpose can be served. In a way, type and moral 
authenticity is conceived as one and the same yet they are understood to be distinct. It is 
like human body and spirit, the metaphor above that Prof. Mehmet Görmez, President of 
PoRA, used regarding the Şekil/Maksat (Form/Spirit) debate in his opening speech. The 
sprit is understood to be constant and related to fıtrat thus it is substantial to keep the spirit, 
but form, like human body changes. The question is how much a form can legitimately 
change to keep its original spirit? I interpret the discussions around Islamic banks’ products 
and services to be fundamentally linked to this question. The discussions around contested 
practices are generally in the form of; How to implement murabaha so it is indeed a 
commerce?; How to deal with late payment fees so it is still not interest?; How to 
implement insurance, so it is indeed about solidarity? that are all related to the Form/Spirit 
entanglement that I interpret as reflecting type authenticity and moral authenticity 
dynamics. 
The discussions of Form/Spirit are further complicated because, continuing with Prof. 
Görmez’s human metaphor, the ‘body’, unlike human body, has no clear, consensual 
features and the ‘spirit’ is too distant. Thus assessments of products and services in terms of 
şekil (form), maksat (spirit), and their compatibility to ‘body’ and ‘spirit’ are usually carried 
out with discussions of features and qualities of ‘body’ and ‘spirit’. That’s why I claim 
authenticity assessments in Islamic bank are simultaneously about establishing authenticity 
criterions. 
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To be sure, I do not claim that the example quotes above on the discussions regarding 
criterions to be used while evaluating financial instruments of Islamic banking reflects the 
complete and comprehensive views of all Islamic scholars. I provide these examples to 
provide evidence on my arguments about first, concurrent criterion discussions along the 
evaluations of Islamic banking and second, the references to fıtrat. 
!!!
5.1.2.2. Authenticity debates between Islamic bankers and Islamic law scholars  !!
The discussions of authenticity assessment and authenticity criterion are prominently 
figure in the accounts of people I refer to as moral certifiers and idealist as I explained 
above. Lacking fiqh knowledge, Islamic bankers’ involvement in the discussions of specific 
forms and their injunctions in Islamic law are rather limited. However, Islamic bankers are 
actively involved in authenticity discussions. In replying to authenticity criticisms of 
Islamic scholars, i.e. the challenges regarding compatibility to Islamic law both in form and 
spirit, Islamic bankers draw attention to: the current realities and what is workable within it; 
juridical plurality in Islamic law and the transitionary nature of Islamic banking; and 
symbolic meaning of Islamic banking that resonates with larger social and political 
concerns of moral certifiers and idealists. 
!!!
5.1.2.2.1. Workability/feasibility !!
Islamic bankers are very well aware of the disputes among Islamic scholars over Akıl/
Nakil (Reason/Transfer) and Şekil/Maksat (Form/Spirit) dichotomies and usually refer to 
legal framework and the present conditions as obstacles for strict adherence to form. The 
constrains due to legal framework and the present conditions are usually referred as a 
matter of fact manner in response to Islamic scholars’ criticisms regarding improper 
implementations without directly challenging the validity of such criticisms. I already 
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explained how Islamic bankers use legal framework as a shield while interacting with 
moral certifiers and idealists in response to the their challenges in previous chapter in 
Section 4.1.3.2. 
Islamic bankers sometimes do challenge the validity of type and moral authenticity 
criticisms and when they do they usually highlight ‘unworkability’ of those views because 
they ignore the current realities. For example, the criticism about high reliance on 
murabaha is not valid because it ignores all the realities regarding larger legal framework, 
economic institutions, macro economic conditions, institutional capabilities of both Islamic 
banks and private firms and the preferences and attitudes of modern Muslims. 
In these accounts type and moral authenticity challenges of Islamic scholars are 
sometimes fired back with the same authenticity challenge to the larger Muslim community. 
Muslims are blamed for insisting on strict forms in Sharia while mentally and morally 
following the norms of modernity. Even the very preference of form over sprit is regarded 
as the reflection of modern mentality that values appearance over spirit. 
To be sure, direct challenges to Muslims’ preferences and behaviors are rare in the 
accounts of Islamic bankers’ and moral certifiers. And such criticisms are usually 
incorporated in the larger criticisms of modernity and its influence on human mind and 
behavior. According to these accounts, a judgment based solely on Sharia knowledge 
disregarding current conditions creates unworkable suggestions. Instead Sharia experts 
should explore other ‘technically applicable’ and ‘ethically appropriate’ options in Islamic 
law while taking social, psychological and cultural realities into account. Ahmet Ertürk, 
then assistant general manager of Albaraka Türk puts these arguments succinctly in his 
article published in a symposium book on the occasion of 15th year of the establishment of 
Islamic banking on May 31st, 2000: 
!
   “Faizsiz bir iktisadi hayatın en temel müessesesinin “mudaraba ortaklığı” 
olduğu kabulünden hareketle Türkiye’deki faizsiz finansman tecrübesine eleştiri 
yöneltenler, tasarruf sahiplerinden fonları yine mudaraba esasında toplayan 
Türkiye uygulamasının bu fonları kullandırırken mudaraba’yı fazla tercih 
etmemesini tartışma gündeminin en başına oturtmuşlardır. Bu eleştiride iki 
unsurun ne kadar dikkate alındığı şüphelidir: birincisi, mudaraba’nın 
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geleneksel yorumunun modern ekonomi şartlarındaki tatbik kabiliyeti; diğeri, 
objektif (ekonomik şartlar) ve sübjektif (müteşebbislerin tercihleri) unsurların 
“ortaklık”tan çok “finansman”ı hakim fonksiyon haline getirmesinin kurumsal 
ve fonksiyonel etkisi. Bu unsurları dikkate almanın, sadece geleneksel ticari 
formların fıkhî dayanaklarını bilmekle sınırlı olmayıp içinde faaliyet gösterilen 
modern ekonominin şartlarını, tabi olunan pozitif hukuk normlarını ve iktisadi 
aktörlerin tercih ve davranış kalıpları ile bunların ardındaki motifleri de iyi 
analiz etmeyi gerektirdiği açıktır. Faizsiz finans kurumlarının bu verili şartları 
değiştirme gücü yoksa ne yapması gerektiği sorusu, son tahlilde varılacak olan 
sorudur. Bu soruya cevap ararken bulunabilecek çok sayıdaki tarihsel örneğin 
hem “teknik olabilirlik”, hem de “etik uygunluk” açısından gündemin başına 
oturtulması, tartışmanın daha verimli yönlere kaymasına katkıda bulunacaktır.” 
(Ertürk, 2000: 146) !
   “Acting on the recognition that the fundamental principal of an interest-free 
economic life would be “mudarabah partnership”, people who have criticized 
the interest-free financing experience in Turkey have put the fact that 
implementation in Turkey, that gathers funds from savings owners based on 
mudarabah principals, does not prefer mudarabah when placing funds, to the 
top of the agenda. It is doubtful whether two factors are taken into 
consideration in these criticisms: first, the applicability of the traditional 
interpretation of mudarabah in modern economic circumstances; and two, the 
corporate and functional effect of the fact that objective (economic 
circumstances) and subjective (the choices of the entrepreneurs) factors make 
“financing” rather than “partnership” the leading function. It is clear that in 
order to take these functions into consideration, one needs not only to know the 
fiqh foundations of traditional commercial forms but also analyze well the 
modern economic conditions where business is transacted, the positive legal 
norms that are relied on and the behavioral patterns and preferences of 
economical actors and the motives behind these. The question concerning what 
interest-free finance houses should do if they do not have the power to change 
these given conditions is one to be reached at the final phase. While searching 
for an answer to this question, putting many of the historical examples to the 
top of the agenda in perspective of both “technical applicability” and “ethical 
appropriateness” will aid in taking the debate to a more productive 
flank.” (Ertürk, 2000: 146) !!!!!!
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5.1.2.2.2. Juridical plurality regarding Islamic law !!
Some Islamic bankers refer to differing judgements of Islamic scholars on certain 
applications in response to authenticity criticisms. According to these accounts, it is not 
possible to reach full consensus in every aspect of Islamic banking anyway because even 
the fundamental principles regarding interest is not fully determined. Islamic banking is 
usually referred as a ‘trial’ or ‘transition phase model’ in these accounts with a note that 
Islamic scholars should base their judgements on this realization. According to these 
accounts, what is important is trying to learn and improve the model along the way and 
authenticity discussions should serve to this purpose and be welcomed to encourage this 
evolution. In these accounts, authenticity challenges and criterion discussions should and 
would guide the development of Islamic banking instead of hamper its development. 
!!!
5.1.2.2.3. Symbolic meaning of Islamic banking !!
Another common reply of Islamic bankers to authenticity challenges that may 
occasionally figure in the accounts of moral certifiers as well, is the ‘symbolic’ importance 
of Islamic banking. According to these accounts, judgements based solely on technical 
functions and appropriateness of Islamic banking to Sharia is not adequate; Islamic banking 
represents more than financial institutions. First, Islamic banking is a reply to modernity 
and secularism and puts the sacred fundamentals instead of secular principles on the 
foundations of economic relations. Second, it is one of the rare contributions of Muslims to 
civilization in a long time. Third, Islamic banking has a pioneering role that enables and 
inspires Muslims to find creative ways to live in modern and secular systems without 
contradicting their beliefs. This argument is sometimes elaborated in terms of freedom, 
social justice and equality. Islamic banking is framed as a right for Muslims to participate in 
economic activities without a need to choose between their religion and their social and 
economic well-being. All of these arguments refer to social recognition and welfare of 
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Muslims that resonate highly with the concerns of all the people I refer to as moral 
certifiers and idealists. Ertürk encourages emphasizing and analyzing this aspect of Islamic 
banking for its adequate judgement and thorough appreciation and understanding.  
!
   “Vurgulanması gereken husus faizsiz finans yöntem ve araçlarının yukarıda 
değindiğimiz geleneksel fıkıh literatürü içinde ne ölçüde meşru olarak 
görüldüklerinden çok, modernitenin ‘secular’ meşruiyet anlayışına karşı ilahi 
kaynaklı bir etik öğretiyi meşruiyetin temeli yapma niyet ve arayışının ürünü 
olmalarıdır…Türkiye’deki faizsiz finansman tecrübesini sadece tarihsel 
şemalara uygunluk açısından değerlendiren eleştirilerin çokluğuna mukabil bu 
tecrübenin, modernitenin meydan okumasına verilen bir ahlâkî cevap olarak 
değeri ve anlamı konusunda yeterli analizlerin bulunmaması, ciddi bir eksiklik 
olarak görülmelidir. Çerçevesini modern şartların belirlediği bir faaliyet 
alanında gelenek’ten medet ummanın kıymet-i harbiyesi konusunda yapılacak 
sosyo-ekonomik ve tarihsel analizlerin meseleye daha fazla ışık tutacağı 
açıktır.”(Ertürk, 2000: 140,146) !
   “The point that needs to be emphasized is not the level of legitimacy of 
interest-free financial methods and tools within the traditional fiqh literature 
mentioned above but more the intention and search for replacing the 
modernity’s ‘secular’ understanding of legitimacy with an ethic doctrine 
stemming from divine source… The absence of analysis of Turkey’s interest-free 
financing experience from the perspective of its value and meaning as a moral 
answer to modernity’s challenge against the multitude of criticism that 
evaluates it only based on historical schemes should be seen as a major 
drawback. It is clear that socio-economic and historical analysis on the 
importance of appealing to tradition (tradition is vaguely referring to practices 
of Prophet) in an area of activity defined by modern circumstances will shed 
more light on the matter.” (Ertürk, 2000: 140,146) !
Prof. Sabri Orman, one of the leading Islamic economics scholars states that Islamic 
banking represents the normalization of economic and political systems in Turkish context 
that strayed from its historical course dramatically with her modernity project that 
disregarded the realities and sensitivities of her people. He claims Islamic banking is a step 
for Turkey to make finally a peace with its Islamic roots. 
!
   “Bu kurumlar, bir yandan İslam Medeniyetinin uzun zamandan beri çağdaş 
medeniyete yapabildiği nadir katkılardan birini temsil ederken, diğer yandan 
tarihe nasıl yaklaşılacağı ve ondan yapıcı ve yaratıcı bir şekilde nasıl 
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yararlanılabileceği konusunda öğretici bir örnek teşkil eder… ÖFK, ideolojik, 
doktriner veya epistemolojik bir görme bozukluğunun ürünü olan vahim bir 
politik iktisat hatasından kısmi bir dönüşü ifade eder…Türkiye bağlamında bu 
kurumlar, hem iktisadi sistemin ve politikanın normalleşmeye olan ihtiyacını, 
hem de normalleşmeye doğru atılmış küçük, ürkek ve belki arızi, ama yine de 
önemli bir adımı temsil eder.”(Orman, 2000: 131) !
   “These establishments, while on the one side come up as one of the rare 
contributions of the civilization of Islam to modern civilization, on the other 
side constitute a didactic example on how to approach history and make use of 
it in a constructive and creative manner… SFHs represent a partial comeback 
from a political economic fault stemming from an ideological, doctrinal or 
epistemological visual impairment… In the context of Turkey, these 
establishments represent the need of normalization for both the political and 
economic systems and a small, hasty and maybe accidental, but still a very 
important step towards normalization.” (Orman, 2000: 131) !
I interpret accounts similar to two quotes above that highlight social and political 
importance of Islamic banking as raising the ‘symbolic importance’ of Islamic banking in 
reply to authenticity criticisms. 
All these accounts raising workability/feasibility, juridical plurality, and symbolic 
importance arguments were in reply to challenges regarding the appropriateness of Islamic 
banks’ products and services in terms of Islamic law. And, these accounts usually directly 
or indirectly criticize the arguments that emphasize strict adherence to contractual forms. 
Islamic banking in these accounts, is a search away from modernity and all that it brings 
like capitalism and secularism. In these accounts, focusing on technical details of 
contractual forms in Islamic law misses the bigger picture about what Islamic banking 
represents thus, Islamic banking should not be taken solely as a religious or financial 
phenomenon while judging its authenticity.  
!!!!!!!
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5.2. Organic Agriculture as a Moral Enterprise !!!
5.2.1. Type Authenticity and Formal Certification !!
Organic law and regulations define a clear set of rules for a production method and 
the product to be labeled as organic. Organic-certified food is considered to be a member of 
category of foods that are produced and labeled according to those rules. Thus, formal 
certification in organic agriculture ascribes products with type authenticity. As I explained 
in previous chapter in Section 4.1.1.2, industry insiders understand the organic production 
method as clearly defined and distinct from conventional methods. Thus unlike type 
authenticity of the products in Islamic banking, type authenticity of organic products are 
conferred with formal certification and is not contested. 
As I explained in the previous section, establishing type authenticity of a product or 
service in Islamic banking is much more complicated compared to organic agriculture. 
Formal banking law and regulations do not explicate what an interest-free product looks 
like and as such formal codification does not confer type authenticity as in the case of 
organic agriculture. Advisory Boards (Sharia Boards) of Islamic banks endorse products or 
services as interest-free or ‘Islamic’, however the lack of consensus among Islamic scholars 
on form weakens those endorsements’ power to assign type authenticity on Islamic 
products as distinct and conforming to Islamic law. 
To be sure, chemical-free nature of organic products are questioned too. Almost all 
my respondents acknowledged that the most frequent questions they get from consumers is 
“are these really organic?” referring whether the control and regulation can really make 
sure no chemicals were used during the process. However this question prompts the 
question of trust that whether the rules are followed rather than the question of distinct 
production method usually in relation to conventional farming. 
!!!
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5.2.2. Moral Authenticity and Revolt to Hegemony !!
Although organic agriculture as a production method is understood to be clear and 
distinct from conventional agriculture, it is generally perceived to be similar or getting 
similar to conventional agriculture, especially among the people I call as idealists. The 
main theme in idealists’ criticism of organic agriculture is the criticism of organic 
agriculture becoming increasingly industrialized and as such becoming a part of the 
hegemonic system taking its place on the side of conventional agriculture in dominating 
small farmers, society and the Nature in general. 
Idealist accounts hold almost always similar arguments around the contested practice 
in organic agriculture such as seed, biodiversity, small farmers and voluntary certification 
and carried out through system critique and hegemony. System is usually referred as 
industrialization, capitalism and/or urbanization. Discussions are always linked to cultural, 
societal or political concerns invoking the common good of small farmers, communities 
and human civilization in general. As such, I interpret these conversations as discussions of 
moral authenticity. Due to common patterns in idealists’ accounts around these topics, I 
claim that the moral authenticity criterion in organic agriculture is consensual and 
fundamentally linked to the system critique. This is different than the ambiguous and 
contested moral authenticity criterion in Islamic banking that I discussed in Section 5.1.2.1. 
above. 
Idealists certainly acknowledge the difference between organic and conventional 
agriculture in terms of the production method. The people I refer to as idealists are not 
questioning whether the chemicals are really excluded in the production process; they know 
that they are. However idealists do not see the chemicals or hormones as the main and the 
only feature of conventional agriculture and as such a distinction based on exclusion of 
chemicals or hormones is never complete. 
According to idealists’ accounts, a defining character of conventional agriculture is its 
industrial character as linked to agribusiness model based on commodification of seed and 
agricultural products and firms doing monoculture production in vast fields. In this respect, 
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idealists perceive organic agriculture as becoming increasingly industrialized and getting 
similar to conventional agriculture. Certified organic farming in these accounts are 
irreconcilable with idealists’ conception of ecological farming. In a workshop called ‘Is 
Another Organic Agriculture Possible’ on May 16th, 2011, Prof. Tayfun Özkaya, 
Agricultural Economics professor at Ege University explains: 
!
   “2–3 sene önce organik tarımda arama toplantısına katılmıştım. Yerel tohumu 
destekleyerek, organik tarımda yerel tohumun kullanılmasının şart olduğunu ve 
tohum kanununun yerel tohumu şiddetle baskıladığını ve satışına yasak 
getirdiğini söyledim. Katılımcılardan bir bürokrat “tohum kanunu ben çıkardım 
bu iyi bir kanun” dedi. Beni bu toplantıda açıktan destekleyen çıkmadı. Çay 
arasında kutlayanlar oldu. Ayrıca organik tarımda üretici pazarlarını önerdim, 
fakat gerek tarım bakanlığından gelenler, gerekse organik tarım ürünleri 
pazarlayıcı şirket yetkilileri üretici pazarlarına karşı çıktılar, sakıncaları 
olduğunu söylediler. Gerçekten ekolojik bir tarım istenmiyor. İstenilen 
“endüstriyel organik tarım “dediğimiz şirket girdilerine dayalı, monokültür 
tarım yapan ve biyoçeşitliliğe dayanmayan, hibrit şirket tohumlarını bile 
kullanan, pazarlamada şirketlerin hâkim olduğu bir tarım sistemi. Bu da işte 
“endüstriyel organik tarım” dediğimiz bir sistem. Toplantıda endüstriyel tarıma 
karşı olunmalı dediğimde gelen cevap “o ayrı organik tarım ayrıdır. İkisi 
birbirine karıştırılmamalıdır” deniyor. “Biz endüstriyel tarıma da karşı 
değiliz” diyorlar. Bu kişiler ve çevreler organik tarıma sadece bir iş gözüyle 
bakıyorlar. Onlar için sadece kâr önemlidir…..Kısacası bu sistem bir 
hegemonya. Bürokratlar bu kadar insan nasıl doyar, endüstriyel tarım olmalı 
diyor. Onların ufkunda sadece azınlık bir grubun organik tarım ürünlerini talep 
etmesi ve Avrupa Birliğine organik ürünlerin ihraç edilmesi var. Bu bizi tatmin 
eden bir vizyon değil. Onlara göre bu sadece bir iş.” (Özkaya, 2012: 73) !
   “2–3 years ago I joined a conference on organic agriculture. I stated that 
local seeds needed to be supported and should be used in organic farming and 
that the seed act puts substantial pressure on local seeds and forbids them from 
being sold. A bureaucrat among the participants said, “I introduced the seed 
act and it is a good one”. Nobody supported me outright in the conference. 
Some congratulated me at tea break. I also recommended farmers’ markets in 
organic agriculture, but both the people from the ministry of agriculture and 
companies marketing organic agriculture products were against this, they said 
it had drawbacks. A real ecological agriculture is not what is wanted. What is 
wanted is an agriculture system based on company input, doing monoculture 
farming and not based on bio-diversity, even using hybrid company seeds and 
with companies ruling the marketing. This is the system we call “industrial 
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organic agriculture”. When I stated that we should be against industrial 
agriculture, the response was, “The two are different things. They should not be 
mixed up.” They also say, “We are not against industrial agriculture either.” 
These people and circles see organic agriculture just as business. For them, it is 
profit that matters… In short, this system is hegemony. Bureaucrats say, how 
will all the population be fed, there should be industrial agriculture. All they see 
is only a small group of people demanding organic agriculture products and the 
export of organic products to the European Union. This is not a vision that 
satisfies us. For them, this is just business.” (Özkaya, 2012: 73) !
Idealists in organic agriculture are mainly opposed to the larger structure of organic 
agriculture that they perceive as similar to industrial character of conventional agriculture 
such as standardization, intermediaries, the infrastructure of distributional channels and the 
role of firms in agriculture. This similarity is criticized because it is perceived to be serving 
to the same ends: the hegemony of the system over nature and people. These accounts are 
almost always elaborated how formal law ignores the rules and models in Nature. One 
respondent puts succinctly: 
!
   “Organik tarım, yani ilk çıktığında endüstriyel tarıma karşı bir hareket olarak 
çıktı. Yani biz endüstriyel tarımın o yeşil devrimin, vesaire getirdiği 
mekanizmanın ve sistemin içinde olmak istemiyoruz, bu sistemden rahatsızız, bu 
sistemin dayattığı gıda biçiminden de rahatsızız diyen bir hareketti. Ama bugün 
gelinen nokta organik tarımda artık endüstriyel tarımdan bir ayrışma noktası 
kalmadı. Yani yapmadığı sadece pestisit kullanmamak. Onun dışında, şöyle bir 
resim kabaca, farkı da yaratan o esasında. Organik mi organik, eyvallah. Peki, 
siz bu organik tarımı neyle, sudan da aldığı bir milyon hektar arazi üzerinde 
arazi gaspı yaptığı, 50 yıllığına bir diktatörden kiraladığı bir milyon hektar 
üzerine, tamamen monokültür olarak üretim yaptığı ürünleri bu organiktir diye 
piyasaya sürse, organik olarak bunu yapsa ne çıkar, yapmasa ne çıkar? Bu fark 
artık organik tarım konseptinin ayrıştırabildiği bir fark değil. !
   “When organic agriculture first came out, it was a movement against 
industrial farming. That is, we were a movement that said we were not content 
with the green revolution etc. of industrial agriculture, we do not want to be in 
the system and mechanisms it brings and the food style this system imposes on 
us. But at the point we have reached today, there is no distinction anymore 
among organic and industrial agriculture. I mean the only thing they don’t do is 
use pesticide. Apart from that, when we look at the general picture, that is 
actually what makes the difference. Is it organic, all right it is. Okay, what are 
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you doing it on? On one million hectares of land that includes water sources, 
obtained by seizing land, leased for 50 years from a dictator, producing 
completely based on monoculture and putting them on the market as organic 
products. What difference does it make if it is organic or not? This difference is 
no longer one that the organic agriculture concept can distinguish.” !
The debates around the hybrid seed provides a revealing example to explicate the 
themes of hegemony and the domination over nature and fellow humans in idealists’ 
accounts. Hybrid seeds refers to seeds that are produced by controlled pollination to 
improve the characteristics of the resulting offspring in terms of yield uniformity, 
predictability and disease resistance. First, pure lines with desired characteristics are 
produced by repeated self-pollination in isolation. Then the established pure lines are cross-
pollinated to achieve the characteristics of all pure lines in the breed. Once those desired 
features are reached in the breed they are called first generations of hybrid seeds, generally 
referred as F1 hybrid seed. This process makes seed production highly technical and 
producing desired traits takes years and technology and money as opposed to seed 
produced by open pollination by insects, birds, wind, or other natural mechanisms. 
Moreover saving seed from the crop for next year is undesirable as the offspring seed from 
F1 crop do not carry the superior qualities of the F1 hybrid. 
Although hybrid seeds have indeed superior qualities over open pollinated seeds in 
terms of yield efficiency, they are criticized by idealists based on various grounds. First, the 
achieved qualities of uniformity and predictability precludes biodiversity that is believed to 
be threatening the human and natural survival. Biodiversity argument is usually elaborated 
how technological intervention in seed production is interfering with the way the Nature 
works in its own way to ensure variability and diversity. Biodiversity is believed to be 
crucial in cases where a natural disasters threatens food supplies. If all the produces have 
the same features as it is the case when the hybrid seeds are used then there is less 
possibility that some produces will survive the disaster. The argument goes, if there is 
biodiversity both between and within crops, then it is more probable that some crops will 
have the necessary traits to survive the disasters like drought or epidemics. 
"221
Second, the technically complex character of the process had left seed production to 
the seed companies. This prevents the farmers from saving and replanting their own seeds 
as they have been doing for thousands of years, making it necessary to purchase seeds 
every season. This argument about commodification of seed is usually elaborated how the 
agribusiness controls and dominates not only food production at the expense of small 
farmers, but also human life and the Nature, by controlling the most fundamental part of the 
life, the seed. 
Apart from the most articulated criticisms around biodiversity and the 
commodification of seed, hybrid seeds also criticized for its adverse effects on culture. The 
people I refer to as idealists usually emphasize how hybrid seeds result in the loss of local 
knowledge and culture that the mankind developed throughout centuries. This argument is 
usually depicted with the traditional ways of collecting seed. The knowledge of collecting 
the best seed is transferred from father to son by generations. Moreover, the seed was saved 
by the oldest and the wisest women in the family and that the seed was the first to be saved 
in a disaster. It was also a tool for solidarity in that the farmers exchanged their seeds when 
needed. With hybrid seed, it is argued, all this knowledge and culture is being lost. 
The debates around local seeds versus hybrid seeds and GMOs; mono-culture 
production versus biodiversity; small farmers versus agribusiness; formal certification 
versus voluntary certification are all discussed from the perspective of hegemony and 
domination that is similar to in hybrid seed example above. 
As such authenticity discussions in organic agriculture differ from the authenticity 
discussions in Islamic banking in two aspects. First, the authenticity discussions in organic 
agriculture revolve around how organic agriculture is becoming a part of the system that is 
associated with agribusiness dominating farmers, people and the nature. In Islamic banking, 
system critique usually do not figure prominently in the accounts of idealists’ evaluations of 
Islamic banking. Idealists in Islamic banking usually focus on whether the products are 
indeed interest-free and whether the Islamic banking fully conforms to Sharia both in form 
and spirit. It seems to be implicitly assumed as if the conformity to Sharia in form and spirit 
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will resolve those ills of the society that idealists in Islamic banking address forcefully in 
different contexts. 
To be sure, the people I refer to as idealists and to a certain extent moral certifiers do 
have a strong criticism regarding secular, modern, capitalist system and the issues of 
exploitation and injustice usually come up in the discussions of why interest was prohibited 
in Sharia. But these discussions in the context of conformity to Islamic law are generally 
briefly touched upon and assumed to be well known and accepted and then quickly evolve 
to the discussions of what is interest and how to avoid it. As such, I claim, the system 
critique is a salient part of moral authenticity judgements in organic agriculture whereas its 
link to moral authenticity is not explicit in the discussions of moral authenticity in Islamic 
banking. This may be also due to the disagreements over criterion on how to evaluate 
contemporary financial products in relation to Islamic law that I explained in Section 
5.1.2.1. above.  
Second, authenticity discussions in organic agriculture and Islamic banking differ in 
the relation between type authenticity and moral authenticity. Moral authenticity usually 
hinges on the exclusion of interest in Islamic banking, while its link with the exclusion of 
chemicals is not salient in organic agriculture. Discussions around the technicalities of 
interest-free nature of products are usually, implicitly or explicitly, linked to the discussions 
about the purposes, aims, intentions, and morals of the products which I interpreted as 
related to moral authenticity. Unlike this entanglement of type and moral authenticity 
judgements in Islamic banking, type and moral authenticity discussions in organic 
agriculture are separate. 
The prevalence of ‘interest-free’ in both type and moral authenticity discussions in 
Islamic banking may be due to the understanding of the ‘interest-free’ as a less of technical 
matter than the moral whereas ‘chemical-free’ is easier to be understood as a technical 
issue. The Quranic prohibition of interest may account for such a value charged meaning of 
interest-free; it is not about preference but belief. Chemical-free, however, seems to be less 
value laden in organic agriculture compared to interest-free in Islamic banking. Indeed, 
organic agriculture, in its inception in the world, was never about chemicals per se, it 
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challenged more wider issues of industrialization and modern production and consumption 
systems. 
!!!
5.2.3. Authentic Organic Agriculture as Being Accord with Nature !!
In idealists’ accounts, organic agriculture is perceived as a ‘resented ally within the 
system’. Idealists celebrate the initial aims and the philosophy of organic agriculture in its 
inception in the world as representing the true spirit of organic agriculture. Moreover, they 
acknowledge its health and environmental benefits through the exclusion of chemicals and 
raising consciousness among public. But in its current status, organic agriculture is 
understood to be far from the ideal and mostly lost to the system. One respondent explained 
organic agriculture in its current form as the solution of the urbanization and as such 
inadequate for the real problems. She states: 
!
   “Bu (organik tarım) bizim eğri düzenimizin dikiş tutmaz çözümü. Tamamen 
şehir düzeninin bir çözümü. Yoksa idealimiz değil, yani organik tarım bizim 
kültürümüzü korumaz. Organik tarım bizim tohumumuzu korumaz; organik 
tarım bizim üreticimizin daha fazla kazanmasını sağlamaz. Organik tarım bir 
ihtimal üreticinin tüketiciye ulaştırabilmesi için gıdasını araçtır.” !
   “This (organic agriculture) is the solution of our crooked order that won’t 
hold. It is the solution of the metropolis order. It is not our ideal; I mean 
organic agriculture will not protect our culture. Organic agriculture will not 
protect our seed; organic agriculture will not help our producers earn more. 
Organic agriculture is perchance a tool for the producer to get its food to the 
consumer.” !
Idealists’ conception of organic agriculture is related to not only ecological but also to 
social, cultural and political concerns and informed by the Nature’s rules and models as 
being accord with Nature explained in Section 3.5.1. 
In idealists’ conception, being accord with Nature is about being able to read, 
understand and respect the Nature. The knowledge regarding the Nature is taught to be 
embedded in indigenous knowledge that is rooted in a specific geographical and cultural 
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setting. Indigenous knowledge regarding the soil, weather, and the seed are understood to 
be dynamic, tacit, and embedded within the agricultural and social practices that stood the 
test of time. As such, indigenous knowledge refers to a comprehensive way of life, not 
confined to food production but the culinary, art, housing and social practices. 
Similar to comments on Islamic law as linked to the cultural heritage of Muslim 
civilization, idealists in organic agriculture links the indigenous knowledge to the cultural 
heritage of communities. The people I refer to as idealists in organic agriculture and Islamic 
banking usually hold that the knowledge regarding human existence and its relation with 
Nature or Divine is encoded in cultural heritage grounded on indigenous/local knowledge 
and Islamic law respectively. According to idealists, industrial agriculture and to a certain 
extent organic agriculture disregard the local knowledge regarding ‘how to live and exits in 
relation to Nature’, because of practices such as reliance on standard, human made hybrid 
seeds and mono culture production stripped from the Nature’s knowledge. 
The loss of indigenous knowledge regarding Nature is usually linked to alienation 
and the rise of consumption culture. In these accounts, small farmers who cannot survive on 
agriculture have to sell their land and go to big cities to work on low wage jobs. Consumers 
are bounded to buy their foods from supermarkets without knowing anything regarding 
how, where and by whom they are produced. In these accounts, what is at stake here is a 
meaningful and sustainable existence. 
Another salient theme in the accounts of idealists’ is related to technology and 
mechanization. Idealists’ seem to have an ambivalent attitude to technology. On the one 
hand, they are aware of rejecting technology is too romantic and on the other hand, they 
resent the way it interferes with local and traditional practices in agriculture. 
!
   “Mekanizasyon traktörden tutun, biçerdöver bile mesela, biçerdöverin 
sisteme girişi sizin ürettiğiniz gıdanın biçimini ya da ürünün biçimini değiştiren 
bir şey…Makine hiçbir zaman tek başına girmiyor. Pamuk bundan on sene 
öncesine kadar elle toplanırdı, şimdi artık pamuk toplama makineleri 
kullanılıyor. Ama onu kullandığınız zaman, belli tür pamuk tohumları ekmeye 
başlıyorsunuz. Çünkü başka türler makine için mümkün olmuyor. Onu 
kullandığınızda, aynı zamanda işte ilaç kullanmanız gerekiyor ki, bütün 
pamuklar aynı anda bloom etsin, tek seferde toplayasın. Normalde çünkü 
"225
pamukta üç el toplanır. Birinci el, ikinci el, üçüncü el vardır. Parça parça, ilk 
elde atıyorum yüzde 50’sini toplarsın mahsulün, ikinci el yüzde 30’u, sonra 
üçüncü el de yüzde 20’si o daha kabadır, bilmem nedir az açmıştır vesaire…
Makine bütün bir o tarımı yapma pratiğini kökten değiştiriyor. Karbon 
inanılmaz artırıyor, çok daha fazla petrol giderlerini, dolayısıyla yüksek girdili, 
yüksek outputlu bir tarım sistemine geçiyorsunuz. Böyle bir sistemde de küçük 
çiftçi mesela yaşayamıyor. Ama mesela küçük çiftçi böyle çeşitliliğin, tarımsal, 
bitkisel üretimdeki çeşitliliğin de koruyucusu diye düşünürseniz eğer, o 
perspektiften bakıyor olursanız, yani ben gıdanın korunması için, o gıdayı 
üretenlerin de korunmasına inanıyorum; korunması gerektiğine, var olması 
gerektiğine inanıyorum ve onu üretenler de temelde küçük çiftçilerdir diye bir 
siyasi, politik ekonomik bir duruşum varsa, o zaman onları bertaraf eden 
mekanizmaları da karşı oluyoruz. O mekanizmaları hem makinenin girdiği, hem 
işte diğer monokültür pratiklerinin girdiği bir mekanizma.” !
   “Mechanization is from tractors to harvesters, even a harvester for instance, 
when it enters your system, it changes the form of the food or product you 
produce… Machines never come alone. Cotton used to be picked by hand up 
until ten years ago. Now cotton-picking machines are used. But when you use 
that machine, you start planting a certain kind of cottonseed, because other 
types do not fit the machine. Again, when you use the machine, you also need to 
use agricultural inputs in order to make all the cotton bloom at the same time 
and be picked at the same time. Normally, cotton is picked in three rounds. First 
round, second round, third round. Part by part, in the first round let’s say 50 
percent of the cotton is picked, in the second 30 percent and in the third the 
remaining 20 percent which is more rough, I don’t know, less bloomed, etc.… 
The machine changes the application of farming from its roots. Carbon 
increases heavily, the petrol costs, so you turn to an agriculture system with 
high input and high output. And in such a system the small farmer, for instance, 
cannot survive. When you think that the small farmer is the protector of this 
kind of variety, agricultural, plant diversity, when you look at it from this 
perspective, I mean, I believe in protecting the producers for the protection of 
food; I believe they should be protected and they should exist and if I have a 
political, economic stance because the ones who produce these are basically 
small farmers, then we are against the mechanisms that try to eliminate them. 
These mechanisms are the ones where machinery is introduced and the other 
monoculture applications are involved.” !
Another contested topic in the accounts of idealists is standardization and formal 
certification. It is deemed problematic because of two reasons. First formal certification is 
too complicated, expensive and time consuming for small farmers, and second it creates 
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new intermediaries that contradicts the imagined conceptualization of agriculture based on 
direct producer-consumer relations. 
!
   “Regülasyonları, düzenlemeleri, sertifikasyon sistemi, onun işte kontrol 
mekanizmaları vesaire. Çok ciddi bir bürokrasi yaratıyor. Teknik bilgi 
manzumesi yaratıyor. Onun da altından kalkmak hem özellikle küçük üreticileri 
için kolay olmuyor. İkincisi de, araya yeni ara mekanizmalar, ara kurumlar 
ekliyor. Bu da belli bir grup ekolojisi, ekolojik tarım yapmak isteyen kesimin 
rahatsız olduğu, tercih etmediği bir şey.” !
   “Its regulations, arrangements, certification system, control mechanisms etc. 
This creates a serious bureaucracy. It creates a mountain of technical 
information. Tackling these is especially hard for small producers. Secondly, 
new intermediary mechanisms, intermediary establishments are added. This is 
something that makes a certain group of people who would like to do ecologic 
agriculture uneasy, something they don’t prefer.” !
The political stance in these accounts seems to directly linked to exclusion of small 
farmers from the system. From highly bureaucratic and standardized process of organic 
agriculture to technology and mechanization in agriculture all threaten the very existence of 
small farmers. When small farmers are eliminated, large commercial firms will lead the 
agriculture that is deemed detrimental for environment, culture and society. 
!!!
5.2.4. Authenticity Debates among Idealists, Moral Certifiers and Certified Producers !!
Idealists’ criticisms of organic agriculture is well known among moral certifiers and 
large certified producers. Although idealists’ some criticisms related to agribusiness model, 
and mono-culture production are shared among moral certifiers, moral certifiers and large 
certified organic producers usually deem idealists’ criticisms either irrelevant or unrealistic 
for organic agriculture. 
The main difference between the idealists’ accounts and moral certifiers accounts’ 
comes down to how they approach to system. Although both sets of actors imagine an 
alternative to conventional agriculture and that imagined alternatives are usually similar in 
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most aspects, idealists and moral certifiers differ in their understanding about how to reach 
that alternative. Moral certifiers emphasize the necessity of understanding and 
accommodating the concerns of larger stakeholders and collaborating with those 
stakeholders to raise consciousness for a better system. Basically moral certifiers believe 
that they need the system to change the system, while idealists thinks that the system is too 
rouge to be worked with. 
Moral certifiers sometimes suggest that their approach to system is about who they 
are. Some moral certifiers claim that non-confrontational and inclusionary approach to the 
system is the reflection of how they view life and Nature. A confrontational approach 
would be contradictory to their understanding of harmonious and holistic existence. One 
respondent says: 
!
   “Biz karşıtlıktan beslenmeyiz, biz karşı durmayız. Biz bayrak açmayız, biz 
yumurta atmayız, biz savaşmayız. Biz barış, uzlaşma ve alternatifini koymaktan 
yanayız. Sonuna kadar ikna, sonuna kadar uzlaşma ve alternatifini koyarak 
gösterme….Yani karşıtlıktan bu sefer varlığını bazı insanlar varlığı ona 
(karşıtlığa) dayanıyor. Varoluşu bir şeye karşı olmak, yani karşısını yok 
edersen, sen nesin? … Ben akort etmeye çalışıyorum; kavga etmeye 
çalışmıyorum.” !
   “We do not feed off of rivalry, we do not stand off. We do not unfurl flags, we 
do not throw eggs, we do not fight. We are for peace, reconciliation and putting 
down an alternative. Convincing to the end, reconciliation to the end, 
demonstrating by putting down an alternative… I mean, there are some people 
who base their existence on rivalry. Their existence depends on being against 
something. What if I disperse with that thing, what are you then? … I try to 
accord; I do not try to fight.” !
Another respondent who is opposed to certified organic agriculture explained the 
difference between certified organic agriculture and his vision of agriculture based on local 
seed and social certification as the difference between Non-Governmental Organizations 
(Sivil Toplum Kuruluşu) and Democratic Mass Organizations (Demokratik Kitle Örgütü). 
He claims the first is interested in the problems in the system and suggests solutions for 
those problems whereas the second imagines an alternative system. He states: 
!
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   “Ben Karaot Tohum Derneğinin demokratik kitle örgütü olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. Yani var olan sistemi kabul etmeyerek, yeni bir sistemi tarif 
etmesi gerekiyor. Yani bir şeyden bağımsız olmak. Hani dedik ya, eskiden yerli 
tohum üretimi vardı, şimdi yok. Demokratik kitle örgütleri der ki, bu sistemde 
problem var, şöyle bir sistem denemek gerekir, demokratik kitle örgütü bu. Sivil 
toplum kuruluşları ise, bu sistem böyle işliyor, ama içinde şunlarda problemler 
var, bunları düzeltmek gerekir der.” !
   “I believe that Karaot Tohum Association is a Democratic Mass 
Organization. That is to say, not accepting the existing system, it needs to 
describe a new system. I mean, independent of anything. Like we said, there 
used to be local seed production, now there is not. Democratic Mass 
Organizations say, there is a problem with this system, we need to try this other 
system, this is what a Democratic Mass Organization does. On the other hand, 
non-governmental organizations say, this system works like this, but it has these 
problems, they need to be fixed.” !
The difference among the idealists, moral certifiers, and large certified producers 
regarding the system usually figure out in the discussions of contested practices. For 
example, moral certifiers generally regard idealists’ criticisms on greenhouse production as 
irrelevant to organic agriculture. Greenhouse production in organic agriculture is 
interpreted from the perspective of supply and demand among moral certifiers and certainly 
by large organic producers. Moral certifiers usually acknowledge that greenhouse 
production is not ideal but if the consumers demand to access foods at all seasons then it is 
not only organic agriculture to blame. When talking about organic agriculture and 
greenhouses one respondents says: 
!
   “Mesela bize şunu diyorlar, canım organik pazara da gittik, kışın sera 
domatesi vardı, bu nasıl organik? Yani şimdi orada o zaman ben ona şunu 
diyorum. Siz istediğiniz sürece o olacak. Organik pazarda serada organik 
domates var ve evet serada organik olarak domates üretilebiliyor. Ama sağlıklı 
mı, hayır değil. Neden, çünkü mevsiminde yetişmiş bir şey değil, bu nedenle 
değil. Dolayısıyla, ama alıcısı da var, alıyorlar yani, adam da üretiyor. 
Dolayısıyla, belli bir noktadan sonra iş tamamen ekonomik döngü meselesi 
aslında. Yani bir şeyin alıcısı varsa, o işin üreticisi muhakkak var. O kısmını 
kontrol edemeyiz. O kısmını kontrol etmeye hakkımız da yok. Çünkü o adamın 
da ekmek parası neticede. O da onu üretiyor ve sertifikasını da alıyor, 
kontrollerden de geçiyor, onun gereğini de yerine getiriyor. Organik Sertifika 
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Yönetmeliğinin gereklerini yerine getirmiş. Yani kimyasal kullanmıyor, sonra 
ilaçlı tohum kullanmıyor, şunu kullanmıyor, bunu kullanmıyor. Ama sonuçta o 
domatesi tüketecek olan kişinin kışın domates yemesinin doğru bir şey 
olmadığını biliyor olması gerekir. O artık o noktadan sonra organik tarımın 
derdi değil, beslenme biliminin derdi. Biz mesela bunu her zaman söyleriz. 
Mevsiminde beslenin, mevsiminde yiyin, hatta işte sebzeleri meyveleri mevsim 
tabloları, çünkü bu bilgi de unutuldu. Artık hangi mevsimde hangi meyve, hangi 
sebze yetişiyor bilmiyoruz, bilmiyorlar. Bu bilgiyi her zaman yayarız ve pazarda 
da söyleriz. Pazardaki, ekolojik pazardaki standlarda bunlar söyleniyor tabii 
ki.” !
   “For example they say to us, we went to the organic marketplace, there were 
greenhouse tomatoes in the winter, what kind of an organic is this? In response 
I say to them, as long as you demand it, it will be there. There are organic 
greenhouse tomatoes in the organic market and yes it is possible to grow 
tomatoes in greenhouses organically. But is it healthy? No, it is not. Why? 
Because it was not grown in its season, that’s why. However, people buy it, they 
do, so others grow it. Therefore, after a certain point, it is only a matter of 
economic cycle. I mean, if somebody is buying, somebody will be making it. We 
cannot control that part and we don’t have a right to control it. Because, in the 
end, it is that person’s source of income. So he grows it and certifies it, gets it 
through controls and meets all the requirements. He meets the requirements of 
the Organic Certificate Regulations. That is, he doesn’t use chemicals, 
pesticides, this, that… But in the end, the consumer needs to know that it is not 
right to consume tomatoes in winter. From that point on, it is not the problem of 
organic farming but of nutrition. This is what we always say. Eat according to 
season, know in charts when to eat what fruits and vegetables, for this has also 
been forgotten. We no longer know which fruits and vegetables grow in which 
season, nobody does. We always try to spread this information and in the 
marketplace too. We tell it at the marketplace, the stands at the ecological 
marketplace all the time.” !
Her account in greenhouses is the example of how questionable practices such as 
hybrid seeds and monoculture production are understood by moral certifiers in organic 
agriculture. Moral certifiers’ accounts on the questionable practices usually explain why the 
current practice is at it is and why it cannot accommodate more idealistic views. Moral 
certifiers acknowledge the questionable aspects of these practices, usually raised most 
vocally by idealists. Moreover their accounts on why these practices are considered to be 
problematic is very similar to those of idealists’. Basically both moral certifiers and 
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idealists regard those practices as not reflecting the true spirit of the industry. And both 
resent this. But moral certifiers tend to see these problems as not necessarily could or 
should be tackled within the scope of the industry. Part of the responsibility is put outside 
the industry; the people, the system, the state all share some of the blame regarding the 
prevalence of questionable practices and before they all change these practices are there to 
exist. 
Idealists, however, treat those questionable practices as in the heart of the industry. 
They may acknowledge the problems with the outside world; the people, the system, the 
state, they may all figure in their accounts as flawed. However they see these questionable 
practices within the responsibility, ability and impact area of the industry. Only through 
proper application of these practices that conforms to the spirit and the aim of the industry, 
the people, the system and the state can be transformed. They tend to refuse to believe in 
the claims that social, political or economic conditions are holding these industries back 
from reaching their true self. Instead, certified producers and moral certifiers are 
understood to be as not committed enough to realizing the true image of these industries. 
They are especially critical of moral certifiers’ endorsement of these industries. According 
to idealists, moral certifiers should have known better and they are believed to know better 
but sell out those ideals for the sake of viability of the industry and even sometimes for 
personal social and economic gains. 
For some large certified producers, organic agriculture is strictly understood to be 
related to exclusion of chemicals as defined in law and regulations and it must be 
communicated and evaluated based on that concrete criterion. The idealist criticisms on 
seed, biodiversity, small farmers and voluntary certification are deemed irrelevant outright 
in these accounts. One large organic producer refer to references to small family farmers; 
romanticized references to taste and smell of organically produced food and community 
supported agriculture as ‘adornments’ of the business. To be sure, he acknowledges the 
principles of fair production but his references are about child labour and under-wage 
schemes that he states should be avoided by every business anyway. He does not carry the 
cultural, social and political concerns of idealists’ on hybrid seeds, technology, and 
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greenhouse production and as such he does not see any contradiction between those 
practices and organic agriculture. While talking about greenhouse production and hybrid 
seeds he states: 
!
   “Yani iklim koşulları el vermiyorsa, biz domates yetiştirmeyelim mi?…ben 
üreteyim de sen yeme. Ben bir şey yapmıyorum ki, ben onun içine kimyasal, 
sentetik, bilmem ne falan bir şey koymuyorum ki, ben sadece yani klimatolojik 
etkiyi aklımla daha verimli hale getiriyorum, ayıp mı ediyoruz yani? Haziranda 
değil de, aralıkta domates yediriyorsak organik ayıp mı ediyoruz?…Osmanlı 
çileği vardır, koku verir. Böyle küçücük reçel yapılır, şimdi bitti o. Çok az 
çıkıyor, şimdi ondan Portekiz’deki bir cins çileğin tohumundan tamamıyla GDO 
falan değil yani, tamamıyla aşılanma yöntemiyle hani hibrit denilmiş, yani 
melezlendirilmiş bir tohum cinsi. Fevkalade güzel bir çilek çıkıyor mesela bu 
konuyla ilgili, hem dayanıklı, hem lezzetli. Şimdi bunun ne yanlışı var? Bunda 
yanlış olan bir şey yok ki. Yani ben baştan da söyledim. Ben diyorum ki, bunlar 
yönetmeliklere uygun olmak kayıt ve şartıyla biz teknolojiyi inkâr etmiyoruz 
yani, biz çarık giymiyoruz, illa çarık giyelim diye bir şey yok yani.” !
   “I mean, if the climate conditions are not right, are we not to grow tomatoes?
… Let me grow them, don’t eat it if you don’t want to. I do not do anything, I 
don’t put chemicals, synthetics, any of that sort into it, I am being smart and 
only make climatology effect more efficient, where is the shame in that?… We 
have the Ottoman strawberry, it gives out a scent. Jam is made out of it, now its 
gone. There is very little grown. Now we grow strawberry cross-pollinated with 
this type and a type from Portugal, there is no GMO involved, completely with 
the hybrid method, that’s what they call it. I mean an exceptional strawberry 
comes out of this; it is both enduring and tasty. Now, where’s the wrong in that? 
There is nothing wrong with it. I have told this before, I say we don’t deny 
technology as long as it abides by the regulations, we don’t wear çarıks 
(rawhide sandals, mainly used by traditional villagers) anymore, there’s 
nothing to say that we should wear çarık.” !
Some idealists’ criticisms are deemed unrealistic. For example, insisting on local seed 
is not workable for every situation as it may not be possible to find the required volume. 
Unlike, idealists, moral certifiers and large certified producers celebrate the technology too. 
Technology is deemed necessary to help tired and worn-out earth. 
However idealists’ understanding of organic agriculture is much more encompassing 
including social, cultural and political concerns. Following quote is a typical Idealists’ view 
comparing organic agriculture with their imagined agricultural model. 
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   “Organik tarım kuralları, Kibele'nin amaç edindiği ilkeler açısından yeterli 
değildir. Bu kurallar; biyolojik çeşitliliğin korunması, adil ticaret, hayvan refahı 
gibi konuları içermemektedir. Doğal, doğa dostu tarım yöntemleri 
tanımlanmadığı gibi, yer yer organik tarımın kurallarına uygun 
bulunmamaktadır. Özellikle hayvancılıkta bunun örneklerini görmekteyiz. 
Dünyada ve Türkiye'de organik tarım giderek endüstriyelleşmekte, piyasa 
kurallarına göre üretim yapan, para kazanmaktan başka düşüncesi olmayan 
şirketler organik tarımı karlı bir yatırım alanı olarak görerek sertifika 
almaktadırlar. Amaç bu olunca, hedef “müşteriler” de üst gelir grupları olarak 
belirlenmekte, organik ürünler “lüks tüketim malları” haline getirilmektedir. 
Organik tarım bir görüş açısı, bir yaşam biçimi olmaktan uzaklaşmış, bir 
“sektör” haline getirilmiştir. Tüm bu olumsuz gelişmeler nedeniyle “organik” 
kelimesini kullanmaktan kaçınıyor, kendimizi “ekolojik üretim yapan çiftçiler” 
olarak tanımlıyoruz.” (Ertürk, 2012: 66-67) !
   “The rules of organic agriculture are not sufficient in view of the principles 
adopted by Kibele. These rules comprise topics like the conservation of 
biological diversity, fair trade, the well being of animals. Natural, nature 
friendly farming methods are not defined and not only that, from time to time 
the rules of organic agriculture are not found appropriate. We see examples of 
this especially in stockbreeding. Organic agriculture is starting to industrialize 
more and more in Turkey and the world. Companies, which produce according 
to the rules of the market and who think nothing but profits, see a profitable 
field of investment and get certificates. When the goal is to make profit, targeted 
“clientele” are specified as high-income groups, organic products are turned 
into “luxury consumer products”. Organic agriculture has been distanced from 
being a perspective, a way of life and has been turned into a “sector”. In the 
face of all these negative developments, we avoid using the word “organic” and 
define ourselves as “farmers who produce ecologically”. (Ertürk, 2012: 66-67) !!!
5.3. Discussion and Contributions ! !!
In this chapter, based on data, I argued that conversations among moral certifiers and 
idealists are mainly about authenticity in both Islamic banking and organic agriculture. 
These discussions had two aspects and were carried out in relation to Islamic law or rules 
and models in nature: authenticity evaluations of specific practices and discussions and the 
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criterions to be used on those evaluations. Certified producers were also involved in these 
discussions around authenticity evaluations mostly to defend themselves against idealists’ 
criticisms. Based on archival data and my informants’ accounts, I argue that the authenticity 
debates in both industries are about alignment to an ideal that is informed by Islamic law in 
case of Islamic banking and rules and models in Nature in case of organic agriculture. 
Authenticity discussions in relation to sacralized forms and purposes that I observe in 
this study is different than the recent studies in ecological research and social movements 
perspective that link authenticity claims of nascent producers to the signals of distinction 
and separation from inauthentic other, usually the incumbent producers (e.g. Baron, 2004; 
Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Weber et al., 2008; Carroll and Wheaton, 2009; Negro et 
al., 2011; Kovács, et al., 2013; McKendrick and Hannan, 2014). 
My findings on authenticity bring a fresh look at to the concept of authenticity in the 
studies of new organizational forms and categorizations. Authenticity may have a larger 
role than a mere strategic tool used for separation as generally assumed in categorization 
studies. It may be at the center of form/categorization emergence as part of collective 
construction of meaning discussed in relation to not only the inauthentic ‘other’ but maybe 
more so in relation to an ‘ideal’. 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 depict authenticity as studied in literature on new organizational 
forms  and authenticity as observed in this dissertation respectively.	

!
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Figure 5.1	

Authenticity in literature on new organizational forms 
!!
Figure 5.2	

Authenticity observed in this dissertation	
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6.  !!
6. CONCLUSION !!!!
In this dissertation, I set out to examine events and debates within and around Islamic 
banking and organic agriculture in Turkey throughout their history spanning three decades 
to understand how the concepts of Islamic banking and organic agriculture were 
conceptualized, codified and discussed. 
I have shown that in both industries the question of ‘alignment’ to an ‘ideal’, the ideal 
being informed by the alternative codes of, Islamic law in the case of Islamic banking, and 
nature’s rules and models in the case of organic agriculture was persistent in the main 
debates. In these industries, alignment to an ideal was discussed in terms of both ‘form’ - 
implementation as informed by ‘the other law’ and as codified in formal law - and ‘spirit’ - 
conforming to purposes and morals behind the ‘form’ informed by ‘the other law’. As such, 
in these industries, form definition was not only about identifying the technical features, 
processes and product specifications but explicitly bringing the moral into the realm of 
concrete organizational practices. 
I have shown and argued that debates around alignment in form and spirit in both 
industries reflect divergent positions of different sets of actors as well as concerns over 
authenticity. Even though the actors were drawing values, norms and beliefs from the same 
source, ‘the other law’ as the foundation of the focal industry, they differed in their 
understanding of the ‘the other law’ and how to make it alive through formal law and 
practices. As such, this study highlights the importance of deeper historical examinations 
focusing on communications and agency in the studies of form creation and development to 
better understand the diversity among and within sets of actors involved in these ventures. 
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Examining the discussions around ‘realness or genuineness’ of two industries with 
specific moral foundations and claims, this study highlights the utility of studying the 
concept of authenticity beyond cultural fields. In both industries with explicit moral 
foundations and claims, authenticity contestation is in tandem with discussions of legal 
codifications and stays a persistent concern with each new product or service that is 
introduced. As such, the signals and outcomes of perception of authenticity are notable not 
only in the symbolic domain as generally suggested with social status and identity claims or 
in the material domain as generally suggested in organizational features such as ownership 
and process but also in legal domain as in the formal codification of the features of each 
product and service. 
One counter argument against these findings regarding the plurality in meaning in 
Islamic banking and organic agriculture may be that their lifespan of three decades is not 
long enough to converge on a common understanding as expected by extant literature. In 
Islamic banking, sectoral strategic plans involving the state foresee an industry-wide 
standardization process which may indeed encourage to settle on common meanings and 
practices. However, in both industries there are also initiatives which may widen the gap 
between the two accounts of Islamic banking and also of organic agriculture. Idealists in 
organic agriculture are organizing meetings to discuss whether another organic agriculture 
is possible. They are experimenting with voluntary certification systems instead of formal 
organic certification, developing models of community supported agriculture, and opening 
up new types of farmers’ markets emphasizing locality and traditional farming different 
than organic farmers’ markets that are exclusively for certified organic produces. Idealists 
in Islamic banking establish research centers on Islamic economics, and provide Islamic 
economics and banking seminars to convey their understanding of Islamic banking. So, in 
both industries, segregating and blending processes are coexisting which may sustain the 
dual understandings of each industry. 
By explicating key actors and their divergent arguments around the legal codification 
and moral assessment of the focal industry, I have provided a foundation for more extensive 
investigations of heterogeneity among actors. I find that authenticity assessments of the 
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claims and practices as conforming to a conceived ideal were the main concern in many 
debates from formal codification to legal framework and from names to the scope and the 
content of products and services. This points to the value of giving more attention to the 
ideals, moral claims and their assessments in the studies of organizational forms or 
practices. Based on my data, I believe the nature of the ideal for the venture may be 
important in spurring authenticity discussions. The sources of ideal and its historical and 
conceptual relation to the venture could influence the saliency and content of authenticity 
discussions. Based on my findings I would propose that the more law-like the ideal for the 
venture, the more likely it is that authenticity related discussions may emerge among actors. 
Similarly, my findings lead me to propose ventures with moral claims -such as social 
impact entrepreneurship and social responsibility projects- may foster roles parallel to those 
roles of idealists and moral certifiers.  
One direction to go further would be to assess whether these propositions hold in 
other morally grounded industries. Assuming an explicit moral claim eventually may 
require a substantiation of that claim, it is probable to observe actors playing similar roles 
to the moral certifiers described in this study. A close examination of actors playing moral 
certifier roles would also shed light on the heterogeneity among them. An attention to these 
actors would clarify whether similar roles to those of idealists exist or whether they emerge 
under specific conditions. I expect when the moral claim is based on an explicit ideal 
model, this may eventually create fragmentation among moral certifiers or other actors 
regarding the nature, source, and the relation of that model to the phenomenon at hand. 
Another direction could be conducting specific case studies to have a deeper 
understanding of ideas put forward in this dissertation. For example, assuming authenticity 
is also a concern in ‘halal sector’ including halal food, travel, fashion and health, how do 
authenticity dynamics play out in those sectors compared to Islamic banking? Given 
ventures in food, travel and fashion have more observable and less contested qualities 
compared to Islamic banking, the type authenticity assessments in these sectors may be 
easier to agree on. The health sector, however may be more contested when considering the 
new practices technology brings in to this domain. The practices of artificial fertilization, 
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plastic surgery either for health reasons or for aesthetic concerns, organ transplantation and 
pharmaceuticals may require their status to be assessed in Islamic law both in terms of form 
and spirit which may lead similar conversations to those I observe in Islamic banking. This 
kind of case studies would help further elaborate the content of authenticity and its 
influence in shaping organizational forms and practices. 
Another direction would be conducting additional comparative case studies between 
other ‘ecological’ and ‘Islamic’ ventures to see if the similarities and differences that I find 
between organic agriculture and Islamic banking in this study are also found there. For 
example do ecotourism, eco friendly textile or cosmetics in relation to halal tourism, halal 
fashion or cosmetics carry similar dynamics described in this dissertation? To what extent, 
the oppositional stance against incumbent practices and system is salient in these 
industries? Assuming there is a salient stance against conventional systems which is very 
likely, how the system criticism is elaborated? Are there similar references to ‘being accord 
with Nature’ and ‘being accord with Creation, fıtrat’ in relation to the system? How are 
their contents similar to or different from those described in this dissertation? This kind of 
studies would help further our understanding of ‘anti-system’ industries in relation to 
incumbent models; ‘How are alternative anti-system/anti-capitalist models are 
conceptualized and enacted within capitalist order?” 
Studies at the organizational level in Islamic sector could reveal more varied accounts 
of  authenticity and the sources of contestation among the audience. For example, what 
does it mean if a company is producing halal food or fashion but not qualifying for Islamic 
financial market index (meaning that its debt levels, and interest income and expenses did 
not meet Sharia compliance) so its stocks cannot be invested in Islamic financial markets? 
What does it mean to be qualified as Islamic in one dimension (e.g. product) and not in 
other dimension (e.g. its financial dealings) in terms of authenticity assessments? How 
sharia compliance in respect to different aspects of a company (its production, finances 
etc.) are related or separated? 
And lastly, investigating cases where there are two sources of ‘ideal’ blended and 
inform practices could reveal new insights regarding ideal-practice relation. For example 
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how is Islamic environmentalism similar to or different from mainstream 
environmentalism? How does religion play out in the accounts of environmentalism? In his 
book examining environmental trends in Turkey Ignatow (2007) suggests that Islamic 
environmentalism view Islam as the authentic source of environmental consciousness and 
discredit science, secularism and modernism. How is this reflected in the practices of firms 
and/or NGOs associated with Islamic environmentalism? How are they similar to or 
different form environmental practices of secular firms or NGOs? All these suggestions 
would further our understanding of morality, authenticity and their relation to 
organizational forms and practices. 
!
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APPENDIX 2 Summary of Newspaper Articles related to Islamic Banking in 1989 !
1989 YILI OLAY: Kuveyt Türk 31.03.1989’da faaliyete geçti.(21.09.1988’de faaliyet izni 
aldı) 
HÜKÜMET: 46. Hükümet: 21 Aralık 1987 - 9 Kasım 1989; ANAP, Başbakan Turgut 
Özal ; 47. Hükümet: 19 Kasım 1989 - 23 Haziran 1991; ANAP, Başbakan Yıldırım Akbulut !
1989 ZAMAN (1988;19 haber -> 1989; 36 haber) 
Zaman gazetesinde 1989 yılı haberleri iki başlık altında toplanabilir: (1) varolan 3 
ÖFK ile ilgili şube açılışı, kar miktarları vb vesilerle çıkan haberler ve , (2) İslami 
bankacılığın çeşitli yönlerden tartışıldığı haberler. 
İlk gruptaki haberlerde öne çıkan kişiler ÖFK temsilcileri. ÖFK yetkilileri 
kurumlarını teknik/ekonomik odaklı anlatmış, faizsiz işlem yaptıklarını belirtmekle birlikte 
İslami özelliği vurgulamamışlar. Spesifik olarak bu haberlerde yetkililer; ne kadar tasarruf 
toplanmış, ne kadar kar payı dağıtılmış belirtmiş, kurumlarının faaliyet alanlarını (kar-zarar 
ortaklığı; satış işlemleri; leasing), hedef kitlelerini (faizden kaçan müslümanlar), ve 
amaçlarını (ticari ilişkiler ve ekonomik gelişme) açıklamış. Bankalara ve kanuna referans 
var (bankalar kadar kazandırıyoruz; bankaların verdiği hizmetleri veriyoruz; ve Türkiye 
İslam Bankacılığının kanunlastığı ender ülkelerden biri) ve yeni ÖFK'ların kurulmasının 
olumlu olduğu düşünülüyor. Sadece bir kere, Al Baraka Türk Genel Müdürü Yalçın Öner’in 
(Niçin yatırım yapmıyorsunuz sorusu üzerine) "Biz yatırım yapmaktan bir nevi 
çekiniyoruz. Basın bizi doğru şekilde lanse etmiyor. Üzerimizde baskı var. Al Baraka değil, 
Al Amerika olsaydık bu baskı olmazdı” ifadesine benzer ifade var. Formun ve ilk 
orneklerinin Arap/Körfez menşeeli olmasının problemlerini ÖFKlardan çok sık 
duymuyoruz, ama 1999'da ÖFKları kapatma girişimi sırasında ‘origin’ meselesine daha 
farklı şekilde vurgu var. Örneğin: Ekrem Pakdemirli’nin modelin Araplardan değil 
İngiltere’den alındığına dair demeci. Özal’ın bu işi Amerika’da iken öğrendiği gibi. 
İkinci grupta akademisyenlerin ve fıkıh uzmanlarının İslami bankacılık nedir, 
İslam’da bankacılık olabilir mi, bu bankalar gerçekten İslami mi/faizsiz mi, amaçları nedir/
ne olmali konularındaki görüşlerinin yer aldığı haberler var. İlk gruptaki haberlerin aksine 
bu bankaların tarifleri ve amaçları sadece ekonomik değil toplumsal ve İslami yönüyle de 
ele alınmış. Bu bankaların tariflerinde ve amaçlarında spesifik olarak Batı’ya, kapitalizme 
karşı duruş ve İslamileşme ve müslümanların varlığını gösterme vurguları var. İlk gruptaki 
haberlere benzer biçimde hedef kitle müslümanlar ve İslam alemi. Amaç sadece ekonomik 
gelişme değil, faizin iktisadi ilişkilerden silinmesi ve buna bağlı olarak İslam toplumlarının 
refahı gibi daha geniş tanımlanmış. İslami bankaların teknik olarak kar-emek ortaklığı olup 
Batıdaki risk sermayesinden (venture capital) farklı olmadığı söylenmiş. Fıkıh köşesindeki 
okuyucu mektuplarına cevaben yazılan görüşlerden bu bankaların İslami karakterlerinin 
okuyucular tarafından farklı yönlerden sorgulandığını anlıyoruz. İslami yönden 
sorgulamanın dayanakları: kar payı ve faiz oranlarının benzer olması; murabaha (vadeli 
satış) işlemlerinin ağırlıklı olup kredi kullanıcısı açısından bankalarla benzer sonuçlar 
doğurması; bu kurumlara para yatıranların aslında hep kar beklentisi içinde olması; 
fakirliğin olduğu bir ülkede bu kuruluşlarda para biriktirmenin caizliği. Cevaplarda 
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ÖFK’lar savunulmuş, müslümanların kullanacağı başka alternatif olmadığından 
desteklenmeleri gerektiği söylenmiş, ve bu kurumların içinde bulunduğu ikili durumlardan 
bahsedilmiş. Spesifik olarak: hem İslami kurallara hem de devletin kanunlarına uygunluk; 
hem İslami yönden hem iktisadi yönden müşterilerini tatmin; iktisadi düzenle, insanların 
dünya görüşlerinin uyumsuzluğu. 
İki haberde Korkut Özal’ın ÖFK’ların kuruluşundaki rolü ve ilişkisi üzerine 
konuşulmuş; Korkut Özal bu kuruluşların Türkiye’de kurulması için tabiki çaba 
gösterdiğini söylemiş, Faisal’a ortak olduğunu reddetmiş. Faisal’a ortak olması neden sorun 
ediliyor Zaman gazetesinde açık açık söylenmiyor, zaten Zaman gazetesinde böyle bir 
suçlama yapılmıyor. Milliyet’teki diğer yıllardaki haberlerde Korkut Özal’ın Faisal'a 
ortaklığı irtica üzerinden ve Korkut Özal’ın iş bağlantıları ile ilgili olarak eleştirilmiş. 
Milliyet gazetesinde 1989 yılındaki nerdeyse tüm haberlerin konu ettiği yeni vergi 
tasarısının ÖFKlari kayırmak için olduğuna dair görüşlerse, iki haberde, iki köşe yazarı 
tarafından bankaların ve TÜSİAD’ın hedef saptırarak İslam’a saldırması olarak nitelenmiş. 
Sadece 1 haberde köşe yazarı, bu kurumların gelişmesi için devletin çeşitli destekleri 
olabileceğini vurgulamış (Devlet finans kurumlarına ortak olabilir; resmi dairelerin 
mevduatları bu kurumlarda tutulabilir; ssk ve emekli sandığı paraları buralarda 
değerlendirilebilir; finans kurumları halka arz edilebilir; devlet İslami karakterde banka 
yani finans kurumu kurabilir.) ÖFK yetkilierinin demeçlerinde devlet desteği/devletten 
talepleri yok. Bu durum Zaman gazetesindeki 1996 yılındaki haberlerde tüm ÖFK 
yetkililerinin devlet desteği beklentilerini ifade etmelerinden ve hangi konularda destek 
beklediklerinden farklı. 
Zaman gazetesinde hemen her yıl dünyadaki (hem batıda, hem İslam aleminde) 
İslami bankacılık uygulamalarından haberler var. 1989'da Malezya’da ‘para ile para satın 
almayan, para karşılığı para satmayan’ İslami bankaların üstüne bir de Hacı Fonu kurduğu 
ve müslümanları hacca gönderdiği yazıyor. !
1989 MİLLİYET (1988; 9 haber -> 1989; 9 haber) 
Milliyet’te 1989 yılında çıkan haberlerin çoğu yeni vergi tasarısının devlet tarafından 
ÖFK’ları desteklemek için çıkarıldığına dair tartışmaların olduğu haberler. Yeni vergi 
tasarısında, kredi faizlerinin gider olarak gösterilmesini engelleyen madde, TÜSİAD 
tarafından ÖFK’ların lehine haksız rekabet yaratacağı gerekçesiyle eleştiriliyor. Vergi 
tasarısındaki bu maddenin duyurulduğu haberlerde, bu vesileyle; ÖFKlar vergi ödemiyor; 
ÖFKlardan kar payı alanlar vergi ödemiyor (Not: 1989 yılında bankalardan faiz alanlar da 
vergi ödemiyor) ve spesifik olarak Albaraka Türk sermayesine oranla %40 kar etmesine 
rağmen vergi ödemiyor türünden eleştiriler var. TÜSİAD’ın, bu tasarının haksız rekabete 
yol açacağına dair görüşüne, Hazine müsteşarlığı ‘zaten ÖFK’ları bankacılık kanununa alıp 
banka-ÖFK ayırımını kaldırmalı’ diye cevap vermiş. Bu konuda çalışma başlattıklarını ve 
yıl sonuna tamamlanacağını da eklemiş (ÖFK’ların kanuna girmeleri ise tam 10 yıl sonra, 
1999’da olacak). Yine bir haberde Dünya Bankası ve IMF’nin ÖFK’ların yasal çerçevesinin 
çizilmesini istediği yönünde haber var. Bu isteğin Müsteşarlığın ‘ÖFKları bankacılık 
kanununa almalı’ ifadesinde etkisi var mı bilemiyoruz. Zaman’daki yazarlar ve Milliyet’te 
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bir akademisyenin görüşüne göre ise vergi tasarısının ÖFK’lara rekabet avantajı sağladığı 
yönündeki tartışmalar ‘işin politik tarafı’, çünkü ‘ÖFK’ların payı sistemde sadece %3’. 
Milliyet’te 3. ÖFK Kuveyt Türk’ün açılışına dair çıkan tek haberde, Zaman 
gazetesindeki haberlere benzer şekilde, Kuveyt Türk yetkilisi kurumun ekonomik 
faydalarını vurgulamış (işsizlere iş; devlete döviz sağlayacak; enflasyonu düşürecek). 
Yine bir haberde bir akademisyen tarafından günümüzde İslami bankacılığın 
olamayacağı ifade edilmiş (Gerekçe: Herşeyde faiz var. ‘Kapitalist sistemde İslamı 
yaşamak mümkün olmadığı gibi faizsiz bankacılık da mümkün değildir’. Ayrıca ‘İslam’da 
bankaları devlet kurar, kişilere verilmez’). Zaman’da daha ziyade fıkıhçıların ifade ettiği 
gibi, İslami bankaların sadece paranın toplandığı yerler olmadığı, düzenin, İslam’ın 
öngördüğü biçimde işlemesini sağlayan en önemli araçlar olduğu vurgulanmış, ‘duality’den 
bahsedilmiş ve fakat Zaman gazetesinden farklı olarak kapitalist sistemde İslami bankacılık 
olamayacağı, ÖFK'ların İslam ekonomisini kapitalistleştirme işlevi gördüğünü söylemiş. 
Yine bir haberde Vakıflar Bankasının Kuveyt Türk’ün ortakları arasında olmasından 
hareketle ‘faizsiz çalıştığını öne süren bir banka, faizle çalışan bir bankayla ortak olursa ne 
olur?, faiz bulaşır mı’ sorgusu yapılmış ve ÖFK’ların hep kar etmesi şüpheli bulunmuş. !
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